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By Tong Kim
Pressure on North Korea has been mounting since its defiant nuclear test on Jan. 6, followed by a satellite launch last week, which is regarded by the West as a missile development test. While the UN Security Council has yet to adopt an additional resolution to sanction the North Korean provocations, a series of significant actions have been taken by Seoul and Washington.
The South Korean government closed the Gaeseong Industrial Complex (GIC). Pyongyang responded by expelling South Korean workers from the complex, putting it under military control. This all happened within a span of 24 hours after Seoul announced its decision to close the GIC. Immediately afterwards, the South cut off its supply of electricity and water to the industrial complex, which also benefits the families of the North Korean workers in the area.
The U.S. Congress passed a tough unilateral sanction legislation to punish anyone involved in North Korea’s nuclear and missile development, arms-related materials, luxury goods, and cyber attack activities. Under this new authority, the administration could sanction Chinese banks and trade firms doing business with the North, which account for 90% of North Korea’s trade.
Seoul also decided to support the deployment of a THAAD battery by the U.S. forces in Korea, at the risk of diplomatic deterioration with China, its largest trading partner. The THAAD issue could hurt Seoul’s trade with Beijing. Through the conversations between Washington and Beijing, including a foreign ministerial meeting that took place in Munich, Germany last week, it is clear that China would not go along with Washington and its allies in Seoul and Tokyo to support the toughest possible UN resolution against Pyongyang.
Beijing still argues in favor of dialogue to bring the North back to the six-party talks. The Chinese believe that THAAD undermines its security interest, dismissing the U.S.-ROK claims that the missile defense system is not targeting China but only for defense against North Korean threats.
Sooner or later China will have to accept a new multilateral sanction resolution that would not compromise its interest in a stable Korean peninsula. The Chinese understand that sanctions alone would not end the North Korean obsession with nuclear weapons. Beijing would not agree to a resolution to punish Chinese businesses doing business with North Korea. Sanctions will bring more hardships to the North Korean people, instead of forcing the regime to capitulate to pressure from them.
Many Americans, including Republican presidential candidates such as Donald Trump and Ted Cruz, believe that if Washington pressures Beijing hard enough, China would be forced to resolve the nuclear issues, either by getting rid of Kim Jong-un or by changing his regime. There is no disagreement that China has the most influence on the North. But, they failed again to stop another rocket lunch by the North Koreans.
The two Koreas always distrusted each other even during the heyday of inter-Korean relations under the presidencies of Kim Dae-Jung and Rho Moo-Hyun who pursued policies of engagement. After the closing of the Gaeseong Industrial Complex, both sides became angry at each other. Pyongyang’s “committee for the unification of the fatherland” employed the b word in reference to the South Korean president in its response to Seoul’s decision on Gaeseong.
In a follow up, the Seoul government announced the suspension of all humanitarian assistance to the North, including its contributions to international humanitarian programs to help infants and their mothers suffering malnutrition. Pyongyang closed all military communication channels across the Demilitarized Zone. Right now, the only communication left available would be public announcement or sending a message through a third country conduit.
From a humanitarian perspective, the closure of the GIC takes away jobs from 54,000 North Korean employees, depriving the workers and their families ― an estimated 200,000 people ― of their means of living. The Pyongyang regime was taking about 30-40% of the wages paid to the workers, whose average income was around $75 a month. The total revenue was $88 million for the North and $500 million for the South.
The amount that North Korea was getting from Gaeseong was only a fraction of the one billion dollars that it earns from trade. Seoul’s unification minister said last Friday that his government has “confidential materials” that show that the money from GIC was used for Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs.” This was the first time that the government made such an allegation.
After the latest round of North Korean provocations, the Park government has given up all of its pronounced policy approaches to the North ― “trust building,” “building a foundation for peaceful unification,” “a peace park in DMZ,” “security cooperation for East Asia,” “ an Eurasia Initiative,” and “unconditional humanitarian assistance to the North Korean people.” The South gave up GIC, which served as a safety pin against military conflict and a successful model of inter-Korean economic cooperation.
Here is what is most likely to happen. If the North and the South do not stop and think to do something to get out of this crisis, tensions will continue to escalate out of control. It is quite likely that the North Korean military will bring back its forces to the Gaeseong area, located only about 60 kilometers from Seoul, armed with long-range artillery and multiple rocker launching units to threaten the densely populated capital city of the South, which is within range of their fire power, without resorting to long-range missiles or nuclear weapons.
Military tension and confrontations will accelerate an arms race on and around the peninsula. A reemergence of the Cold War structure with North Korea, China, Russia on the one side and South Korea, Japan, and the United States on the other side will be a matter of time, not direction.
The problem is that the current direction toward sanctions, deterrent, and confrontation will only lead to a more dangerous and more unstable security situation on the peninsula. Measures that intensify tensions do not contribute to curbing the North Korean nuclear and missile program. What’s your take?
Tong Kim is a Washington correspondent and columnist for The Korea Times. He is also a fellow at the Institute of Korean-American Studies. He can be contacted at tong.kim8@yahoo.com.