Insecure path to peace

By Tong Kim

It appears that North Koreans will not attend a second round of “high-level contact” at Panmunjeom on Oct. 30, as proposed by Seoul. A delegation of three ranking DPRK officials agreed to do so, when they came to attend the closing ceremony of the Asian Games at Incheon on Oct. 4.

Since their visit to the South, a series of portentous events has unfolded to impact inter-Korean relations as well as U.S.-DPRK relations. These include border clashes between the North and the South, release of an American detainee, a subtle semantic change in Washington’s position on nuclear talks, and an indefinite deferment of the transition of operational control to the ROK.

On the 7th, a North Korean patrol boat intruded south of the Northern Limit Line (NLL) ―a borderline in the West Sea which the North has never accepted. This caused an exchange of gunfire. No damage was inflicted, but the purpose of the boat’s intrusion was never established.

On the 15th, a rare military meeting was held at the request of the North Korean side between KPA General Kim Yong-chul, director of the General Bureau of Reconnaissance for the National Defense Commission, and director for policy Ryoo Seung-yul of the ROK Ministry of Defense.

The meeting did not produce any agreement. At the unannounced meeting, the North demanded that the South observe a “sea border line” unilaterally fixed by the North encroaching into the waters south of the NLL and stop “slander campaigns” by leaflet dissemination and by the press. Kim Yong-chul also proposed that both sides refrain from “preemptive firing, unless an intruding ship is intentionally provocative” and resolve disputes by dialogue.

Leaflets are sent by large balloons operated by defector organizations, and Pyongyang is extremely resentful of the leaflets which, it says, “insult the supreme dignity” of its leader. Seoul’s Ministry of Unification upholds a position that there are no legal grounds to disrupt the leaflet operations by civic organizations which are exercising freedom of expression.

On the 18th, the North Korean Army troops fired anti-aircraft machine guns at balloons carrying leaflets defaming Kim Jong-un and his regime. Some of the bullets landed in the vicinity of Yeoncheon, south of the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) that keeps out the opposing forces.

The next day, another exchange of fire took place during a skirmish across the MDL. When ROK troops fired warning shots to push back about 10 KPA soldiers approaching the borderline, they fired back at a Guard Post in the South Korean side near Paju, south of Panmunjeom. Evidently, such leaflets can trigger more security problems now before they can achieve whatever intended objectives they had.

The North has repeatedly warned that it will physically strike the distribution points of such balloon-borne leaflets. On the 24th, the North threatened that it would regard a continuation of leaflet dissemination as a “declaration of war” against its regime, declaring that it jeopardizes any chance of dialogue unless it is suspended.

On the 21st, Pyongyang unexpectedly released Jeffrey Fowle, an American tourist who was detained for leaving a bible in a hotel. Last December, it released another American detainee, Merrill Newman, again without a visit by a prominent American to secure his release. North Korea sometimes makes moves that take on the form of public relations stunts.

Secretary of State John Kerry said there was no quid pro quo to achieve Fowle’s release. Yet, he said, “If Kim Jong-un and the regime are prepared to talk seriously” about denuclearization, the U.S. would get back to talks with them. “If they do denuclearization,” Kerry added, “we are fully prepared to begin the process of reducing the need for American forces and presence in the region.” On the 24th, Kerry corrected this part of his earlier statement as “entirely premature.”

In October last year Kerry made a similar statement during an APEC meeting in Indonesia: the U.S. wants to “have a good relationship with North Korea; it does not seek regime change in the North; and it would be possible to sign a non-aggression pact with the North, if it gives up its nuclear weapons.”

Also on the 21st, the U.S. envoy for nuclear talks, Sydney Seiler, who reportedly made a secret trip to Pyongyang last month, told a Washington audience that if the North puts a moratorium on nuclear and missile tests and suspends its nuclear programs, the U.S. would consider resuming the six-party talks.

On Sept. 4, Seiler said more specifically, “We are not ideologically opposed to dialogue with North Korea, nor have we placed insurmountable obstacles to negotiations in our insisting that North Korea simply demonstrate it will live up to international obligations and abide by international norms and behavior…we insist that “denuclearization talks be about denuclearization.”

On the 23rd, the U.S. and ROK defense ministers announced that the timing of the “condition-based” transition of wartime operational control (OPCON) has been put off indefinitely until the ROK forces’ capabilities are “secured and the security environment on the Korean Peninsula and in the region is conducive to a stable OPCON transition.” With this decision, the earliest possible transition timeframe will be some time in the mid-2020s, when the ROK military hopes to complete the development of Kill-Chain and Korean Air and Missile (KAMD) systems at a cost of 17 trillion won.

It was also decided that the Combined Forces Command and its headquarters would remain in Yongsan until the OPCON transition takes place. A U.S. counter fire brigade will remain north of the Han River at the current site of Camp Casey at Dongducheon until the ROK Army builds its counter-fire capability contrary to the original plan of base relocation.

The indefinite postponement of the OPCON transition and the changes to the base relocation plan have sparked controversy in the South and triggered an alarm in the North. President Park had pledged in her election campaign to retrieve the OPCON during her term in office. The North ridicules the leaders for the South for being “stooges of the U.S.” and for lacking control over its own forces.

In an innocent state of confusion, people want to make sure that their government authorities know what they are doing to protect the peace and wellbeing of their nation. What’s your take?

The author is a visiting scholar at the Ilmin Institute of International Relations at Korea University, a visiting professor at the University of North Korean Studies and an ICAS fellow in the United States.