What next on denuclearization

By Tong Kim

More than a month has elapsed since the spectacular collapse of the U.S.-North Korea summit in Hanoi, and there is no clear indication of how soon diplomacy will be back on track to tackle the issue of denuclearization, which nobody had ever thought would be resolved easily in a short period of time.

It is clear at this point that the Trump administration wants to re-engage the North soon as possible and to explore the possibility of a third summit to agree on some steps of progress, provided that they be worthy of another summit.

By common sense, President Trump will not repeat at the next summit the offer of the anachronic Libyan model, demanding Kim Jong-un's early unilateral surrender of all North Korean weapons of mass destruction without reasonable rewards. This offer was rejected outright by the North Korean leader in Hanoi.

Since an empty-handed return from Hanoi, where he must have been devastated by Trump's decision against his demand for badly needed sanctions relief, Kim Jong-un has been quiet. Although Pyongyang's vice foreign minister, Choe Sun-hui, has expressed her personal view that Kim might have lost interest in the American way of computation and that he may soon make a grave decision on whether to resume nuclear and missile tests, there has been no official follow up from the regime.

While Kim has absolute authority to make decisions on the matters of life and death in the North Korean system, he is still subject to constraints of the policy lines ingrained by his father and his grandfather. His predecessors, Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, talked about “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” They are also given credit for developing a nuclear weapons deterrent against a foreign invasion.

Kim may be reviewing a range of options including giving up negotiations and going back to the familiar pattern of provocative nuclear and missile development. He learned that the closing of the nuclear infrastructures at Yongbyon that constitute a major portion of the North's nuclear program was not enough for the U.S. to lift the sanctions.

Kim will watch President Moon Jae-in's meeting with President Trump on April 11 and how it plays out for North Korea. Moon has suggested some constructive ideas to promote negotiations between Pyongyang and Washington that focus on “an early harvest” that may not be an “all-in-one” or “good big deal” but “a good-enough deal” by an exchange of what is realistically possible for both sides to do at this point. Moon hopes that initial U.S. corresponding measures include sanctions exemptions for inter-Korean economic projects.

U.S. top diplomat Mike Pompeo repeats that while he seeks a negotiated end state of denuclearization, he makes clear that no sanctions will be lifted until after complete denuclearization. This policy simply will not work, because the North Koreans will not move.

Moon's North Korea envoy, Lee Do-Hoon, shared an accurate observation last week, “It's an illusion to expect North Korea to give up its nuclear program all of sudden due to sanctions and pressure only.” He added, “Sanctions can stop the North from making bad decisions but they are not the fundamental tools that can resolve the issue of denuclearization.”

It will be good if the visiting Korean president talks to Congressional leaders and think tank skeptics about his view of what conditions and measures it would take for his North Korean counterpart to contribute to the settlement of peace and denuclearization.

There are many skeptics in Washington who do not believe Kim's public commitment to denuclearization. Yet, a sensible argument is emerging that some new, adjusted modality of negotiation should be considered if anyone wants to make progress or to test the true intent of the North Korean leadership.

The March 26 edition of this column proposed a five-year denuclearization plan, incorporating the two approaches of Washington and Pyongyang that collided in Hanoi. Under the proposed plan, a general road map and a timeline will be agreed on up front, but their implementation will be phased over five years with a gradual sanction lifting as the agreement is being verifiably implemented.

It is a good time to think outside the box in a serious search for a possible path to build a denuclearized, peaceful Korean peninsula. Yes, we hear all kinds of bad stuff about North Korea ― poverty, starvation, dictatorship, oppression, gulags, no freedom, etc. But, 25 million people live there through no fault of their own. The last thing they need is war.

Tong Kim (tong.kim8@yahoo.com) is a Washington correspondent and columnist for The Korea Times. He is also a fellow at the Institute of Corean-American Studies.