President Lee Myung-bak returns home today from what his aides say was another ``tremendously successful'' U.S. visit: We beg to differ.
It was certainly reassuring to see Lee and U.S. President Barack Obama vow ― once again ― to ``completely denuclearize'' the Korean Peninsula by never accepting North Korea as a nuclear power and leaving it no other choice but to return to the dialogue table.
Frustratingly absent in their rhetoric was ``how'' they would do it, particularly if all diplomatic and financial sanctions fail to change the recalcitrant regime, as has been the case since 1994. Cheong Wa Dae officials confirm such concerns, saying only that both Seoul and Washington are now in a ``sanctioning mode'' ― but not adding much.
Equally relieving was Washington's renewed pledge to provide ``extended deterrence,'' or a nuclear umbrella in plainer terms. Yet, all Koreans have taken such a return service for granted ― whether in words or documents ― since Seoul abandoned its right to develop nuclear weapons, and if it is to maintain the no-nuclear policy in the future, too.
So its express stipulation is feared to only enhance North Korea's justification to develop atomic bombs for its own ``deterrence'' rather than scaring it to abstain from nuclear saber-rattling.
Most ambiguous ― if not downright empty ― of all was the much-trumpeted ``joint vision of the alliance,'' which Lee's aides say would upgrade the bilateral relationship to political, economic, social and cultural cooperation, raising a question over whether these officials could explain what this means exactly and specifically.
While the so-called gains the President has won are abstract, redundant and theoretical like these, his ``losses'' appear quite clear and concrete. President Obama virtually rejected his South Korean counterpart's pressure for the early implementation of the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, saying he ``would not put the cart before the horse.''
Seen not from a national but universal standpoint, the U.S. leader was to the point by making clear that what's important is not how soon but how fair and effective its implementation should be. Even presuming an FTA is a win-win trade game, Obama tried to maximize the U.S. portion of the win, while it is doubtful whether Lee has done the same.
No less regrettable was Lee's unnecessary challenge against Pyongyang with respect to the drifting Gaeseong Industrial Complex by all but threatening to shut it down if the North keeps making excessive demands. It defies our understanding why the South Korean leader had to aggravate the completely inter-Korean issue in the U.S. capital even if someone raised the question.
A South Korean president who ignores the dual nature of North Korea as both a rival and cooperator seriously reduces his or her own room for diplomatic maneuver on the multilateral stage.
President Lee, who has kept eroding his own radius of diplomatic initiative with hard-line North Korea policy, seems to have removed almost all the remaining room through his latest U.S. visit. Now all he can do may be to hope for the best intention from friends and foes alike.