Human rights in N. Korea

By Tong Kim

The passage of a U.N. committee’s human rights resolution on Nov. 18, recommending referral of the accountability of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for alleged "crimes against humanity,” has spurred a new wave of awareness and concern of the North Korean human rights situation as detailed in a powerful 400-page report that the U.N. Commission of Inquiry (COI) released last February.

The U.N. General Assembly (UNGA) is also likely to adopt the resolution next month. The assembly can request that its resolution be endorsed by the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) ― which has the sole authority to refer the case to the ICC. However, there is only a very slim chance that the North Korean human rights case will be sent to the ICC.

China and Russia, as permanent members of the security council, would veto the referral. Only one veto is needed to kill a proposal. China and Russia were among the 19 countries that voted against the U.N. committee’s resolution seeking ``targeted sanctions” against North Korea, while 119 countries voted for and 55 abstained.

Beijing’s relationship with Pyongyang may have been strained in recent months, but China maintains a consistent position against foreign interference in its internal issues ― political or human rights. China opposes singling out North Korea for referral to the ICC. Russia, sanctioned by the U.S. and EU for Crimea, has noticeably been improving cooperation with North Korea on bilateral and international issues.

Adopting a human rights resolution on North Korea has been an annual U.N. exercise for 10 years. These resolutions accused North Korea for egregious violations but failed to make a difference to the human rights situation. Pyongyang typically dismisses the resolutions as a hostile plot to bring down its regime.

In a change, North Korea this year actively responded to the charges only after the COI ― with evidence collected from defectors, escapees and security guards from North Korean prison camps ― threatened to hold Kim Jong-un, the core and ``supreme dignity” of the North Korean state, accountable for ``the unspeakable atrocities” and to take him to the ICC.

In September, Pyongyang published its own human rights report that claimed North Korea had “the best human rights system.” It also tried to defend its human rights record at various venues of diplomacy. Its representatives engaged the EU and other sponsors of the U.N. resolution to prevent them from accusing Kim Jong-un of ``complicity in crimes against humanity comparable to those committed by the German Nazis or the apartheid regime of South Africa.”

In New York, North Korean foreign ministry officials met U.N. Special Human Rights Rapporteur Marzuk Darusman, offering him a visit to the North on condition that the call for Kim Jong-un and North Korea be referred to the ICC be deleted from a draft resolution. Darusman turned down the offer and is still asking for an unconditional visit to pursue ``a two-track approach ― for accountability and engagement.”

On Nov. 8, North Korea released American hostages Kenneth Bae and Matthew Miller. It was apparently seeking a ``breakthrough” to the deadlock of dialogue with the U.S., when it invited U.S. National Intelligence director James Clapper to bring a personal letter from President Obama. The letter simply identified Clapper as the president’s envoy with a short message saying the release of the prisoners would be regarded as ``a positive gesture.”

Clapper told ``Face the Nation” on CBS on Nov. 16 that the North Koreans were disappointed he had brought no offer of engagement. During his overnight stay in Pyongyang there was no negotiation of any policy issue. Consequently, Clapper said he was not sure whether they would release the Americans, until he was told he had 20 minutes to pack up and leave. The COI report and the threat of an ICC role may well have influenced the release.

Although the COI’s report was fully substantiated by evidentiary statements by witnesses of the prison camps, collected from interviews and public hearings, the COI officials have not visited the scene of ``crimes against humanity” ― which is one of the categories of charges under which the ICC can investigate, prosecute, and precede a trial against the culprits. Following the U.N. committee’s adoption of the resolution, North Korea complained, ``No other U.N. report or resolution was ever adopted without consultation with the party concerned or a visit to the country involved.”

North Korea is not a signatory to the ICC. Even if the ICC prosecuted or even convicted Kim Jong-un, there would be no way to arrest him or obtain his habeas corpus for punishment. The best punishment would be economic and travel sanctions against him and his officials. North Korea has nuclear weapons and more than one million heavily armed troops trained to fight and die for their leader. What ``marshals” of the ICC can execute court orders in North Korea? Systematic abuse of human rights did not begin after Kim Jong-un became the ruler three years ago.

The severity of the North Korean human rights issue is not new. It has been included in the U.S. state department’s annual human rights reports for many years and other reports by international human rights organizations. Given no access to the ``gulags,” report writers have depended on defectors from North Korea and even unconfirmed press reports.

The goal of human rights advocacy should not be simply to expose and denounce a horrible human rights situation but to contribute to improving human rights and enhance the wellbeing of the people in impoverished North Korea. In this context, the work of the U.N. human rights commission, albeit its limited authority and capability, has produced some positive response from North Korea.

Nevertheless, Pyongyang threatened to conduct a fourth nuclear test in reaction to the resolution. Instead, North Korea should try to improve the human rights of its people. To this end, they need a policy change as well as resources, of which they have little. Providing humanitarian assistance is one way of helping to improve human rights in North Korea. What’s your take?

The author is a visiting scholar at the Ilmin Institute of International Relations at Korea University, a visiting professor at the University of North Korean Studies and an ICAS fellow in the United States.