Structural problems for peninsula

By Tong Kim

The month of January has gone by without making any progress toward the goal of inter-Korean dialogue that was pronounced by the highest leaders in Seoul and Pyongyang at the start of 2015. Even the next few following months do not look good for North-South relations or denuclearization talks.

The chance to hold reunions of separated families around the coming lunar New Year’s Day is eclipsed. The North keeps pounding on unrealistic conditions for talks ― including suspension of joint ROK-U.S. military exercises, which will begin in weeks, and lifting of the May 24 sanctions, which the South says should be discussed in talks.

Calling for suspensions of the joint military drills with the U.S. and leaflet campaigns by South Korea civic groups, Pyongyang has resumed verbal threats to “mercilessly punish the provocative acts of machination for system competition” through the National Defense Commission on Jan. 25 and the Rodong Shinmun on Jan. 30.

While the North has not officially rejected Seoul’s offer of talks made about a month ago, it is highly unlikely to come to the table any time soon in view of recent developments. In Seoul, the foreign minister said, “North Korea cannot continue forever as it is now,” essentially resonating President Barack Obama’s recent YouTube comment, “North Korea will collapse in the end.”

Rejecting Pyongyang’s proposal for cancelling a fourth nuclear test in return for suspension of military exercises with South Korea, Washington imposed new sanctions, albeit doubtful for their effectiveness, against North Korean front companies doing business abroad, in reaction to Pyongyang’s alleged cyber attack on Sony Pictures.

A trilateral meeting of nuclear envoys from the U.S., Japan and South Korea in Tokyo, Jan. 28, reconfirmed a two-tack policy of pressure and conditional talks under which there would be no negotiation with the North, unless it shows concrete commitment to implement denuclearization. In Seoul the next day, the same point was reiterated by Wendy Sherman, U.S. under secretary of state, who said, “There is no disagreement between the U.S. and South Korea over how to deal with North Korea.”

Diplomats know well their policy is not effective to change North Korea; they also know their periodic meetings do not contribute to progress. Then, why do they meet and say the same thing? The answer is because they are paid for keeping their job titles of nuclear negotiators. Denuclearization requires the political will of the highest state leaders involved.

Another event unhelpful to inter-Korean relations unfolded in Seoul, Jan. 29. It was the report of an advance review of former President Lee Myung-bak’s memoir, “The President’s Time,” detailing bad experiences of secret talks with the North for a possible summit, which went on from 2009 to 2011.

The story of secret talks began August 2008 when a North condolence delegation to the funeral of former President Kim Dae-jung came to Seoul and paid a call on President Lee, to whom it informed of former North Korean leader Kim Jong-il’s intention to seek a summit with the South. Lee writes that Pyongyang made the same overture on five occasions thereafter, but he turned them down, because he could not accept the enormous North Korean demand for economic aid.

Im Tae-hi, then the minister of labor, met with Kim Yang-gun of the North, who was in charge of inter-Korean relations, in Singapore in October 2009. At the meeting, the South wanted a resolution of the nuclear issue and repatriation of ROK prisoners of war held in North Korea, holding the position that there would be no reward for a summit. Pyongyang in response promised a joint effort for denuclearization and a permit for one prisoner or two to visit the South.

According to Lee’s memoir, the North demanded 400,000 tons of rice; 100,000 tons of corn; 300,000 tons of fertilizer; asphalt materials worth $100 million; and a loan of $10 billion for a national development bank of North Korea. Later, the North claimed that the South had accepted its demands. The South said there was no agreement on Pyongyang’s request.

The book also describes other unsuccessful secret visits and contacts between Seoul and Pyongyang through their intelligence agencies and other organizations to negotiate a summit. It confirms that the two sides met in Beijing in May 2011, in which Seoul then allegedly tried primarily to get a North Korean apology for the sinking of the South Korean Navy ship Cheonan.

Of the same meeting, Pyongyang claimed that Seoul “begged” for a summit with a proposal for holding three meetings with a specific schedule, even trying to hand over an envelope of cash to the North Korean officials. The Lee administration denied Pyongyang’s claims and deplored the unilateral detailed disclosure of the secret talks in Beijing. Last week Lee disclosed sensitive secrets.

President Park’s administration does not appreciate the release of Lee’s memoir, which also swipes at Park for some unsettled domestic issues and reveals some sensitive conversations Lee had with foreign leaders. For example, Lee said to Wen Jiabao, China’s premier, in May 2010, “Children do not correct their bad habit if the parents always give them what they want. I hope China will lead North Korea onto the right path.”

Lee also told Wen that he will be retiring and he is concerned that a young leader (Kim Jong-un) in power would probably last 50-60 years. Wen was quoted as saying, “But, will the logic of history allow it to happen?”

For structural reasons of governance, as well as ideological reasons, South Korea cannot maintain a consistent policy for long-term goals and North Korea cannot give up the conflicting pattern of engagement and threats. Pyongyang’s intransience appears a bigger problem. What’s your take?

The author is a visiting scholar at the Ilmin Institute of International Relations at Korea University, a visiting professor at the University of North Korean Studies and an ICAS fellow in the United States.

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