Signs of peace for the Peninsula

By Tong Kim

Careful reading of the New Year’s statements by leaders of the two Koreas and the subsequent direction of inter-Korean relations, although appearing hesitant and tenuous, gives a rational basis for optimism that both sides would work together this year to reduce tension and to move toward mutual accommodation.

On Jan. 12, President Park Geun-hye issued a guarded response in a positive tone to the Jan. 2 proposal by North Korean leader Kim Jong-un calling for ending confrontation and “the threat of a nuclear war” and mentioning a possible summit. Park said she would not impose any condition to a summit, but it should be held to help the processes of denuclearization and peaceful unification.

In recent months, Seoul seems to have clarified its basic approach to unification as one of mutual consultation and common endeavor with Pyongyang, finally discarding the long-held, unrealistic concept of absorbing the North by way of “a sudden change” or implosion. This contributes to removing one of the greatest impediments to the improvement of relations. The North would never be serious in engaging the South, if it suspects the latter is committed to destroy it.

This column has long argued against the likelihood of a North Korean collapse in the near term. Today, few advocates talk about the collapse theory that they had ardently supported, perhaps from their moral or political beliefs. They should note that morality or international pressure does not determine the fate of the resilient North Korean regime, armed with a unique ideological blend of dynastic socialism and Confucianism and an increasing nuclear arsenal.

Seoul is still waiting for a positive response to its call for resuming high-level meetings that it has repeatedly proposed. The unification minister is working hard to send a message to the North that Seoul is not seeking a North Korean collapse and it wants to work with Pyongyang to resolve all issues of mutual concern – including reunions of separated families, the May 24 sanctions and projects of economic cooperation.

While the Park government was viewed as more forward looking than was the Lee Myung-bak government, the South Korean public in general supported a more pro-active approach to engage the North in dialogue. Recently the National Assembly adopted a resolution calling for the authorities in both capitals to engage each other for making progress for denuclearization, peace and unification.

Only under public and political pressure, did the unification ministry start to discourage leaflet campaigns, to which the North had angrily reacted. Defector groups carrying out leaflet operations are assured of their constitutional right to freedom of expression in the South, yet they also created the cause of friction in relations with the North, providing grounds, legitimate or not, for North Korean threats to harm the residents of the nearby areas where leaflet balloons would be released from.

The Constitution also obliges the government to protect the safety and lives of its citizens.

The defectors and their conservative supporters may have high goals of democracy, freedom and human rights for their North Korean compatriots, but it is doubtful that these goals would be achieved by leaflet campaigns. These goals would be achieved only after a long process of peaceful engagement towards an ultimate democratic form of unification.

In the meantime, instead of coming forward to meet with South Korean representatives, the North Koreans kicked off another peace offensive directed towards Washington. In New York and Geneva, DPRK senior diplomats have suggested that Pyongyang would suspend a fourth nuclear test if the U.S. suspends joint annual military exercises with South Korea. This demand regarding the military exercises has always been a condition to any improved relations with Seoul or Washington, but it is the first time Pyongyang linked it to a nuclear test.

Pyongyang may have expected that their new proposal would be rejected outright by Washington, as it turned out to be. The North knows any military, including its own, needs to keep training. Kim Jong-il, the father of the current North Korean leader, said in 2000, “all militaries must do training exercises. But, we do not want to see the U.S. and South Korean forces exercise together to invade the North.”

Recently, the North even asked the U.S. forces to conduct drills elsewhere away from the peninsula. Pyongyang’s latest proposal was interpreted by the U.S. state department as “an implicit threat” that the North Koreans are threatening to go ahead with a fourth nuclear test, if the joint exercise are not suspended. In other words, the North was looking for an excuse for another nuclear test. However, the proposal also shows the consistency of Pyongyang’s interest in talks with Washington.

Washington’s rejection on the other hand shows no change in its strategy to avoid engagement with the North until it renews its commitment to denuclearization that Pyongyang had renounced. In the wake of the alleged charges against North Korea for cyber attacks on Sony Pictures, the Obama administration imposed additional financial sanctions on the North, although the efficacy of the additional sanctions were skeptical.

Scientific observers of the North Korean nuclear program find no signs for an imminent nuclear test at its testing site, but they agree it can conduct one at any time after three or four months of preparation. If this were carried out, it would suspend all South Korean or international efforts to engage the North. It will rally all South Koreans, conservative and liberal, to denounce the North. The North Korean leadership understands the dire consequences of another test, and they have no domestic imperative to choose this fatal blow to the prospect of a more beneficial relationship with the South.

A fourth nuclear test will destroy any chance Seoul may have to persuade Washington and Beijing to work for a peaceful resolution to the nuclear issue. The South’s more receptive attitude that has been noticed in recent weeks will have positive influence on the North. We all want to see a more peaceful year, a year of less tension, less threat, and more stability and better relations with the North. What’s your take?

The author is a visiting scholar at the Ilmin Institute

of International Relations at Korea University,

a visiting professor at the University of North

Korean Studies and an ICAS fellow in the United

States.