Diplomacy back on track

By Tong Kim

There seems to be two types of reaction to the fait accompli that a second U.S.-North Korea summit will be held near the end of February in a country, already decided on, but to be announced later with more details: cautious optimism and skepticism.

These reactions come from a decade-long history of North Korean behavior and the lack of confidence in the North's commitment to denuclearization. Plausible reports that the North is continuing to produce fissile materials and delivery systems, while operating undeclared missile bases, supports the validity of skepticism.

The Washington Post warned about Trump's next meeting with Kim Jong-un: “But the danger is that Kim will use a second summit to persuade a gullible U.S. president to yield valuable concessions in return for fool's gold.”

On Jan. 23, Kim Yong-chol, Pyongyang's chief negotiator with Washington, reported to Kim on the result of his meeting with President Trump at the White House on Jan 18. According to the North Korean Central News Agency, Kim “expressed great satisfaction” with a personal letter from Trump.

The KCNA quoted Kim as saying, “we will believe in the positive way of thinking of President Trump, wait with patience and in good faith and, together with the U.S., advance step by step toward the goal to be reached by the two countries of the DPRK and the U.S.” Kim did not elaborate on “the goal.”

A three-day conference in Stockholm last week among the two Koreas and the U.S. does not seem to have produced anything concrete with respect to the upcoming summit or new steps toward denuclearization. According to the Swedish foreign minister, the conference in Stockholm dealt with vague and broad subjects such as “trust building,” “economic development,” and “long-term engagement.”

A second summit will take place in about a month, probably in Vietnam. The big question is what kind of a deal the summit will be able to pull off. There is a consensus that the next summit must deliver something more concrete that can actually contribute to denuclearization. Yet, it is doubtful that the working group talks will reach any significant, substantive agreement for their leaders to accept. They can make a summit arrangement for logistics and a broad agenda.

The U.S. demand for a timeline for denuclearization or a declaration of the North's nuclear arsenal may have to be reconsidered as a matter of sequencing denuclearization steps in a practical order, tackling easy issues first. What the North wants in return for their possible concession is a relaxed sanctions regime, more urgently than a war ending declaration or discussion of a peace regime.

Even if Kim wants to shift to the economy from nuclear development, he just cannot overcome the negative impact of stifling sanctions. He knows his people want a better economy and more food. Kim knows he cannot meet their wishes under the increasing sanctions. The number one “corresponding measure” that he wants from the U.S. and the international community is to lift the sanctions imposed against the North. However, there are good reasons to keep the sanctions in place, until after good progress is made in denuclearization.

Among North Korea watchers in Seoul and Washington, there are floating theories and speculation on how the issue of denuclearization should or can be handled. These theories do not exclude a “big deal” for “a final, fully-verified denuclearization.” However, the theory of a “big deal” seems to lack the details of a comprehensive road map.

On the other hand, the theory of “a small deal” argues that as the U.S. offers small steps such as to ease the sanctions for the Gaeseong Industrial Complex and other inter-Korean economic cooperation, the North will invite inspectors to verify its destroyed sites for nuclear and missile tests, and will dismantle the Yongbyon nuclear facility under inspection. Pyongyang will also suspend expanding its nuclear and missile arsenal.

A part of the small deal package could include the dismantlement of a small number of ICBMs, while leaving nuclear warheads untouched until the next stage of denuclearization. The problem with this approach is that under this deal, the North will keep short and mid-range missiles that threaten South Korea and Japan.

In addition, a tradeoff between permanent suspension of U.S. strategic military exercises on the Korean peninsula and North Korea's permanent end to nuclear and missile tests is also a thinkable idea, as an early step moving along the process of denuclearization.

Tong Kim (tong.kim8@yahoo.com) is a Washington correspondent and columnist for The Korea Times. He is also a fellow at the Institute of Corean-American Studies.