N. Korea's new strategy

By Tong Kim

This column was written before North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's New Year's announcement that will impact the prospect of nuclear diplomacy and the security situation on the Korean Peninsula for 2020. Christmas passed without any onerous gift that North Korean officials threatened to deliver.

North Korea may have missed the Christmas mark. But they were winning in the psychological war against the United States. Last week, a false alarm went off regarding North Korean provocation on a U.S. Army post in South Korea, and the Japanese NHK filed a false missile launch.

Guarding against a possible missile launch, the U.S. has mobilized the most advanced surveillance aircraft on and around the peninsula. Some American generals were talking about revisiting military options prepared for the height of tensions in 2017. CNN reported that the U.S. forces were “authorized” in advance to use force in response to an actual provocation: not a very credible report.

In the lead up to Christmas, the media outlets were inundated with analyses of just what that Christmas gift might be. It all started with Ri Thae-song, North Korea's vice foreign minister in charge of U.S. affairs, who said in early December: “What is left to be done now is the U.S. option and it is entirely up to the U.S. what Christmas gift it will select to get.”

It appears that many read too much and got too hyped-up over the vice minister's rhetoric, linking it to Kim Jong-un's arbitrary year-end deadline. Kim has said if the U.S. makes no new concessions, he would take an undefined “new path.” At this point, the North Korean warriors seem to have yielded more than expected.

But Ri Thae-song is only one of Pyongyang's several officials managing foreign affairs. The North uses a variety of sources to issue statements (of policy or position) according to importance ― starting from a spokesman's answer to a question posed by the North's official Korean Central News Agency, then going up the ladder to the director-general for U.S. affairs, the chief nuclear negotiator, the vice minister in charge of U.S. affairs, the vice foreign minister, the foreign minister, the foreign ministry adviser, heads of other government organizations, and ultimately to the top level of Chairman Kim Jong-un.

In hindsight, it should have been noted that the implicit threat of Ri's statement was watered down by the People's Army general staff chief, Pak Jong-chon Dec. 14, who, probably having more authority to speak on missile or nuclear matters, said, “We should be ready for dialogue and confrontation,” whichever Kim Jong-un chooses.

The undelivered Christmas gift would hardly have been a “beautiful vase” which Trump may have dreamed of, albeit the U.S. president also warned that whatever provocation the North Korean leader may wage, it will be met “successfully.” It could have been Kim's return to nuclear and long-range missile tests or to terminate nuclear negotiations.

As of this writing, North Korea is yet to convene an expanded party meeting to “discuss and decide on grave issues” of the North. Their policy decisions are contemplated by a very small inner group and, once adopted, they are announced in the name of the leader. They go through the formality of endorsement from rubber stamp organizations ― whether a party apparatus or a people's assembly.

Their priority is the protection and survival of their system, primarily through continuing political indoctrination, improving military capability, and maintaining a minimal level of wellbeing for the people. The North understands that there are a multitude of variables and uncertainties to consider before they will choose their options ― American politics, roles of China, Russia, and South Korea which recently agreed to try to ease crippling sanctions on North Korea.

The North Koreans seem to believe Trump is still their best bet who can help them. They know Trump does not want them to interfere in the 2020 presidential election. While Kim would not help Trump by making concessions on the nuclear issue, he may refrain from launching the type of provocation that will make it more difficult for Trump to win reelection.

They will not make a deal with Trump, uncertain of his political fate. Yet, it is possible that they will maintain a double-edged sword for dialogue and confrontation, pressuring the U.S. to adopt an acceptable position, while refining and increasing their nuclear arsenal, but not testing more nuclear bombs or firing ICBMs. That's the best we can hope for now.

Tong Kim (

tong.kim8@yahoo.com

) is a visiting professor with the University of North Korean Studies, a visiting scholar with Korea University, a fellow at the Institute of Corean-American Studies, and a columnist for The Korea Times.