Seoul's dilemma on N. Korea

By Tong Kim

Tensions are rising again in Korea, albeit slowly, since North Korea conducted the testing of short-range ballistic missiles on May 4 and May 9, including a North Korean version of a low-flying Russian missile, the Iskander, that flew over 420 kilometers, out of the ranges of missile defense systems deployed in South Korea.

Kim Jong-un's return to a calculated show of force coincides with no imminent prospect of resurrecting denuclearization talks and with a series of U.S. actions Pyongyang sees as hostile to it: including the seizure of a North Korean cargo ship for exporting coal in violation of UN and U.S. sanctions, a State Department press statement criticizing human rights abuses in the North, and the U.S. Air Force testing an ICBM that it said was unrelated to North Korea.

On May 14, a North Korean foreign ministry spokesperson issued a statement of protest, demanding an immediate release of the North Korean ship “forcibly taken to the U.S. territory of Samoa.” The statement censured the application of the U.S. domestic law in the “unlawful and outrageous dispossession.” It warned, the U.S. “should ponder over the consequences its heinous act might have on the future developments.”

Kim Jong-un has been telling a universal rationale to his military and the people that protection of peace requires a strong military force. His propaganda outlets justified the recent missile tests saying they were only part of a routine military exercise. The North had not conducted missile launches since November 2017 when it announced its self-imposed moratorium on any additional long-range missile or nuclear tests.

Recently, Pyongyang has complained about a revival of joint U.S.-South Korean military exercises in the name of “dongmaeng” (alliance) instead of the Foal Eagle and the Freedom Guardian, readjusting the scope and withholding nuclear capable strategic assets from participating in the joint exercises.

Pyongyang accuses Seoul and Washington of violating their agreements: the inter-Korean summit agreements between President Moon and Kim in which both sides agreed not to conduct military exercises in the DMZ and Trump's commitment to Kim at Singapore to end “provocative joint drills”.

To make it worse, North Korea seems to believe that Washington is committed to “overthrow its system” by maximum pressure from a combination of military threats, economic sanctions, and human rights pressure. The North accuses the U.S. of acting against its Singapore promise to end hostile policies, and improve relations.

Yet, diplomacy has a role to manage the currently precarious situation and to develop a positive hope. Fortunately, President Trump believes the trust he has with the North Korean leader was not breached by Kim's launch of short-range missiles: He still hopes to make a deal. Kim promised to wait until the end of the year.

By now, we know neither the Trumpian demand for an early, comprehensive ridding of the North Korean nuclear/missile arsenal nor Kim's step-by-step reciprocal path without an agreed timeline is going to work. Everybody knows the two negotiating protagonists will have to make some concessions acceptable to the other side, if they want to make progress.

By the end of June, President Trump will visit Seoul after attending the annual G-20 summit in Japan. Two years into the Korean presidency, Moon Jae-in still has solid support for his North Korea policy at home, especially from progressive forces.

His approval rate runs up and down around 45 percent, despite his struggle with a poor economic performance. A rising trend of the opposition Liberty Korea Party that generally opposes Moon's approach to the North is a political challenge that he is not expected to overcome easily. Yet, full and open discussion of the government's North Korea policy must be followed to minimize the opposition, even if that may not neutralize it.

Last week President Moon made two right decisions, showing his genuine interest in keeping a good relations with the North: to provide $8 million in humanitarian food aid through world organizations and to allow South Korean businessmen to visit the Gaeseong Industrial Complex to inspect their production equipment and facilities which were closed three years ago.

Until his next meeting with Trump, Moon has time to review and analyze the core issues of the nuclear stalemate and craft a new, concrete approach to North Korea. The new approach should constitute a compromise of differences that is acceptable to the U.S. and the DPRK. If there will be no exchange of concessions from their current positions, there will be no peaceful denuclearization.

Perhaps, Seoul should send another special envoy to Pyongyang to convince Kim to accept another inter-Korean summit at Panmunjeom before Moon meets with Trump.

Tong Kim (tong.kim8@yahoo.com) is a Washington correspondent and columnist for The Korea Times. He is also a fellow at the Institute of Corean-American Studies.