U.S. President Barack Obama's two-day stay in Korea should be the most stress-free leg of his four-nation East Asian swing ― after dealing with unyielding Japan and almost arrogant China.
Even before the U.S. leader made his maiden visit here, Seoul gave him an important ``present" ― the sharp expansion of the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan and re-dispatch of troops to protect it from Taliban insurgency. What Obama would give in return seems less tangible, probably reiteration of previous commitments concerning the North Korean nuclear issue and bilateral trade accord.
President Lee Myung-bak and his administration want to get U.S. assurance that it will not revisit the bilateral free trade agreement but the prospects are not that bright, considering the rising unemployment among American workers and complaints the U.S. Congress about what it regards as an unbalanced auto trade.
So it may be safe to say the two leaders will end up reaffirming their will and efforts for the early ratification of the so-called KORUS FTA by their respective legislature. The delay, however, may prove to be not so unilaterally disadvantageous for Seoul, given the accord's fine print.
Far easier to get for Lee will be Obama's formal approval for the Korean leader's recent proposal of a ``grand bargain," in which the allies are supposed to seek a ``one-shot" solution instead of the previous step-by-step tactic in dealing with the decades-old North Korean nuclear crisis, as it is not much different from Washington's comprehensive approach - at least on the face of it.
The problem is both the grand bargain and comprehensive approach will not likely succeed in making any difference to North Korea's attitude. For instance, although the U.S. administration has made it clear that the visit to North Korea by Ambassador Steven Bosworth scheduled for early December is to persuade Pyongyang to come back to the dialogue table, North Korean officials seem to expect to have some substantive bargaining from it as the precondition to rejoin the six-party talks.
Obama and Chinese President Hu Jintao agreed to strive to solve North Korea's nuclearization ``peacefully," and ``through dialogue and negotiation." Underneath the diplomatic rhetoric, the U.S. leader seems to have fallen short of winning his Chinese counterpart's agreement to serve as a more cooperative leverage ― or stick ― in pressurizing Pyongyang.
This means if Lee and Obama fail to come up with more detailed carrots in Thursday's summit ― which is highly unlikely ― there will be little progress from their tete-a-tete in Washington, D.C., in June when the two leaders voiced their disapproval of the recalcitrance of the communist regime but didn't present any alternative plans for a breakthrough.
Summit meetings and the following announcements tend to be largely formalities, and more important talks are often made behind doors. The Korean leader is advised in this regard not to call for his U.S. counterpart to refrain from rushing the bilateral dialogue with Pyongyang. Sometimes it seems as if Lee and his administration are too active when they should be rather passive, such as in unprepared globalization, while they are passive when they should be active, such as in dialogue with North Korea.
This could not only aggravate the inter-Korean relationship but also embarrass its allies.