By Jason Lim
It has been only six months since President Lee Myung-bak took office, and yet I would be willing to bet that his tenure probably has already inspired more ``expert" pontifications and debates on leadership than all his predecessors combined. In fact, he might have already single-handedly jumpstarted a whole leadership industry in Korea, a sector worth about $50 billion in the United States today. In this way, at least, MB is living up to his billing as a business-friendly President.
Most of the leadership debates have so far centered on President Lee's failures in personal leadership, everything from his arbitrary decision making to ``follow me" leadership style, apparently forged from his days at Hyundai Engineering and Construction. However, the fact that all these troubles emerged during what should have been his honeymoon period leads me to believe that this is less a matter of personal leadership failure than mistakes in the management process of a presidential transition.
Managing a presidential transition is a Herculean task, presenting plenty of opportunities to falter as the president-elect shifts gears from campaigning to governing. And this was not just any transition. It marked a tectonic shift in the political history of modern Korea, heralding the triumphant ascension of the conservatives after ten years of exile. As such, expectations were so unrealistically high and urgent that not even Atlas could have borne its crushing weight. Also, there were many who were more than ready, willing, and able to help the new president fall.
Confusion and near-chaos necessarily characterizes most transitions, seriously impeding the incoming president from engaging fully in the urgent matter of running a country. But falling into this trap of urgency and thus failing to find the time for proper change management during a transition can really dictate the success or failures of the subsequent months, as MB's inner circle must have more than amply found out by now.
Analyzing MB's current troubles through the lens of change management points to two glaring errors:
One, MB committed the error of not creating a powerful enough coalition to back his policy initiatives. An attractive vision is not enough to induce real changes. Even a supposed political mandate is a puff of illusion when you have to change real preconceptions, guide through real laws, and drive real behaviors in order to make your political vision come true. Although major renewal programs usually begin with the powerful vision of one or two individuals, the actualization of a vision occurs as a result of a coalition of powerful backers who buy into the vision early on to create that critical mass needed for change. An incoming president needs to build up this ``tipping point" of engaged followers and stakeholders as quickly as possible in order to have something to show in the first few months. And unless such critical mass is achieved early on, the transformation effort mostly sputters and chokes on its own exhaust.
Two, MB committed the error of under-communicating his vision, which is something that happens so often in transitions that it should actually be elevated to one of the seven deadly sins of leadership. And, contrary to what most pundits have said, MB's communication failure is not really an issue of a ``communication stewardship," failing to bring the people along and inform them at every step of the process.
Nor can MB's communication failure be solely defined by not enough this or not enough that of broadcast messages, press conferences, or direct face-time with the people. If you had to run a country by getting the people's implicit permission for every policy change by using all the dizzyingly numerous options, you would be running a paralyzed mess with a swollen tongue. Most of these criticisms are nothing more than Monday-morning quarterbacking.
No, MB's supposed communication failure actually came from his initial appointments of his inner circle, when he failed to properly vet his nominees and showed glimpses of confusion and mismanagement. Any effective communication must be visible and experiential, constantly reinforcing the vision or image you want to impart to your audience.
For a president who came in as the professional antidote to the bumbling amateurism of the previous administration, even the tiniest chink in MB's image as a legendary, capable executive was bound to turn into a gaping wound by a people already burned by such amateurism. You can't behave antithetical to the vision and image that defined your candidacy and expect to emerge unscathed. The disappointment and cynicism unleashed by those seemingly minor episodes of amateurism by his transition team have led directly to the crisis of trust today.
Actions do speak louder than words, and you can bet that people are listening intently all the time. The real error comes from thinking that communication is a subset of management. In fact, management is a subset of communication.
Jason Lim is a 2007-2008 fellow at Harvard Korea Institute. He can be reached at jasonlim@post.harvard.edu