Motives behind Xi’s visit to Pyongyang

Choo Jae-woo

Chinese President Xi Jinping’s two-day visit to North Korea raises numerous questions. Many observers are confused about his goals — why at this time, and what he achieved from the meeting. They believe Xi was concerned about Pyongyang’s connection with Moscow being too tight for Beijing’s diplomatic standing in their trilateral relationship. Does North Korean leader Kim Jung-un play China off Russia? Why was North Korean or Korean Peninsula disarmament not discussed? Could Beijing be acknowledging Pyongyang as a nuclear weapon state? My conclusion is no to the first two questions and yes to the last.

After Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Pyongyang in April, rumors spread that Xi would visit North Korea soon. Many thought a July visit would be a better option politically as it would mark the 65th anniversary of the friendship treaty between the two countries. No Chinese leader has visited on the event. After the foreign minister returned, Xi would then visit two months later. It would be odd to delay the visit beyond two months diplomatically. Naturally, a question arises. Why did Xi chose North Korea for his first international trip this year? Was he worried about Pyongyang and Moscow's apparent growing closeness? Was he forced to announce China's participation to strengthen the trilateral cooperation that has grown since Kim and Russian President Vladimir Putin attended the Victory Day parade in Beijing in September?

Chinese officials seem unconcerned about giving Xi’s first overseas destination this year, Pyongyang, political significance, as it was a reciprocal visit to Kim’s visit to China last September. Strategy dictates that the trilateral coalition among China, North Korea and Russia should strengthen its unity against a developing U.S.-led alliance in the Pacific. Putin visited North Korea in June 2023 and signed a semi-alliance friendship and cooperation treaty. Pyongyang’s ties with Moscow has grown since then, with North Korea sending troops to the Ukrainian war in the fall of 2023 and supplied Russian forces with ammunition.

Given the current situation, it is possible that Beijing perceived itself as falling behind in the trilateral cooperation. The timing of reaffirming China's position was of utmost importance, driven not by anxiety over the scheduled meeting between Xi and U.S. President Donald Trump last April. The Xi-Trump summit was followed by a summit between the Chinese leader and Putin, which set the stage for China to pursue its objective with increased aggression. In the joint statement issued after the Sino-Russian summit, a clear opposition to all military measures undertaken by the United States on the Korean Peninsula was articulated. This includes extended nuclear deterrence, nuclear power sharing, the nuclear umbrella and the missile defense system that South Korea is pursuing, referred to as the Kill Chain. Political and defense compromises brokered by Putin have allowed Xi to assert his intention to “strengthen top-level planning and strategic guidance for China-North Korea relations in the new era” during his meeting with Kim.

Following his promise, Xi revealed some crude ideas to achieve them, including an increase in military exchanges. While he did not elaborate, circumstantial evidence allows an intellectual estimate. Last September, Kim met with Xi and Putin in Beijing to discuss bilateral and trilateral military cooperation. The three nations agreed to a military drill. North Korea is currently unavailable to do this. No land combined exercise is almost impossible. They have historically prohibited foreign military from entering their country save for port calls. Even port calls were rare. That is why China and Russia conduct land joint military exercises in a third nation as part of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) defense initiatives.

North Korea’s participation in military exercises alongside China and Russia is likely to occur exclusively in maritime contexts, similar to the bilateral engagements between Beijing and Moscow. North Korea’s advancement in naval capabilities is of significant importance. Kim has intermittently highlighted the significance of this initiative in 2022 and 2024. However, it was not until March 2026 that he formally designated it as a national project. In June, he visited a shipyard to inspect the construction process of two naval vessels: the Choe Hyung-ho and Kang Gun-ho, both classified as 5,000 ton-class battleships, in April and June, respectively.

At this point, North Korea finds itself in a position where it does not need to leverage its relationship with Russia against China, as it has done so in previous instances. The balancing tactic or tightrope diplomacy that Pyongyang previously employed during the Cold War era is no longer aligned with its strategic interests. North Korea is under pressure to rapidly enhance its naval capabilities, following a declaration made by Kim in 2024. He aims to increase the number of his naval vessels by 2.5 times. This marks a crucial juncture in the cooperation between China and Russia, particularly regarding the supply of materials, parts, equipment and weapons. In November 2025, Kim expressed his desire for his nation to transition into a normal state, signaling an intention to enhance its diplomatic presence, especially within the Global South. He can utilize platforms such as the SCO and BRICS Plus, which are established and led by China and Russia. This factor hinders Kim's ability to employ a strategy that involves playing one off the other.

For this reason, Xi added two concepts to assist the initiative. China wants to improve “local areas and sister city” cooperation, indicating that geographical barriers won’t matter. This project opens economic potential for local governments and entrepreneurs in both nations, possible extending to North Korean shipyards. The other involved redefining the two nations’ regional interests. Xi stressed that “Asia is the common home where regional countries, including China and the DPRK, coexist and prosper.” The statement implies that the two countries’ regional collaboration will grow beyond the Korean Peninsula. Kim’s persistent support for China’s “One China” principle and opposition to foreign involvement in Taiwan since September certainly contributed to this indirect embrace. After Xi’s visit, China has equalized its position in its trilateral coalition with Russia and North Korea. In this context, it is only natural that North Korea’s denuclearization is off the table for discussion.

Choo Jae-woo is a professor at Kyung Hee University. The views expressed here are his own.