A possible North-South summit

By Tong Kim

As 2015 marks the 70th anniversary of Korea’s liberation from Japanese colonial rule, the leaders of the two Koreas have expressed their wishes, at least in rhetoric, to end outdated Cold War confrontation and resume dialogue and engagement to improve inter-Korean relations towards a durable peace and eventual unification.

Through a 29-minute New Year’s address, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un proposed to “hold the suspended high-level talks with South Korea and other talks in various areas.” Speaking flawlessly in a fast-paced delivery, he said, “If the right atmosphere and conditions are there, we would have no reason not to hold a summit on the highest level.”

On the following day Jan. 2, President Park Geun-hye made a cautious, indirect response: “the North should first come to the high-level talks,” which Seoul proposed last month through the Unification Preparation Committee. She appears to favor a gradual approach to the holding of a summit. She “does not want a summit for its own sake” but as “part of a process en route to unification.”

In her New Year’s message to the South Korean people, President Park reemphasized the importance of “establishing a substantive and concrete foundation for unification, to end the 70-year division of conflict and pain.” In response to the North’s latest proposal, the unification minister welcomed it as “an advanced, positive step.”

A few days earlier on Dec. 29, President Park proposed to hold high-level talks to discuss reunions of separated families and other issues of mutual concern, including the lifting of the May 24 sanctions and resuming tourism to Mount Geumgang.

However, it is not clear whether Kim’s offer was a direct response to Park’s proposal: Kim did not mention the proposal made in the name of the unification preparation committee, which is viewed negatively by the North as an organization planning for unification by absorption under Seoul’s term.

Paradoxically, the committee has developed some constructive plans to improve inter-Korean relations, but it also undertook the controversial drafting of a constitution for a unified Korea, without consultation with the North, which has contributed to Pyongyang’s rejection of the committee chaired by President Park.

Last October, Pyongyang promised to resume vice ministerial talks with Seoul’s Presidential Office of National Security, but only to boycott them over the issue of leaflet operations carried out by defector groups aiming at damaging the image of the North Korean leader, to which the North Koreans are extremely sensitive.

Genuine or guileful, the positive statements from both capitals are fitting to the occasion of the New Year’s Day, when everyone wishes for something better and more optimistic. Nevertheless, there is a whole stack of hurdles, which the two sides must overcome if they really want to move forward toward reduced tension, more security and better well-being.

True, it is the first time that Kim Jong-un mentioned a possible high level summit, which as proven by precedents would bring about a substantive change in relations and economic benefits to the North through exchange and cooperation. Pyongyang’s proposal was presented against the backdrop of acute international attention on the alleged abuses of human rights in North Korea.

Pyongyang’s move has evolved from their apparent self-realization that their economy cannot grow as they want it without foreign investment and under the current international sanctions imposed against their nuclear and missile programs. Their relations with China are not likely to improve if they continue a policy of military confrontation on the peninsula. Kim Jong-un announced no change in his nuclear stance: he will stick to nuclear weapons.

Kim Jong-un demands removal of obstacles to the implementation of his proposal. His list of obstacles include “large-scale nuclear war exercises” by the South; competition in political system -- he says neither side should impose its system on the other side; infringement upon North Korean sovereignty and dignity; involvement of foreign forces in demonizing the North; and quarrel with the North on trivial issues.

There are two things that would not be given up by the South under the present security situation: pursuit of denuclearization and continuing annual joint military exercises with the U.S. The South does not demand an immediate denuclearization, as it may be better dealt with in another venue of talks. Yet, it wants to see a realistic start of progress in denuclearization.

The South will have to keep conducting combined military exercises until a reliable permanent peace mechanism is in place. Kim Jong-un recently said himself, “We need to keep building our deterrence, nuclear and conventional, in order to improve North-South relations.” There is no mutual trust between the two sides. The South relies on a strong security to maintain a stable relationship with the North.

Perhaps, it would serve a purpose if both sides freeze their military capabilities at their present level, instead of increasing their war fighting strength in the name of defense. What is defensive to one side appears offensive to the other side. When the intention is unknown or misunderstood, competition in military armament could lead to the danger of miscalculation. A breaking point in the unstable balance does not serve the interest of a “negative peace.”

The first step to improved relations would be going back to the inter-Korean agreements in the July joint statement of 1972 and the two summit declarations of 2000 and 2007 to accept each other as they are, stop mutual slander and inter-Korean bickering, avoid mutual provocations and work together for peaceful unification.

The formula of a confederation with one state and two systems is still deemed as the best, practical initial form of government for a unified Korea. This form may last indefinitely until the conditions for complete integration are nurtured naturally over the course of a long, long process. What’s your take?

The author is a visiting scholar at the Ilmin Institute of International Relations at Korea University, a visiting professor at the University of North Korean Studies and an ICAS fellow in the United States.