Controversy over presidential records

By Tong Kim

Questions about former President Roh

Moo-hyun’s 2007 conversation with the also deceased North Korean leader Kim Jong-il regarding the Northern Limit Line (NLL) have dominated South Korean politics for some weeks now. Both conservative and progressive forces are still trying to find a definitive answer to the central question of whether Roh Moon-hyun had in fact given up the NLL, which has a history of costly military clashes, claiming dozens of lives.

However, this controversy has developed into an unintended, bizarre investigation of presidential record keeping at the Presidential Archive, the director of which said the original copy of Roh’s meeting with Kim Jong-Il did not exist. A joint panel consisting of representatives from both parties, supported by archive specialists, is still searching for the document, which may hold the answer to the question of the NLL.

From charges and counter-charges between the contesting parties, there are three possibilities of what may have happened: (1) Roh did not turn over the document to the archive, (2) somebody destroyed it during the Lee Myung-bak administration, and (3) it cannot be found easily because of its cryptic labeling, intended for concealing. These speculations are based on distrust and suspicion and in disregard of the testimony of some witnesses who said the document was electronically sent to the archive.

A careful reading of the transcript of the Roh-Kim conversation as released by the National Intelligence Service (NIS) on June 15 finds no clear evidence that Roh had given up the NLL but an arguable ground to suspect and accuse Roh of harboring an intent to give up the NLL. In other words, the battle of opposing claims ended in a draw without a clear winner. Subsequent to the document’s release, the NIS and the Ministry of Defense issued a statement respectively supporting the view that former President Roh had given up the NLL.

Opposition members immediately claimed that the document had been tampered with and revised by President Park Geun-hye’s NIS. They demanded access to the original copy that should have been kept in the Presidential Archive, and the ruling party agreed. The NIS’s involvement began when it produced a transcript of the inter-Korean summit, either in October 2007 or during the last two months of Roh’s term in 2008. The former NIS director under the Roh administration has said two copies of the transcript were produced from tapes and notes, and one copy was sent to the Blue House and the other copy was kept at the NIS for future references.

At a time when the national legislature is expected to work with the administration to improve the livelihood of the people, politics seems to be more involved with this bizarre controversy over the document on the NLL. The real task for the opposition Democratic Party is whether it can prove a decisive correlation between the NIS’s interference in the last presidential election and the election of President Park. The NLL was a campaign issue that seemed to work in favor of the ruling Saenuri Party.

A separate question is whether some ruling party members had illegally obtained classified information regarding the NLL to use it against the opposition candidate Moon Jae-in, claiming that his former boss had given up the NLL. The opposition party is defeating its own purpose by letting the issue of document discovery delay the opening of a National Assembly investigation of the NIS’s role in elections.

The ruling party acted timely taking issue with improper gaffes of some opposition members, effectively delaying the opposition’s effort to proceed with a scheduled NIS investigation hearing. The continuing controversy over the presidential record also helps postpone the more important investigation. The big news of prosecutors’ crack down on former President Chun Doo-hwan’s suspected, illegal accumulation of wealth distracts public attention from the issues which the opposition is trying to capitalize.

Today the NLL stands unshaken, which is regarded by most South Koreans as their territorial line. It is being guarded vigilantly by the South Korean forces. The North had drawn its own maritime borer line much lower than the NLL, and it refuses to accept the NLL. Under this situation, there are more chances of future clash on the West Sea. Deterrence to war has worked; deterrence to localized provocation is yet to be tested.

In the document released by the NIS, Roh Moo-hyun did not exactly agreed to the idea of establishing a joint fishing zone as suggested by Kim Jong-il in the area between the NLL and the West Sea maritime borderline claimed by the North. At the same time, unlike the claims by Roh’s people, there was no agreement that the fishing zone was to be set up an equal distance north and south of, and in parallel with, the NLL. The NLL question remains subject to future discussion as agreed to by the 1991 Basic North South Agreement, and as discussed in Roh Moo-hyun’s conversation with Kim Jong-il. In the meantime, the question is how to protect the NLL at the lowest cost possible.

It is not clear how this NLL episode will end. But, it is clear that South Koreans are still divided along their ideological and political inclinations, depending on which political party they support. There is only one truth. However, the truth is often shielded by suspicion, and suspicion begets suspicion. What’s happening now seems to be a politics of suspicion, not a politics of solving problems but creating new problems. What’s your take?

The writer is a research professor at the Illmin Institute of International Relations at Korea University and a visiting professor at the University of North Korean Studies. He is also an ICAS fellow. Reach him at tong.kim8@yahoo.com.