By Tong Kim
After former president Bill Clinton's dramatic meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jong-il ― resulted in the freeing of the two American journalists who have now joined their families back in the United States ― attention has been drawn to what may flow from that first high-level contact between Washington and Pyongyang since the start of the Obama administration.
The White House and the State Department emphatically portrayed Mr. Clinton's trip as ``a humanitarian mission" that had no direct bearing on the administration's policy on North Korea. Nevertheless, many watchers do not readily accept that explanation. Without the release of the two American journalists, it would have been impossible to consider revising the administration's pressure policy.
Although not much is yet known, more will be unfolded or leaked on the actual exchanges between Kim and Bill Clinton. Their meeting may eventually have a far-reaching impact on the future of U.S.-North Korea relations from the perspective of what has long been known correctly or incorrectly. The White House national security advisor, General Jim Jones, who had asked if Clinton would go to the North, said on the record that he hoped Clinton's trip would ``ultimately lead to progress … to some good things."
Change may come more readily from the North than from the United States as a result of Clinton's symbolic visit, which Kim could use internally as a justification to re-engage the United States. Chairman Kim demonstrated that he has recovered his health and has no trouble staying in control, putting an end to speculation of an imminent collapse due to his terminal illness and from succession trouble. But his decision will also depend on his reading of the U.S. response to his release of the two Americans and to his consistent interest in improved relations with the United States, a major point he must have reaffirmed to Clinton this time.
I have often argued that we don't know very much about what is going on in North Korea and we should learn more about the North through interactive engagement. Absent reliable clandestine sources, we can analyze open source reports to gain some understanding of the state of affairs in the North, their intentions and plans on the short-term and long-term basis. But as seeing is believing, exchange in engagement is the best source of information. What Clinton and his party saw of and in Kim and what they heard from him should be the most valuable gain for U.S. policy makers.
The presence of Kim Gey-gwan, North Korea's chief nuclear negotiator, on the scene of Clinton's arrival was insinuated as a link between Clinton's humanitarian mission and the nuclear issue. But, more meaningfully, his presence disproved the widely circulated rumor in Washington that he had been dismissed or sent to a labor camp because of his mishandling of the nuclear negotiations. He also attended the dinner reception for Clinton hosted by the National Defense Commission.
In the winter of 2000 and the spring of 2001, first vice chairman of the National Defense Commission Jo Myong-rok had not been seen for months after he visited Washington and served as the counterpart host for Secretary of State Albright's visit to Pyongyang in October 2000. The press speculated that his absence from public appearances signaled that he had been dismissed from the job. Again, the grounds for the speculation were his alleged failure in the handling of U.S.-North Korea relations.
Soon afterwards, Vice Marshal Jo started appearing again. What happened was that he had been treated for his kidney problems at a hospital in China under a special arrangement made by Kim Jong-il. I knew Jo had a kidney problem and I had heard him say how caring his leader was about his health. The North Korean system relies on trust and loyalty between the leader and his subordinates.
North Korea's top man in charge of inter-Korean relations Kim Yang-gun, who has normally little to do with U.S. affairs, also attended Kim Jong-il's meeting with Clinton. His attendance seemed to have been carefully choreographed to send a signal that the North Korean leader was conscious of the U.S. relations with the South and Seoul's sensitivity to the meeting. Kang Suk-ju, first vice foreign minister who had passed up the opportunity to take the position of foreign minister last year, of course attended the meeting as the chief foreign policy adviser to Chairman Kim.
North Korea's news media all reported that the Clinton-Kim Jong-il meeting had included ``candid and in-depth discussions on the pending issue … and reached a consensus of views on seeking a negotiated settlement of them." The reports also said Clinton ``reflected views on ways of improving the relations," conveying ``a verbal message" form President Obama.
The White House and Hillary Clinton, secretary of state, adamantly denied the North Korean reports, stating that there was ``no message from President Obama," and that the Clinton visit had no connection with the nuclear issue. President Obama reiterated on MSNBC that improved relations would involve the North Koreans ``no longer developing nuclear weapons, not engaging in provocative behavior." There is no change in the U.S. policy. Washington will continue to implement U.N. sanctions in an effort to curb North Korea's nuclear weapons and missile activities.
In his first public comment after his return from Pyongyang, Bill Clinton confirmed the purpose of his trip as a humanitarian mission. But he carefully added: ``I wanted our two countries to have the ability to decide where to go from here. But anything I say beyond that could inadvertently affect the decisions and moves either here or in North Korea and I have no business doing that. I am not a policymaker any more." Clinton will stay out of the North Korean business: there is one president at a time.
The administration's controlled management of the aftermath of Clinton's trip could be understood in the context of the international denuclearization effort involving South Korea, Japan, China and Russia, who all want the revival of the six-party talks.
However, it would probably require some new forms of dialogue to induce the North to denuclearize. The six-party talks are dead as far as the North Koreans are concerned. But they are ready for talks, bilateral or multilateral, which may eventually lead to the reinstatement of the Sept. 19, 2005, joint statement of the six-party talks.
In any case, it is high time that both Washington and Pyongyang took a fresh look at where they are and to get out of the box in search for a bold pragmatic path toward a win-win resolution of the half-century-old U.S.-North Korea hostile relationship. North Korea can survive without nuclear weapons and the United States can undertake negotiations before the North gives up its nuclear programs. The Clinton trip offers both sides a fresh opportunity to make the first positive move.
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Tong Kim is a research professor with the Ilmin Institute of International Relations at Korea University and an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He can be reached at tong.kim8@yahoo.com.