Contending theories on N. Korea

By Tong Kim

Diplomacy is at a stalemate again on denuclearization, casting more doubt over its ability to pull off an acceptable end state of negotiations. No nuclear talks have taken place since last month. It is not known when there will be a next meeting, while there remain a number of sticking points against moving forward.

The North has been avoiding meetings with the U.S. It cancelled a meeting between secretary of state Mike Pompeo and his counterpart Kim Yong-chol scheduled for early November, and it did not respond to a U.S. request to hold another meeting toward the end of November. The prospect of a second U.S.-DPRK summit appears uncertain in the absence of preparatory meetings.

In October, Kim Jong-un agreed with Pompeo to set up a working group at an envoy level but the group has not met. In contrast, a U.S. and South Korean working group has met in Washington to make sure that Seoul is not moving too fast in inter-Korean relations ahead of the pace of denuclearization, a new development to the displeasure of the North.

In Seoul, Kim Jong-un's return visit now is unlikely to happen before the end of this year. In President Moon's meeting with Trump in Argentina during this year's G-20 summit, the pair will likely have discussed cooperation to achieve the goal of denuclearization, but not a new strategy. Washington will not relax or lift sanctions before complete denuclearization.

At the United Nations, its Third Committee adopted a resolution blasting the human rights abuses in North Korea, with Seoul's endorsement. The resolution is likely to be approved by the General Assembly with support of the U.N. Security Council. Pyongyang accuses the U.S. of “stoking confrontation,” warning Seoul and Washington that their “rash acts” against the North “will make everything go belly-up given the hard-won phase of repairing relations” with the North.

In the meantime, a dominant school of thought holds the view that “complete denuclearization” is not achievable with the current tool of diplomacy backed up by sanctions, since the North will not abandon its nuclear weapons anyway. The North's vague commitment to a nuclear-free Korean peninsula without a credible road map is simply getting nowhere.

At the end the North will likely seek to keep some of its nuclear arsenal. This theory will require a redefined goal from “a final, fully verified denuclearization” to a partial but verifiable arms reduction, offering a de facto nuclear status to North Korea, under the strict condition that it will become a responsible, limited nuclear state renouncing further development and proliferation. The problem with this idea is that North Korea is a country that has developed and threatened to use its nuclear weapons in blatant disregard of international law.

A second school of thought believes the maximum pressure ― employing all pressure tools, including sanctions, military force and information programs ― is the only way to strangle the North Korean regime until it caves in with no other option but to denuclearize. For this school, war is an option, not necessarily the last resort. Regime change or unification by Seoul's term are other options for hardliners.

However, the imaginable cost of a nuclear war should discourage any warmongers. Regime change by explosion or implosion also risks a war as the regime may resort to it for survival. A peaceful, democratic unification is still a remote dream: there is no viable, peaceful unification strategy except for absorption upon the North's soft collapse from within.

A third school of thought advocates for a peaceful resolution of the North's nuclear issue through a phased, reciprocal and verifiable denuclearization. Trump has said “no hurry” and “no rush” on denuclearization, and he has not closed the window of opportunity, while South Korea, China and Russia are supporting a peaceful resolution. The process of denuclearization may not be completed within Trump's first term in office, but an irreversible state for the nuclear arsenal could be accomplished.

How and under what conditions the North will decide to give up its nuclear weapons will determine the fate of its leadership. There may be differences between Kim Jong-un and his subordinates on this matter of life and death. His advisers are reluctant to offer bold recommendations, fearful of losing their lives should their advice fail.

Kim may need a justification for making critical moves in the direction of denuclearization, a good cause that can keep the people's support for his regime. At this point, he needs something more than a U.S. promise for “a bright future of North Korea.” Something more tangible.

Tong Kim (tong.kim8@yahoo.com) is a Washington correspondent and columnist for The Korea Times. He is also a fellow at the Institute of Corean-American Studies.