Will Trump swing hard or go for singles in foreign policy?

When former U.S. President Barack Obama faced criticisms that his foreign policy was too cautious, he used two phrases to justify his decisions. The first was “don’t do stupid stuff,” defending his caution in taking foreign policy risks. The second was an analogy of “hitting singles and doubles” rather than a “home run” in foreign policy achievements.

In contrast, current President Donald Trump, who has decried that the U.S. wasn’t “winning” on the international stage because its leaders lacked boldness in their actions, promised an aggressive pursuit of his “America First” foreign policy. Despite the rhetoric, however, Trump’s first term still largely displayed policy restraints. Trump’s policy advisors dissuaded him from several high-risk foreign policy decisions, such as making a “big deal” with North Korea, prolonging a trade war with China or attempting regime changes in the Middle East and Latin America.

Trump’s second term has featured significantly more aggressive, risky foreign policy behavior, becoming less restrained in the use of military force. Last year, the U.S. launched a military operation primarily targeting Iran’s nuclear facilities. In the Caribbean, the U.S. also engaged in controversial naval operations against vessels accused of drug trafficking.

This year, Trump’s military operations directly targeted two adversarial regimes’ leadership. In January, the U.S. military operation abducted Venezuela’s leader, Nicolas Maduro. Since last month, together with Israel, the U.S. has launched air strikes against Iran, killing Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and other Iranian officials.

Since his first term, Trump has been vocal in his threat to use force, saying he would unleash “fire and fury” against hostile countries. Yet Trump’s reluctance to bear the cost of military intervention has often posed restraints. His primary strategy was instead to rely on threats to pressure other countries to make concessions, then proclaim a diplomatic victory. Some foreign policy experts have compared Trump’s coercive strategy to the “gunboat diplomacy” or “big stick diplomacy” of U.S. administrations in the late 1800s.

So why is the Trump administration carrying out the threat to “swing hard” against Venezuela and Iran this year? There are multiple explanations, but I want to point to impatience. As Trump enters his sixth year of presidency, his impatience for a visible foreign policy victory may be increasing. During his first term, Trump expressed frustration toward two sources supposedly slowing down his foreign policy goals. One was the officials and agencies who attempted to restrain his decisions. The other was foreign leaders who made too few concessions. During his second term, Trump has rectified those frustrations, first by appointing government officials more likely to align with his preferred policies, then by intensifying pressure on other countries — allies and non-allies alike — to accommodate his policy demands.

To some observers, Trump has already achieved success through coercive pressure. But others downplay his results, especially in negotiating with authoritarian regimes such as Russia, China, North Korea and Iran. If Trump’s own judgment is that his threats have not achieved substantial policy wins with these regimes, it is plausible that he has become receptive to the suggestion that use of force may be able to achieve a “home run” breakthrough.

So far, the Trump administration’s military operations have revealed that the U.S. wields a powerful bat. Venezuela and Iran have suffered significant political and military losses. Russia and China, failing to protect their allies, have also suffered certain political and technological humiliations. Cuba, though not yet a target of U.S. military operation, nevertheless faces severe economic crisis resulting from the latter’s economic blockade.

However, it is uncertain how far the U.S. can advance its objectives through the use of force. A successful regime change may be assessed as a home run, but it is uncertain whether the current scale of U.S. military operations can achieve this objective. Pressuring the regimes of Venezuela, Iran and Cuba to change their domestic and foreign policies may be more achievable objectives, yet may still encounter drawn-out, defiant negotiations. As the Trump administration weighs the costs of prolonging its military operations (or in the case of Cuba, launching a new one), it will have to calculate the concessions it can realistically attain from these regimes.

A more optimistic prediction may be that the U.S. will achieve certain gains from its current military interventions. The Cuban and Venezuelan regimes appear more willing to negotiate, while the Iranian regime remains hostile. Yet, as the cost of war escalates on both sides, Iran may become willing to make some concessions. The Trump administration may then claim that its use of force achieved gains that diplomacy couldn’t.

A more concerning outlook, however, is that even with these successes, they may be perceived to be outweighed by the costs of military operations. To return to the baseball analogy, will winning only a single in negotiations with Iran be evaluated as worth the military casualties and the cost on the U.S. and global economy? Paradoxically, a president who swings the bat harder may face greater expectations to advance more bases. Subsequently, the Trump administration may struggle to articulate and justify its wins.

Frustration is rising around the world as powerful leaders fail to achieve meaningful progress despite prolonged international crises. For this reason, some people desperately hope for positive outcomes from Trump’s strategy. I also hope that the conflicts in the Middle East and Venezuela do not end with a strikeout, but with at least some gains that may compensate for the costs endured by so many.

Lee Jong-eun (Jong.Lee@ngu.edu) is an assistant professor of political science at North Greenville University. Prior to this, he served as a South Korean Air Force intelligence officer.