Iran deal's impact on N. Korea

By Tong Kim

In the wake of the Iranian nuclear deal ― a long-term, multi-faceted plan to prevent Iran from making a nuclear weapon ― attention is drawn to the North Korean nuclear issue. Would Pyongyang or Washington try one more time to settle the denuclearization issue through negotiation?

Iran and North Korea are certainly different cases in several ways. Yet, the process of negotiation and the substance detailed in the final agreement reached by P5+1/EU and Iran could suggest how a resumed nuclear negotiation with North Korea might lead to success.

Iran did not develop a nuclear weapon and, if it did, it would pose a security threat to the U.S. and its allies and partners in the Middle East. North Korea is a de facto nuclear weapons state, already threatening U.S. allies in Northeast Asia, and is a potential threat to the security of America.

Washington says it is willing to engage North Korea only in an ``authentic and credible” talk, and only if it is serious about abiding by its commitment to denuclearization. Pyongyang says it will never give up its nuclear weapons and it is committed to a parallel pursuit of nuclear and economic development.

If sanctions brought Iran to the negotiating table as claimed by the Obama administration, the pressure of sanctions has not changed the North’s adherence to nuclear armament. Unlike Iran, North Korea does not have a huge financial asset frozen under sanctions ― multilateral or unilateral ― and it does not have oil to export.

For the next two months, the Obama administration will have its hands full dealing with critics of the deal in Congress and among its allies in order to ensure the implementation of the agreement. Thereafter, it will be busy making sure of an effective implementation of the deal in terms of Iran’s responsibility, verification and inspection, and the conditional phased easing of sanctions.

Washington has negotiated some good agreements with Pyongyang in the past, including the Agreed Framework of 1994 and the 9/15 Joint Statement of the six-party talks, which North Korea was accused of having breached. Some questioned, ``Why should we be cheated again?” or famously ``Why should we buy the same horse twice?”

Besides, President Obama has less than two years left in office. He has already scored two big foreign policy legacies ― Cuba and Iran. Before his first election, he said he would reach out to leaders of adversaries with whom the U.S. had differences for a long time. He has done that, except with North Korea.

The North argues that its survival depends on nuclear deterrent, insisting that it did not cheat, and it has never been paid enough for that horse. The regime saw what happened to Muammar Gaddafi of Libya after he gave up his nuclear program. It believes Saddam Hussein could not protect Iraq from U.S. invasion because he did not have nuclear weapons. Pyongyang does not trust Washington and vice versa.

The recent Iranian deal is based not on trust but on an intricate mechanism of verification. For Pyongyang, it is difficult to develop its economy under the current sanctions and without foreign investment, while pursuing a continuous nuclear program, which drains much of its resources which might otherwise be used for improving the livelihood of its people.

The North Koreans believe their nuclear weapons guarantee their survival from hostile U.S. policies. They should know the U.S. or the South has no intent of invading the North or bringing down their regime by force. For the North to give up its nuclear program, it should first be assured of the survival of its regime and of benefits it would get from it. This process was repeated in the past and the North should know what they would be.

The Iranian deal does not resolve other concerns of the U.S. and its allies and partners in the gulf region such as Iran’s missile program, its support of terrorism and its proxies that destabilize the region, holding American hostages, not to mention human rights abuses. The human rights issue of North Korea and other international concerns can be dealt with separately from the nuclear issue. Pyongyang’s missile program is another important issue that can be discussed separately or as part of a package.

Prior to the Iranian deal, few North Korea watchers in Washington saw any chance that the Obama administration would even take up the North Korean issue, given the bad experience with the North and its pronounced nuclear policy. Most of them thought Obama would turn over the North Korean nuclear issue unfinished to whoever will be the next president.

Under the present circumstances, Washington is unlikely to initiate a new negotiation. An offer of new talks will have to come from Pyongyang. The North should come to the table not as a nuclear state and ready to discuss all aspects of its nuclear program to date. Pyongyang should accept that new talks would be about denuclearization and not about arms reduction.

A new agreement should be as comprehensive and detailed, and contingent upon mutual commitment as the Iranian deal. The past agreements with the North were contained in no more than five pages or so, whereas the Iranian deal is detailed in more than 100 pages. A long-term, phased approach to resolution, even if it would take 10 years or longer, would contribute to building trust and confidence through each step of implementation and verification.

Under Secretary of State Wendy Sherman is given most of the credit for the successful conclusion of the nuclear negotiation with Iran. She directly negotiated with the North Koreans before. She accompanied Secretary of State Madeline Albright when she visited Pyongyang in 2000 for a meeting with Kim Jong-il, the father of Kim Jong-un. She would be the best and the most able negotiator, if there comes another opportunity for talks with North Korea. What’s your take?

Tong Kim is a Washington correspondent and columnist for The Korea Times. He is also a fellow at the Institute of Korean-American Studies.