Price of chaos: Why a swift resolution in the Middle East is in S. Korea’s best interest

Chun In-bum

As the conflict between the U.S., Israel and Iran enters its fifth week, the world watches with a mixture of fatigue and growing dread. What began as a sharp escalation has settled into a deceptive lull — a “lull” only by the standard of total war.

In reality, intermittent American strikes continue, Israeli operations persist and Hezbollah’s barrage of rockets and drones remains far more frequent than Iran’s direct missile fire. We are standing on the precipice of a regional conflagration, and while rational actors seek to avoid a wider war, history teaches us that human folly is often the primary driver of international relations.

For South Korea, this is not a distant desert skirmish. It is an existential economic and strategic concern. Roughly 60 to 70 percent of South Korea’s crude oil imports transit through the Strait of Hormuz, making the stability of that narrow waterway directly tied to our economic survival. South Korea’s export-driven economy is also highly dependent on secure maritime trade routes, not only for energy imports but also for the shipment of semiconductors, automobiles, petrochemicals and manufactured goods to global markets.

Even temporary spikes in oil prices have immediate downstream consequences for South Korea. Higher energy costs fuel inflation, raise manufacturing and shipping expenses, weaken consumer confidence and place additional pressure on the Korean won. A prolonged period of instability in the Middle East would therefore not remain confined to the battlefield; it would be felt in Korean factories, ports, gas stations and household budgets.

As the deadline for negotiations stretches into mid-April, the window for a stable resolution is closing. In this high-stakes environment, we must move beyond emotional reactions to individual leaders and adopt a cold, realistic assessment of South Korea’s national interest.

Currently, the global narrative is dominated by fierce condemnation of the Trump administration’s role in creating this friction. Protests span the globe, and even within the United States, the backlash is potent. Critics argue that the administration was misled by Israel or driven by hubris. However, as strategists, we must ask the harder question: What happens to South Korea if the United States fails?

If the conflict concludes in a way that humiliates the United States or grants Iran a strategic victory, the fallout will extend far beyond the Middle East. A failed campaign would likely weaken U.S. political cohesion, reduce public confidence in American leadership and complicate Washington’s ability to sustain its commitments abroad. For a nation like South Korea, which relies on the ROK-U.S. alliance as the bedrock of its national security, a weakened America is not an abstract concern. It is a direct threat to our own long-term stability.

There are those who believe that South Korea’s military and robust economy can withstand these global shocks independently. This is a dangerous illusion. While South Korea possesses a strong military, our defense architecture remains deeply integrated with American intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets, missile defense systems, logistics networks and nuclear deterrence. In any major crisis involving North Korea or China, the United States remains indispensable to South Korea’s ability to deter aggression and sustain military operations.

Furthermore, the diplomatic cost of our current “wait-and-see” approach is rising. There is growing concern in Washington that some allies are content to benefit from U.S. security guarantees while remaining reluctant to share the burden during crises. In the current political climate, silence is often interpreted as distance. If the United States feels abandoned by its allies during a crisis, the resulting frustration could manifest itself through economic pressure, harsher trade negotiations or a reassessment of security priorities in Asia. To protect our interests, Seoul must be more vocal and more proactive in demonstrating support for its principal ally.

We must also consider the economic reality of a prolonged stalemate. A stalemate is merely an extension of anxiety. It keeps oil prices elevated, keeps shipping lanes dangerous and keeps the global economy in a constant state of uncertainty. There are several ways this conflict could end: a decisive U.S. and Israeli success, a negotiated settlement, a prolonged stalemate or a wider regional escalation. Of those outcomes, the least damaging for South Korea is not endless war, but a rapid conclusion that restores deterrence, stabilizes energy markets and preserves American credibility.

Advocating for military action is never comfortable. However, a swift resolution favorable to U.S. strategic objectives is objectively better for South Korea than a long, drawn-out crisis that weakens our primary security partner. A humiliated, unstable United States will not lower oil prices, strengthen the Korean won or improve South Korea’s security environment.

This is not about loyalty to any specific American politician or enthusiasm for war. It is about the pragmatic recognition that South Korea’s prosperity is inextricably linked to a stable and functional United States. A world in which America becomes weaker, more divided and less credible is a world in which South Korean security becomes far more uncertain.

As we enter the fifth week of this crisis, the time for hedging has passed. South Korea should hope for, and diplomatically support, a swift resolution that restores stability and American credibility. For South Korea, the least bad outcome is not endless conflict, but a short crisis that leaves the United States credible, the global economy stable and the alliance intact.

Retired Lt. Gen. Chun In-bum is the former commander of the Republic of Korea Army Special Warfare Command.