Denuclearization efforts abandoned

By Tong Kim

Since denuclearization efforts ― by all parties including the U.S. and South Korea ― stopped some time ago, the threat of an increasing North Korean nuclear arsenal is becoming even more serious. The Wall Street Journal recently reported that Chinese experts assume that North Korea has about 20 nuclear weapons and that its nuclear arsenal could double by next year.

U.S. assessments thus far have estimated that Pyongyang’s nuclear plants have produced enough fissile material for 10 to 16 bombs. U.S. military planners assume that North Korea has miniaturized a nuclear warhead to mount on missiles that can be launched from a mobile vehicle, known as KN-08.

There is consensus on the urgent need of a resumed denuclearization process for the Korean peninsula. Yet nothing is being done to eliminate the dangerous weapons that are in the hands of North Korea. Pyongyang has repeatedly made clear that it is determined to keep its nuclear weapons as a means of survival and to deter any U.S. invasion and U.S. hostility.

After occasional charm offensives, Pyongyang appears to have lost any interest in serious dialogue either with the incumbent administration in Washington or that in Seoul. The Kim Jong-un regime appears to have secured a firm basis of stability through purges and shuffling of military and party leaders in the past three years. It has improved its economic conditions through some reforms, with private markets prospering across the country.

The North does not desperately seek economic rewards from denuclearization talks. Sanctions affect the North Korean economy, but they do not choke it. The North’s trade with China has increased sharply since 2008 when Seoul cut off its economic cooperation with Pyongyang. International isolation is nothing new to the North’s closed society. Russia, having trouble with the U.S. over the Crimea issue, has become more cooperative with the North politically and economically.

Last week at a Washington think-tank discussion, U.S. envoy for six-party talks Sydney Seiler, expounding the Obama administration’s DPRK policy, gave the reason why the U.S. is not doing anything until the DPRK is ready for “credible and authentic” negotiation to achieve a denuclearized Korean Peninsula according to the Sept. 19 Joint Statement of the six-party talks.

Nowadays, one does not hear phrases like “strategic patience” or “preconditions to the resumption of the six party talks,” or “North Korea’s demonstrated seriousness by action.” Pyongyang says it wants to resume nuclear talks, free of preconditions. However, it wants to come to the table as a nuclear weapons state, which Washington and Seoul will not accept.

Obama’s policy is said to be based on the three principles of “sharpening choices,” “putting alliance first,” and “cooperating with China.” According to the first principle, there are two choices for North Korea to make: “the path to denuclearization and prosperity or its current approach of ignoring its international obligations and deepening isolation.” The first path would provide the North with substantial political, economic and security benefits. The second path would mean continued pressure through tightening sanctions.

Washington is committed to a negotiated resolution. Therefore, it is ready for engagement and talks. Washington is not ideologically opposed to talks. But, talks should be about denuclearization, not about DPRK’s status as a nuclear weapon state or arms reduction. In the meantime, Washington watches the evolution of Pyongyang’s postures and the changing security situation in Korea.

To protect its allies ― South Korea and Japan ― and itself, the U.S. reinforces an allied deterrence to North Korean nuclear threats. The strategy of deterrence includes building an expensive, multilayered missile defense system. Washington thinks it is important to share information with and among its allies regarding the North Korean nuclear and missile threats.

Washington and Beijing are pretty much on the same page when it comes to denuclearization. Both want North Korea to return to serious talks. Both want to maintain a peaceful and stable peninsula for continued prosperity. However, China, as well as Russia, is known to favor resuming talks without preconditions.

Given the bad experience with Pyongyang, Washington may be right in its view that nothing good will come out of unconditional talks, unless the North Koreans choose the path to denuclearization. However, bashing Pyongyang for failing to keep its international obligations that the North Korean regime has publicly renounced as invalid does not help change Pyongyang’s mind. Its obligations under UN sanctions were unilaterally imposed and rejected outright.

The Park government in Seoul is now not doing much either or it is unable to do anything in denuclearization efforts. For two years after it launched an ambitious plan to improve inter-Korean relations through the so-called trust-building process, which if carried out successfully, would contribute to denuclearization, no progress has been made. Yet, somehow, a negative peace is maintained on the peninsula.

The North has vowed to keep increasing its nuclear deterrent, but it has not made good on its threat of a fourth nuclear test. It has not test fired another intercontinental ballistic missile, although it has constantly threatened to attack Seoul, Tokyo and Washington with its nuclear weapons. Maybe the North Korean leadership believes it has shown that it is militarily strong enough that it can forgo another nuclear test. What’s your take?

The writer is the Washington correspondent and columnist for The Korea Times, and an ICAS fellow at the Institute of Corean-American Studies.