Abe stumbles

By John Burton

My office is near the Japanese Embassy, and every Wednesday I can hear the shouts of protesters at their weekly demonstrations, demanding that Tokyo pay reparations to the Korean women who were used as sex slaves by the Japanese army during World War II.

In recent weeks, the voices have been louder than usual as another issue has excited passions ― the decision by the Japanese Cabinet at the beginning of July to reinterpret the country’s pacifist constitution to allow the Japanese armed forces to provide military aid to close allies in the name of collective self-defense.

While strategists might see the move as an attempt by Japan to strengthen its military ties with the United States and South Korea in response to China’s growing regional might, many Koreans view the decision as a significant step toward Japanese militarism.

But what has largely escaped notice in the Korean media frenzy over Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s proposal is that the decision is also unpopular in Japan. Public support for Abe last month dropped to its lowest level since he was elected to his present term in December 2012, and legislative approval for the changes in the nation’s defense laws now looks uncertain.

Analysts say Abe will have to expend a great deal of political capital to push the military measures through the Diet, and that he may no longer be able to afford to do so when he also needs to win support for his economic reforms to revive the country’s faltering growth.

Despite talk about a right-wing nationalist shift in Japan, opinion polls reveal that the majority of Japanese still oppose changes to the country’s pacifist constitution. In particular, there has been criticism of the high-handed manner in which Abe gained Cabinet approval without any prior public consultation. This comes on top of a tightening of the state secrecy act last year that was criticized for undermining freedom of information access and harmed Abe’s popularity.

The New Komeito Party, the junior coalition partner in the government led by Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party, could emerge as a brake on the prime minister’s initiatives to beef up Japan’s security posture since it traditionally has been more dovish. It has already succeeded in watering down some aspects of the collective security proposal.

But perhaps the biggest threat to Abe’s defense ambitions is the state of the Japanese economy. The prime minister’s initial burst of popularity last year rested on “Abenomics,” his stimulus program to revive growth after two decades of stagnation. The program has proved less effective than advertised, with a widening trade deficit and persistent deflationary pressure.

The biggest blow came earlier this month when it was revealed that Japan’s GDP had shrunk 1.7 percent in the second quarter, the largest fall since the 2011 earthquake and tsunami. Private consumption plunged as the Abe government increased the sales tax, while job growth remains weak.

These developments look ominous for the Abe government. The prospect of future political trouble means the prime minister faces obstacles in pushing his collective security policy through the Diet when he needs to focus on saving the economy.

In light of the increasing difficult political landscape for Abe in Japan, the strident response among Korean officials and the media to his constitutional revision may seem counterproductive. It has only contributed to the bad feeling between Seoul and Tokyo and damaged what is one of Korea’s most important economic and security relationships. A more astute Korean leader might read the well-informed political assessments from the embassy in Tokyo and decide to allow Abe to stew in his own juices rather than cater to populist sentiment and score political points by bashing Japan.

If Korea wants to stop what it fears is the remilitarization of Japan, a more constructive approach would be for Seoul to talk to Washington and Beijing.

Korea perhaps needs to better coordinate its approach on the issue with Washington since it is the U.S. that has been pressing Japan for years to bolster its military role in the region.

But it is China that holds the key to whether Japan goes down the militarization route. Part of Abe’s initial popular appeal rested on his hawkish stance against China’s military rise, symbolized by the dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. The uncertain security situation has made Abe’s recent constitutional moves more palatable to many Japanese.

President Park Geun-hye should perhaps begin warning her newfound friends in Beijing that the volatile security situation caused by China’s more aggressive stance lies at the core of the problem. A major Sino-Japanese incident might be the only thing that could revive Abe’s dreams of a more militarily assertive Japan.

John Burton, a former Korea correspondent for the Financial Times, is now a Seoul-based independent journalist and media consultant. He can be reached at john. burton@insightcomms.com.