COLUMN Seoul should consider joining UK-France-led Hormuz mission

Korea faces a dilemma over whether to deploy military assets to the Strait of Hormuz. The alliance with the United States is too important for Seoul to simply disregard Washington’s request for a military contribution. At the same time, dispatching a warship would carry serious consequences. Such a deployment could be interpreted as Korea joining U.S. military action against Iran, unnecessarily turning Tehran into an adversary.

The multinational maritime mission being developed by the United Kingdom and France deserves close attention. Early reports indicated that roughly 15 countries were involved in operational planning, while a considerably larger number later joined diplomatic consultations and expressed political support. Korea has also endorsed an international statement calling for freedom of navigation in the Strait and has discussed possible contributions with the United States, Britain and France. Seoul’s choice, therefore, need not be reduced to a simple question of accepting or rejecting a U.S. request.

The most important feature of the U.K.-France initiative is its stated effort to distinguish itself from U.S. military operations against Iran. Its purpose is not to attack or retaliate against Iran, but to ensure the safe passage of civilian vessels and remove mines and other threats to navigation. The proposed mission would focus on defensive activities such as merchant-vessel escorts, mine clearance and maritime and aerial surveillance. It is also intended to begin only after a ceasefire, consent by the relevant parties and other conditions necessary for a sufficiently permissive operational environment are in place.

That distinction is crucial for Korea. Sending a Korean warship to support U.S. operations against Iran would carry a fundamentally different political and military meaning from joining a multinational effort to restore an international sea lane. The former would expose Seoul to accusations that it had effectively become a party to America’s war. The latter could be justified as international cooperation to protect a global public good vital to the world economy.

The Strait of Hormuz is not a distant issue for Korea. Last year, 61 percent of the country’s crude oil imports passed through the waterway. Prolonged instability would raise not only oil and liquefied natural gas prices but also shipping, logistics and manufacturing costs. The resulting shock could spread to consumer prices and weaken the competitiveness of Korean exports. Freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz is therefore not merely an American interest. It is directly connected to Korea’s economic and national security.

Rather than responding to Washington’s request with an immediate deployment, Seoul should pursue a phased approach based on four principles.

First, hostilities must have effectively ended. If fighting continues or is likely to resume, the dispatch of a Korean warship could be interpreted not as protection of a sea lane but as military support for one of the belligerents. Korea should not place its ships and service members at unacceptable risk merely in the name of alliance solidarity.

Second, the mission must have a genuinely multinational framework and a clearly neutral character. Korea should not deploy alone or place its forces directly within the command structure of U.S. operations against Iran. A broader international framework involving nonbelligerent states such as Britain and France, with clearly defined missions and command relationships, would be preferable.

The label “multinational,” however, is not sufficient by itself. Seoul must determine whether the mission is truly separate from U.S. combat operations in terms of intelligence, command and logistics. It must also verify whether Iran, Oman and other coastal states have agreed to, or at least acquiesced in, the mission. If Iran rejects the presence of foreign forces altogether, a multinational deployment could itself become the source of another confrontation.

Third, Korea’s role must be strictly limited. Any Korean contribution should be confined to defensive missions such as escorting merchant vessels, detecting and clearing mines, maritime surveillance, search and rescue, and logistical support. The deployment authorization should clearly specify the mission and rules of engagement to prevent its expansion into attacks on Iranian territory or military facilities, a naval blockade or support for offensive operations. Any substantial enlargement of the mission should require renewed approval by the National Assembly.

Fourth, the deployment must be subject to democratic oversight. Sending troops abroad is a grave decision involving the lives of service members and Korea’s relations with other countries. The government should not seek to create the effect of a new deployment simply by expanding the operational area of the existing Cheonghae anti-piracy unit. Instead, it should explain the mission’s purpose, duration, size, command relationships, rules of engagement and withdrawal conditions to the public and obtain the consent of the National Assembly.

This process should not be viewed merely as an obstacle that delays action. Parliamentary approval could strengthen the government’s negotiating position by allowing Seoul to insist on clearly defined limits and an equitable sharing of risks before committing its forces.

The Washington-Seoul alliance remains the central pillar of Korea’s security. Korea has never taken its alliance responsibilities lightly. It deployed more than 320,000 personnel on a cumulative basis during the Vietnam War. During the Gulf War, it sent a medical support unit and an airlift unit. It dispatched engineering, medical and reconstruction forces to Iraq and provided reconstruction, medical and security support in Afghanistan. Korea has shouldered considerable responsibilities and sacrifices as a U.S. ally and a participant in multinational security operations.

A mature alliance, however, does not require one ally to automatically follow every military action taken by the other. It should be a partnership in which both countries respect each other’s national interests and domestic constraints, consult in advance and share responsibilities where a clearly defined common threat or interest exists.

The current military campaign against Iran was not undertaken on the basis of prior strategic consultations or joint planning with Korea. Nor were both allies subjected to a common armed attack. Pressuring Seoul to join such a war without adequate consultation could fuel anti-American sentiment and alliance fatigue within Korea, ultimately weakening the long-term foundation of the alliance.

A U.K.-France-led multinational mission could offer a practical way out of this dilemma. It would allow Seoul to demonstrate to Washington that it is not ignoring either an ally’s concerns or the threat to navigation through Hormuz. At the same time, Korea could explain to Iran that it is not joining a war against Tehran but contributing to a neutral, defensive mission intended to restore the safety of an international sea lane.

Washington should also respect Seoul’s previous contributions and current constraints. It should not treat a Korean deployment as an automatic alliance obligation. Before requesting military participation, the United States should carefully consult Korea on the common objective, legal basis, scope of the mission, command arrangements and distribution of risk. Drawing an ally into a war it did not choose and was not adequately consulted about does not strengthen an alliance. It erodes trust.

The appropriate course for Seoul is clear: Korea should remain cautious about joining U.S. combat operations against Iran while contributing responsibly to an international effort to restore a vital maritime route. If four conditions are met — an effective cessation of hostilities, a genuinely multinational and neutral framework, a limited defensive mission and democratic oversight by the National Assembly — a UK-France-led mission could protect Korea’s national interests without undermining its alliance with the United States.

The essential question in Hormuz is not simply whether Korea should deploy. What matters more is with whom it goes, when it goes, for what purpose and under what conditions.

Retired Navy Captain Moon Keun-sik is an adjunct professor at the Graduate School of Public Policy of Hanyang University in Seoul.