Gaeseong and way forward

By Tong Kim

At midnight Saturday, representatives from both sides of Korea were still trying to narrow their differences in steps to resume the operation of the Gaeseong Industrial Complex. This working-level government-government meeting was being held to focus on the single issue of the complex, three months after its closure and one month after an attempted talk was aborted on June 12.

The closure has incurred huge economic losses to both sides ― a loss of 54,000 jobs for three months and roughly $270 million in wages for the North and an estimated business loss of $1 billion to the South. If economic terms prevail over political interests, it would make sense for both sides to agree on the resumed operation of the complex. However, the North often thinks more in intangible political terms ― such as dignity, pride, beliefs, or protection of system and society.

At Panmunjeom, the South side has proffered a list of requirements to reopen the complex, including an account for the North Korean responsibility of the closure, cooperation in taking out finished products and raw materials, maintenance of the production equipment, and an assurance against unilateral closure in the future. The South also demanded that the Gaeseong complex should meet international business standards for its future development.

The North side has proposed that South Korean businesses would be allowed to check and perform maintenance service for the production equipment and to start operating their plants in the order of readiness. The North would agree on transport of the finished products to the South, but not the raw materials that would be needed for production, once the operation is resumed.

It appears that both sides have legitimate points, except the South’s position on the raw materials. These measures should be resolved in a sequential order. By definition, any negotiation should proceed on the basis of common grounds and self-interest. However, a successful outcome of negotiation often comes from a compromise of give and take. Given the importance of reopening the inter-Korean joint industrial park, which also has political and military benefits to the South, both sides are urged to free themselves from an unproductive rivalry of pride and to be flexible as to readjust their order of the measures for implementation.

If the talks on the Gaeseong complex succeed this time, it could herald a breakthrough to broader constructive dialogue and engagement ― inter-Korean and international ― that may eventually find some solutions to the question of peace and security on the peninsula and in the region. President Park Geun-hye’s “trust-building process on the Korean Peninsula” can and should begin with Gaeseong.

In recent months, there have been a series of hectic diplomatic activities among the major countries concerned with the Korean issue, including the Park-Obama summit, the Xi-Obama summit, and Park-Xi summit. In the lower tier, North Korean envoy Choi Ryong-hae met with Xi Jinping and Chinese military leaders. Later, First Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye-Gwan also visited Beijing and Moscow. DPRK Foreign Minister Park Ui-chun attended the Asian Regional Forum in Brunei. Japanese cabinet adviser Ijima Isao visited Pyongyang in May.

These diplomatic activities have confirmed the positions of the concerned countries regarding the issue of engagement, denuclearization, and settlement of peace. Despite the North Korean offer of unconditional talks to the United States and despite China’s encouragement of dialogue among the parties concerned and an early resumption of six-party talks, Washington and Seoul are not ready to drop their preconditions to talks ― that is Pyongyang must show seriousness to fulfill its commitments to denuclearization and its international obligations.

The U.S., South Korea, and now China will not accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons state, and the three along with Japan and Russia will continue to pursue the denuclearization of North Korea through peaceful means. None of them has the illusion that the North Koreans would easily give up their weapons, unless they are assured of a security arrangement and a political environment in which they would feel safe.

It is true that North Korea is under more pressure than before with China’s assertive role in the implementation of U.N. sanctions. However, it is still not clear how far China would go in reconfiguring its strategic interest in North Korea. Neither is it sure that the traditional North Korean resiliency would give in to China’s pressure. The North Koreans do not yield to foreign pressure. They would rather suffer hunger than give up arms.

As Pyongyang would not resort to a suicidal war unless it believes its days of survival are numbered, the North Koreans would not accept the U.S, conditions that need to be defined more specifically, unless they are convinced that Washington is seriously interested in addressing their security concerns.

The way forward would be: North Korea declares its negotiable terms for denuclearization. In their turns, Seoul and Washington drop their conditions to talks with Pyongyang and express their willingness to discuss a peace regime and other security arrangements to defuse tension and assure Pyongyang’s security.

If the North Korean issue is to be resolved by diplomacy, the parties should somehow start talking to each other, bilaterally or multilaterally, and without preconditions. Hopefully, Gaeseong provides new momentum to tackle the larger issues of denuclearization and peace settlement. What’s your take?

The writer is a research professor at the Illmin Institute of International Relations at Korea University and a visiting professor at the University of North Korean Studies. He is also an ICAS fellow. Reach him at tong.kim8@yahoo.com.