Dangers of process-light diplomacy with North Korea

Troy Stangarone

Ever since U.S. Donald Trump won his first term as president, some observers have hoped that his unconventional approach could lead to a breakthrough with North Korea. But after more than five years in office across two terms, the record of Trump’s negotiating style suggests any future talks could create more opportunities for Pyongyang than progress towards resolving the nuclear issue.

During Trump’s first term, the administration largely followed a conventional foreign policy approach, even if Trump’s willingness to meet with Kim Jong-un was unconventional. The administration appointed Stephen Biegun as special envoy and he built a team to manage negotiations with Pyongyang.

Ultimately, it was North Korea’s approach to the talks that contributed to the failures in Hanoi. By pushing nearly every decision to the Trump-Kim meeting, Pyongyang entered the summit with no assurances of success and miscalculated by presenting Trump with a proposal he could not accept.

Trump’s second term, however, is not a continuation of the first and it creates vulnerabilities that North Korea can exploit. The administration is less constrained by traditional policymaking structures. Trump’s chief of staff, Susie Wiles, has said that her job is not to restrain Trump but to facilitate his agenda. As a result, the administration’s approach to foreign policy has become more personalized and less process‑driven than in prior administrations.

Less than two years into his second term, three major sets of negotiations demonstrate the shift in Trump’s approach: the trade deals precipitated by the administration’s increased tariffs, the administration’s efforts to end the war in Ukraine and its negotiations with Iran before the war and now to reach a permanent peace. Each case suggests that a desire for quick results, minimal process and limited expertise has constrained the administration’s negotiating capacity.

Take the trade negotiations. The administration prioritized speed over legality, imposing tariffs under two trade laws that courts have ruled were improperly used. That speed pushed countries to negotiate, but the absence of a clear legal framework has left the administration seeking to reverse-engineer its tariffs to preserve the trade deals.

Despite Trump’s claims of being a master dealmaker, the trade deals have largely ended up where one would expect based on the leverage of the individual parties. Countries with limited leverage, such as Indonesia, agreed to detailed commitments. The text of the U.S.-Indonesia trade deal runs 45 pages. For South Korea, Japan and the European Union, which had more leverage, shorter agreements were concluded that deferred key details. China, meanwhile, used its own leverage over the supply chains of critical minerals to negotiate Trump to a draw.

These agreements highlight the limits of Trump’s approach when dealing with countries that have leverage and are less dependent on the United States. They also show the risks of moving too quickly without a structured process.

North Korea’s leverage has grown since Trump and Kim met in Hanoi. Pyongyang has further advanced its nuclear weapons program while deepening its relationship with Russia, a partnership that is weakening sanctions and providing economic and security benefits. Its lack of economic ties with the United States reduces Washington’s coercive power. This leaves North Korea in a stronger position than U.S. allies to resist pressure, and it is more likely to exploit the absence of a clear negotiating plan.

The administration’s approach to Ukraine further illustrates the pitfalls of a personalized style. During the campaign, Trump claimed he could end the war in a single day. Setting aside his tendency toward exaggeration, the process put in place was flawed. Steve Witkoff, a longtime business associate of Trump’s, was tasked with leading negotiations with Russia. Lacking expertise on the conflict, he proved ineffective, while U.S. pressure focused more on Ukraine than on Russia. The war continues with no resolution in sight.

A similar pattern emerged with Iran. Prior to the war, Witkoff and Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, engaged Tehran in talks over its nuclear program, despite lacking the technical and diplomatic expertise required for high-stakes nuclear negotiations. This lack of technical expertise may have contributed to the decision to begin the war.

Since the war began, Trump has repeatedly claimed it would be over quickly, despite realities on the ground. He has also claimed success in securing a pledge by Iran to not develop nuclear weapons, something Tehran has done repeatedly in the past and committed to in writing as part of the nuclear agreement with the Obama administration.

Presumably, North Korea has learned from the failure of Hanoi and overemphasizing direct Trump-Kim talks. To prevent another public breakdown, it will likely try to lock in significant details before any summit. But without a return to a more traditional U.S. negotiating process, Pyongyang could exploit talks with less prepared negotiators. Pyongyang could also take advantage of Trump’s desire to oversell accomplishments.

These factors suggest that without a significantly different approach, any renewed talks between the Trump administration and North Korea are unlikely to achieve significant results.

Troy Stangarone is the director of the Hyundai Motor-Korea Foundation Center for Korean History and Public Policy and the deputy director of the Indo-Pacific Program at the Woodrow Wilson Center.