Pyongyang's statement of position

By Tong Kim

On June 15, marking the 15th anniversary of the joint inter-Korean summit declaration of 2000, the DPRK issued a special “government statement” of its latest position on inter-Korean relations. This statement deserves scrutiny to shed some light on the possible evolution of North-South relations for the rest of President Park Geun-hye’s term.

Among several levels of official statements issued by various North Korean agencies, “government statement” is regarded as the most authoritative and is used only rarely when the government makes grave decisions such as its intent to withdraw from the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1993 or its announcement actually to withdraw from NPT in 2003.

In addition, the latest government statement said it was issued with “authorization” or “commission,” which only the supreme state leader can give, meaning Kim Jong-un personally endorsed the statement. Therefore, any time a North Korean statement carries “authorization,” it represents highest leader’s intent.

The statement consisted of five points that Pyongyang regards as most urgent and important to improve relations with Seoul. Four of the points were the same ones that had been agreed between the sides at different times in the past decades.

They include: (1) an “independent” approach to unification without foreign interference, (2) “no unification by system” of side, (3) ending mutual slander, and (4) creating a favorable atmosphere to improve inter-Korean relations.

The statement said, “If an atmosphere of trust and reconciliation is formed between the North and the South, there is no reason not to hold government to government negotiation,” as if it was offering a renewed proposal of engagement with the South. This sentence was missing from the English version of the same statement published on the KCNA website.

No matter how you read it, the message is a conditional proposal at best, unacceptable to the South, or a rejection of engagement for the reasons the North listed in the statement. The most unacceptable part of Pyongyang’s demands was that South Korea “stop North-targeted war exercises in collusion with the U.S.”

On the other hand, the statement reveals Pyongyang’s perspectives on a range of issues regarding its perceived threat of the combined U.S.-ROK military capabilities demonstrated through various joint exercises. The North Korean leadership, including the military leaders, seems to believe that the South and the U.S. are planning to invade the North, if the North loosens its guard.

“The inter-Korean relations can never improve,” said the statement, as long as the South Korean authorities stage “ceaseless war rehearsals in league with the U.S.” Conscious of South Korean concerns of the North Korean threats, the statement said, “There is no need to feel any uneasiness or fear of the DPRK’s self-defense deterrence and the South should discontinue taking issue with it.”

Earlier this year, Kim Jong-un proposed a trade-off of foregoing a new nuclear test for suspending U.S.-ROK joint exercises. Seoul and Washington rejected this outright. However, that proposal also showed that the exercises are the North’s number one source of perceived threat. During each exercise, the North goes on alert, scared. It is also costly for the North to go through its own response training every time U.S. and South Korean forces conduct joint exercises.

Pyongyang deliberately ignores its own belligerent stance and the fact that it has nuclear and missile capabilities that coerce the South to respond with upgraded war assets and rigorous training and exercises. The U.S. and South Korea alliance has so far successfully deterred a major conflict with the North, at the cost of an arms race.

Also from the statement, one can read that the North has determined that the Park government is pursuing “unification by absorption.” North Korea upholds the June 15 declaration and demands that the South simply carry out the terms of agreement in the declaration, instead of “giving lip service to it.”

The North Korean government statement argued that “co-existence and co-prosperity, irrespective of ideology and system, are the most reasonable way for national unification,” a point of view expressed in the June 15 declaration.

Pyongyang also demanded that the South stop making negative comments about the North’s system of government and that the South removes the legal and institutional barriers to exchanges, visits, and cooperation. These measures, including lifting the May 24 restrictions on inter-Korean relations, if carried out, would help create a favorable atmosphere to improve relations.

However, the Park government would not easily accommodate the North Korean wishes even in non-security areas. It is true that President Park has often sent conflicting messages ranging from tough criticism of the North Korean regime and its nuclear and missile programs and an overture of dialogue and engagement. Pyongyang demanded that the South choose between confrontation and engagement.

There is no disagreement that Seoul’s priority is to seek and secure a stable security environment on the peninsula so the South can concentrate on the economy and the welfare of its people. If security is to rely solely on military measures, it has no limits: an arms race will continue indefinitely, until the leaders realize one day that too much is too much and come to arms reduction talks, as happened during the Cold War.

Every measure of enhancing military capability by the South or any sharp criticism of the North is met with the same North Korean response that it is justified to focus on improving and increasing its nuclear and missile capabilities.

Right now neither Seoul nor Washington has a plan to arrest Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program or to prevent possible proliferation of nuclear weapons and missiles or their technologies. South Korea and the U.S. have only the goal of denuclearization, but no plan. What’s your take?

Tong Kim is a Washington correspondent and columnist for The Korea Times. He is also a fellow at the Institute of Korean-American Studies.