Where are anti-Chinese protests?

By Andrew Salmon

Seoul’s Myeongdong is eerily quiet at present. I am not talking about the lack of Chinese tourism bustle in the department stores, I am talking about the lack of angry Korean shouts outside the Chinese embassy.

Across South Korea ― a country which is hyper-sensitive to national slights, as witnessed by the endless anti-Japanese protests and massive anti-American protests ― the lack of indignation is astonishing. Making this doubly odd is that this silence is resounding at a time when the populace is politically mobilized and emotionally bubbling.

How can we define Chinese pressure on Korea for its deployment of the THAAD missile-defense system? Punishment for a sovereign political decision made by Seoul. However, this punishment is not being administered via diplomacy: Economics has been linked to politics. Chinese tourist numbers are falling, and Korean investors are taking hits on Chinese soil.

These actions are deeply hypocritical, for Seoul offered Beijing the initiative on this issue. For the first half of her term, Park Geun-hye cozied up to Xi Jinping, hoping against hope that he would enact real sanctions against North Korea that would impact Pyongyang’s strategic arms programs.

He never did. So Park turned to traditional ally Washington and green-lighted THAAD. As a result, Beijing has turned the blowtorch of its anger not upon Pyongyang, but upon Seoul.

Is THAAD of use to South Korea? Could it bring down North Korean ballistic missiles? Perhaps. And if those are nuclear tipped, that could save millions of lives.

The problem, of course, is that within the geographical confines of the peninsula, North Korea does not need a ballistic missile to deliver Armageddon to the South. They could place a nuclear warhead on a cruise missile. Or, more likely, pile fissile materials into a mini-submarine, which they can sail into Busan or Incheon harbor, or into a small truck, which they can drive through a tunnel under the DMZ and park in central Seoul.

However, the system has another use: as the forward element of a layered defense of the US mainland. The United States has saved Korea countless billions of dollars over decades with the presence of US Forces Korea. Now, is it not reasonable for South Korea to assist its ally with a defensive system?

Meanwhile, China shows it cannot be trusted. The obvious learning is for Korean businesses to start hedging investments and diversifying export destinations, so they are no longer reliant upon Beijing’s goodwill.

Despite the above, and despite market research that suggests China’s brand is fraying in Korean eyes, there are no protests. Why not? Imagine if Tokyo or Washington were acting as Beijing is: The roars would be thunderous. Perhaps, local emotion is not yet sufficiently stoked. Perhaps, this inaction is based on fear that Beijing will react more harshly than Washington or Tokyo. Or perhaps, liberals are unwilling to act for ideological reasons.

Regardless, my sense is that the next Seoul administration will kowtow before Beijing. That would be a mistake.

On the moral front, it would be surrendering to bullying. On the practical front, what would stop China using similar tactics in future disputes?

From the ancient historical perspective, it would indicate the return of a subservient, vassal-state stance toward “The Middle Kingdom.” From a modern historical perspective, it would be rewarding the same government ― indeed, the same party ― that prevented the imminent unification of the peninsula when it intervened in the Korean War in October 1950.

On the geo-strategic front, it could eventually see the United States and Japan forging a closer alliance, with South Korea left on the outside ― or even being sucked into Beijing’s orbit.

Let us be clear about the implications of that. Does South Korea ― a modern, liberal polity, belong on the same side of the table as one-party state China and its client state, despotic North Korea? For every political, diplomatic, strategic and ― above all, ethical ― reason, I would argue, “no.”

At a time in which South Korea is being viewed as a beacon of democratic freedom and people-power action, for Seoul to shift in that direction would be supremely ironic.

Andrew Salmon is a Seoul-based reporter and author. Reach him at andrewcsalmon@yahoo.co.uk.