Six-party talks are futile

By Tong Kim

The six-party talks, aiming at a denuclearized Korean Peninsula, have been dormant for six years since December 2008. Pessimism prevails that the multilateral forum of six nations ― China, the U.S., Russia, Japan and the two Koreas ― is highly unlikely to resume any time soon. Even if it were resumed unexpectedly, it would not be able to achieve its stated goal.

North Korea has declared itself in its constitution as a nuclear weapons state and pursues a "policy of parallel development of nuclear deterrence and economy,” showing no interest in negotiating away its nuclear leverage that it has built at a high price of scarce resources and international sanctions. It wants to keep its nuclear weapons as a survival kit to safeguard its regime and system.

Pyongyang still talks about nuclear talks ― but not for denuclearization ― in return for political or economic rewards in which it once seemed interested before it broke off the talks. Now it wants to be recognized as a nuclear state that possesses a minimum of eight bombs with plutonium and uranium capabilities. Pyongyang has an improving missile technology that can deliver a miniaturized nuclear warhead for medium and long-range targets and it can produce a few additional bombs a year.

When the North says it is prepared to return to the talks without preconditions and it is willing to discuss all matters related to its nuclear program, it means that the North wants to engage other parties as a nuclear state, a status the U.S. will not grant. Pyongyang wants to discuss arms control, not disarmament. It calls for denuclearization of the South and the withdrawal of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrence provided to South Korea.

The very goal of the six-party talks was "the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” as stipulated in the Sept. 19 joint statement of 2005, which provided the basis for some progress as noted in the Feb. 13 and Oct. 3, 2007, agreements.

However, when sanctions were imposed on Pyongyang after its missile and nuclear tests, it renounced its commitments to denuclearization, which the U.S. persistently has insisted that the North must observe.

Throughout the six-party process, the U.S. interest was primarily focused on denuclearizing North Korea, but not in such other provisions of the Sept. 19 statement as establishing a "permanent peace regime” and a normalized relationship with Pyongyang. Washington maintains a firm position that for the nuclear talks to resume, the North must demonstrate its seriousness that the talks will be about denuclearization.

The North defies pressure from the U.S. and its allies in the South and Japan. It disregards China’s concern about the negative impact of its nuclear program on stability on the peninsula and regional dynamics. One reason China opposes the North Korean nuclear program is that it serves as a justification for deploying the THAD system to South Korea. Russia supports denuclearization but has been lukewarm, especially since its relationship with the U.S. became strained over Crimea.

Like it or not, North Korea is a de facto nuclear state. U.S. and South Korean military planners are developing countermeasures to cope with an asymmetric nuclear threat from the North. Understandably, the military has its mission to prepare for the worst case. However, given the unacceptability of a military solution, other than building a deterrent, to the North Korean nuclear program, one has to look for some kind of a diplomatic solution.

Washington’s policy of "strategic patience” ― waiting for a positive change in North Korea’s policy ― has failed. The danger of the unknown level of nuclear safety in North Korea and its growing arsenal of weapons of mass destruction must not be neglected much longer. To offset its economic predicament, the North might be tempted to sell more missiles and even nuclear materials and technology to a third party.

Pressure ― either in the form of economic sanctions or political condemnation ― has been ineffective, even with Chinese participation. Some may still think that China can denuclearize the North if it threatens to cut all its aid to the North. Such thinking ignores the complexity of Sino-North Korean relations as well as the traditional resilience of the North Korean people for survival.

The North will not collapse soon, and unification is even further away. A solution to the nuclear issue by way of North Korean collapse or unification is only a dream. Efforts for improving inter-Korean relations could contribute to a favorable atmosphere in which denuclearization can be raised, but they would not be able to resolve the issue.

Improvement of inter-Korean relations through humanitarian assistance and economic cooperation as the Park government is promoting, which is yet to circumvent or lift the May 24 restrictions and revive tourism to Mt. Geumgang, would stop far short of denuclearization.

To stop the North from continuing to develop its dangerous programs, the only pragmatic option would be to re-engage Pyongyang without preconditions and resuscitate the essential elements of the February 29 agreement of 2011 – to halt the operation of the nuclear facilities in Yongpyon, place a moratorium on nuclear and missile tests and bring back IAEA inspectors.

The short-term goal would be to contain the North Korean nuclear program and to prevent possible transfer of the dangerous weapons to dangerous third parties. This option can be launched bilaterally between the U.S. and the DPRK independently of, or in conjunction with the six party talks, which may still have some use. Once the North Korean program is controlled, the parties could proceed to work toward eventual denuclearization.

The ultimate goal of denuclearization is a long haul that may or may not be achieved even after all other related issues are negotiated among the relevant parties. Nevertheless, North Korea’s nuclear program can no longer be put aside. Something must be done about it. The earlier the better. What’s your take?

The author is a visiting scholar at the Ilmin Institute of International Relations at Korea University, a visiting professor at the University of North Korean Studies and an ICAS fellow in the United States.