OPCON and peace for Korea

By Tong Kim

An agreement reached between the ROK and the U.S. to defer the transition of wartime operational control (OPCON) to South Korea indefinitely until “an appropriate date” in the future, by at least 10 years from now, reveals the extent of security and political problems on the peninsula to which there is no simple solution.

Since the1990s, successive Korean presidents have wanted to retrieve OPCON from the U.S. and relocate the U.S. Yongsan Garrison base to a location outside of Seoul, partly as for reasons of political symbolism, an assertion of political sovereignty and to show self-reliance in defense, by trying to assume more responsibility for the ROK’s own defenses, not by weakening or ending the alliance with the U.S. but by maintaining it.

The U.S. has exercised OPCON control over the ROK forces since July 14, 1950, when President Syngman Rhee turned it over to General MacArthur, UNC commander, by a letter of authorization that said, “In view of the fact that … all U.N. forces fighting in Korea and in the neighboring areas have been assigned to your command, I feel fortunate …to transfer to you the authority to exercise the military operational control over the ROK forces while the state of war continues...”

The OPCON transition has been postponed twice ― the first time from April 17, 2012 and the second time from the end of 2015. The difference in the latest deferment is a shift from a timeline to a condition-based transition, requiring the ROK counter missile capabilities to cope with North Korean nuclear threats and establishing a stable security environment on the peninsula and within the region.

The two conditions seem too unrealistic or too abstract to meet militarily. The state of current technology is less-than-perfect to detect and disrupt hidden and moving missiles carrying a nuclear warhead or to launch a preemptive strike to destroy them all in a few minutes available. North Korea continues to improve its nuclear and missile technology, to diversify delivery systems including submarines, and to multiply their hideouts underground.

The latest decision of deferment admits that the South Korean forces, which spend over $34 billion a year, are not and will not be ready to cope with North Korean nuclear and missile threats until after a decade. Even if the ROK completes its development of Kill Chain and KAMD (Korean Air Missile Defense) systems at an enormous additional cost, we will not be sure that these systems can successfully detect, disrupt and destroy target missiles before or after they are launched,

What is certain is that South Korea with no nuclear weapons of its own will have to keep depending on the U.S. that has far greater capability than the South does for its nuclear umbrella and its extended deterrence. A plausible argument holds that the U.S. will continue to keep its commitment to defend the ROK from North Korean nuclear and other WMD threats, even after the OPCON is transferred to South Korea. The North Korean nuclear threat is real and is becoming more dangerous, but the threat does not justify the further delay for the OPCON transition either in political or security terms as long as the alliance remains reliable.

The second condition for delay is more nebulous and illusive. The emergence of “a security environment conducive on the Korean Peninsula and the region to a stable OPCON transition” may never come around until the North is denuclearized and a multilateral security mechanism is established for Northeast Asia. There are ominous elements of tension and instability in the region, with China’s rise, the U.S approach to rebalancing, and Japan’s interest in collective security.

Defense Minister Han Min-gu has told the National Assembly that the ROK continues to pursue assuming the OPCON. According the joint statement of the 46th Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) on Oct. 23, the next transition date will be determined by the “National Authorities” of the ROK and the U.S., meaning the presidential level, based on the SCM’s recommendation, when the time is deemed ripe.

Another setback is found in the implementation of base relocations. The Combined Forces Command will remain at the Yongsan location, and a U.S. artillery brigade will remain at Tongducheon, disrupting land use plans for the Seoul city government to build a central park and for the Tongducheon municipality in order to construct an economic and cultural development zone. Now return of these valuable pieces of land is delayed until the time when the ROK will be able to assume the OPCON.

In the meantime, the alliance will continue to conduct exercises in Korea to demonstrate readiness and deterrence, and last week the Pentagon announced a rotational deployment of an armored brigade at Camp Casey as agreed at the SCM. The ROK is proceeding to develop the KAMD system, for which it plans to acquire 136 PAC-3 systems, as recently approved by the U.S. state department for Foreign Military Sales, at a cost of $l.45 billion.

A security measure alone, no matter how thorough it may be, is not sufficient to guarantee peace. While it is necessary to be prepared for security threats and to build the best deterrent possible, diplomacy should not be shelved. Engagement and negotiation, even if it costs economic assistance, could be far more inexpensive than seeking an endless security measure. Deterrence can at best secure temporary peace without a state of war, but not a durable peace.

Here is Pope Francisco’s definition of peace: “Peace is not simply the absence of war, but ‘the work of justice’ (cf. Is 32-17). And justice, as virtue, calls for the discipline of forbearance: it demands that we not forget past injustices but overcome them through forgiveness, tolerance and cooperation. It demands the willingness to discern and attain mutually beneficial goals, building foundations of mutual respect, understanding and reconciliation.” What’s your take?

The author is a visiting scholar at the Ilmin Institute of International Relations at Korea University, a visiting professor at the University of North Korean Studies and an ICAS fellow in the United States.