AIIB and THAAD

By Tong Kim

Ending an eight-month agony of indecision, South Korea has decided to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) being launched by Beijing, but only after some allies of the U.S. expressed their intention to participate in the bank. Washington had reserved its endorsement for the bank, demanding that it meet international standards for a multinational institute in terms of structural and management transparency.

The AIIB will be established in June, whereas the Asia Development was set up years ago through initiatives from Washington and Tokyo. The emergence of the AIIB reflects China’s growing economic power and influence in the region. China is committed to invest $5 billion in the bank, a half of the $10 billion capital target, while the remainder will be shared by participating countries in proportion to their GDPs.

Certainly, the controversial issue of deploying the THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) system to Korea is not directly related to the decision on the AIIB. It is common knowledge that the THAAD has been opposed by Beijing and the AIIB by Washington.

Some may regard Seoul’s decision on the AIIB as a tradeoff for deployment of the THAAD system, since South Korea depends on the U.S. for security and on China for its economy. The majority of South Koreans believe that their government should maintain good relations with both Washington and Beijing.

From the security perspective, the THAAD is a military issue as its system is designed to protect friendly forces, population centers and critical infrastructure from short- and medium-range missiles, interoperable with other ballistic missile defense systems including the Patriot PAC/3, and capable of intercepting warheads in flight in both the endo- and exo-atmosphere, at altitudes of 40 to 150 kilometers.

The U.S. Missile Defense Agency has developed, tested and improved the THAAD system for decades through defense industry contractors, including Lockheed Martin and Raytheon, spending billions of dollars before and even after it actually started fielding the system in 2008.

Despite a high rate of successful tests, the system has never been tested in an actual war. Few believe the system is 100 percent reliable. Yet, U.S. defense officials at the Pentagon and the commander of U.S. Forces Korea understandably support the deployment of the THAAD system, hoping it will eliminate North Korean nuclear and missile threats.

The U.S. State Department maintains the THAAD is a defense issue that should be handled by the Pentagon. There has been no official decision on the part of the U.S. government regarding the deployment to Korea. The Seoul government maintains a ``strategic ambiguity” by insisting that there has been ``no request, no consultation and therefore no decision.”

In the complicated regional setting, it is a complex issue affecting diplomacy, defense financial resources and domestic politics for South Korea. China, Russia and North Korea all oppose its deployment for different reasons.

China opposes the THAAD deployment in the South, as it can reach deep into China’s inland missile bases with AN/TPY-2 radar capable of covering 1,500 to 2,000 kilometers. China believes the system would blunt its anti-access/area denial capability, for which China has been building a massive arsenal of cruise and ballistic missiles. In short, Beijing believes that the THAAD deployment is part of U.S. policy to contain China.

On March 24, the Russian foreign ministry warned against the system’s deployment, claiming that it would threaten regional security and, ``it would serve as another push for an arms race and complicate any resolution” of the North Korean nuclear issue. Pyongyang has been loudly critical of the system that might offset the efficacy of its threats, verbal or real.

The South Korean public is torn apart between support and opposition of the THAAD, in the face of mounting pressure from the two superpowers. One problem for the Korean public is an insufficient understanding of the technological aspects of the sophisticated missile defense system. There has been no explanation of how this system will work in concert with Seoul’s own plan of developing the so-called Korean Missile Defense system.

U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin E. Dempsey, who will soon retire, visited Seoul last week. He spurred speculation that he may discuss the THAAD issue officially with Korean interlocutors. He commented in flight to Japan before his arrival in Korea that his talks in Seoul would, “build on previous talks on integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) … and response options to North Korean provocations.”

However, it was clear that Dempsey was not specifically talking about the THAAD as IAMD means “the integration of capabilities and overlapping operations by air, land and maritime forces.” However, he added that Korea and Japan “made some commitments in procurement” for more interoperability.

In view of the THAAD related activities, including a survey of possible locations in Korea for deployment of a THAAD battery, normally consisting of nine mobile launchers, and a briefing by Lockheed Martin for Korean officers regarding what the THAAD can do to defend their country from North Korean missiles, prove that there have been working-level technical talks on the subject between the U.S. and South Korea.

It is up to South Korea to make a wise decision according to its best national interests. The South has to protect itself from the present danger of North Korean threats. At the same time, it has to improve relations with the North to mitigate tension and reduce the need for acquiring more weapons systems. What’s your take?

The writer is the Washington correspondent and columnist for The Korea Times, and fellow at the Institute of Korean-American Studies. His email address is tong.kim8@yahoo.com

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