Opinion - The Korea Times

Kim Jong-un: his first five years

By Andrei LankovNext month it will be five years since the sudden death of Kim Jong-il led to the second dynastic transition in North Korean history. Kim Jong-un’s reign is approaching the five-year mark, the length of a presidential term in many modern democracies, so it is probably a good time to say what we think of the young North Korean leader.To an extent, we can see the directions that Kim Jong-un wants to take and the trajectory that he wants to steer his country toward. I would dare to describe Kim Jong-un as a modest, perhaps hyper-cautious, but rather determined reformer in economic matters. Unfortunately, his foreign policy is difficult to appraise in anything but a critical fashion: it is quite likely that, in the long run, his diplomatic blunders will be his undoing.But let’s start with the good news. In the last five years the North Korean economy has grown faster than any time since the early 1980s. Economic statistics are murky, speculative and controversial, but the majority of inside observers (diplomatic staff in Pyongyang) tend to estimate growth as b

Dec 11, 2016By Andrei Lankov

Andrei Lankov

Troubles ahead?

By Andrei LankovA new U.S. President has been elected, and this time the world’s most powerful job went to, should we say, a rather unconventional person. Indeed, a former real estate tycoon and TV celebrity is not the type of individual we expect to see in the Oval Office. But such was the will of the people, and the outside world must adjust to this new era.To what extent Donald Trump’s domestic and foreign policies will follow the rather wild promises he generously delivered on the campaign trail remains unknown. Some economist friends are optimistic that some of Trumps’ proposals may work well. We will have to wait and see. Inhabitants of this rather small peninsula in Northeast Asia, however, have good reason to feel uneasy about the next four, perhaps eight years.What little is known about Donald Trump and his world view does not bode well for stability on the Korean Peninsula. During his campaign, Trump offered clues about his approach to North Korea. First, he said in an interview, rather casually, that he would not mind talking to Kim Jong-un ― or, to be mo

Nov 27, 2016By Andrei Lankov

Andrei Lankov

Bridge to nowhere?

By Andrei LankovThe New Yalu Bridge separates the twin cities of Sinuiju and Dandong, lying opposite each other on the Chinese and North Korean sides of the Yalu River respectively.The very existence of the bridge, however, is nowhere to be found in local Chinese media. State censors do not want a reminder of what is gradually becoming a chronic embarrassment; a living (and very expensive) symbol of the uneasy nature of Sino-North Korean relations.Over the many decades since the Korean War, commercial traffic between Sinuiju and Dandong has been serviced by a 1943 bridge originating in downtown Dandong. The narrow passageway is used by both trucks and trains. Decades of heavy use and poor maintenance have made the one-time marvel of engineering dilapidated and unreliable. The New Yalu Bridge still accounts for about two thirds of all land traffic between North Korea and the outside world.Thus, it seemed only logical when in 2009 during a visit of then-Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao to Pyongyang, North Korea and China agreed to build a second bridge, built with the very best materi

Nov 13, 2016By Andrei Lankov

Andrei Lankov

A bit of (realistic) pessimism

By Andrei Lankov Recent talks, technically “Track Two” and “unofficial,” between former U.S. diplomats and North Korean representatives, have predictably spawned a number of speculative suggestions for solving the North Korean nuclear problem. This is understandable, particularly in an era where dialogue is so scarce between DC and Pyongyang, but as somebody who has dealt with North Korea for some 30 years, I have a rather pessimistic, if realistic, answer to the perennial question: What could bring about a solution to the North Korean nuclear problem? My answer is simple: “Short of a military strike or revolution, nothing ”(as long as by ‘solution’ one means ‘complete denuclearization of North Korea’).As decades-long experience has demonstrated, neither sanctions nor negotiations will work. Both have been tried, and both failed, in a rather spectacular fashion.North Korean decision makers see nuclear weapons as their only security guarantee; an absolute deterrent, an infallible defense against would-be attackers foolis

Oct 30, 2016By Andrei Lankov

Andrei Lankov

Phone revolution

By Andrei Lankov Foreign journalists love to take pictures of people on the streets of Pyongyang (preferably nice looking and smartly dressed women, of course) busily chatting over their mobile phones. Indeed, the penetration of North Korea by mobile technology as attracted much attention worldwide (not the least of which because mobile phones are seen as an embodiment modern technology and by extension, capitalism). The arrival of mobile technology in the North was, and is, an important change and is likely to produce numerous cultural and social consequences. It is often overlooked, however, that North Korea’s mobile networks (there are two, which we will see later) is only a part, if an important one, of a generally unnoticed communication revolution, which began to engulf North Korea in the early 2000s. Generally speaking, all communist states in the Soviet era were remarkably indifferent to non-military communications, especially when the communication system in question served the interest of the common people. Long waiting lists for home telephones were th

Oct 16, 2016By Andrei Lankov

Andrei Lankov

Diplomatic roller coaster

By Andrei LankovChina is routinely described in the world’s media as “North Korea’s sole ally,” but this statement is rather misleading: the relations between Beijing and Pyongyang have never been easy, and the friendly official rhetoric all too often has served as a thin veneer, masking a great level of mistrust and suspicion. In the last year, since September 2015 or so, Sino-North Korean relations have been uncertain to say the least. Periods of warmth have been followed in quick succession by sudden cooling, and periods of near open hostility have given way to renewed cordialityBy the summer of 2015, relations between China and North Korea had been bad for a few years. It was an open secret that President Xi Jinping does not like the young North Korean strongman, and such feelings obviously have been reciprocated by Kim Jong Un. The Chinese downgraded official exchanges, and halted all major infrastructure projects which had begun during the thaw of 2008-2011. The North Korean media made thinly veiled attacks on China ― and the Chinese official media

Oct 2, 2016By Andrei Lankov

Andrei Lankov

Bridges of Dandong county

By Andrei LankovBridges connect countries ― few people would argue with this remark. If a country needs connections with the outside world, it builds a bridge, and if it wants to be left alone, it sees a bridge as a threat. There are few places in the world where this can be seen more clearly than on the banks of the Lower Yalu River, where the North Korean city of Sinuiju and Chinese city of Dandong face one another.For over a century the link between Dandong and Sinuiju has remained the major connection between North Korea and China.The cities acquired such a role in 1905 when the Japanese completed the trans-Korean railway line that connected Busan, Seoul and Sinuiju. It was destined to become the major transportation axis of the entire peninsula.Predictably, the new railway was soon connected to the fast expanding railway network of northeast China. The first bridge was completed in 1911. By the standards of the time, it was a big engineering project, since the Yalu River is some 900 meters wide there.Soon afterward, the Yalu and Tuman ― two rivers that divide Korea and China ― w

Sep 18, 2016By Andrei Lankov

Andrei Lankov

Jumping the ship

By Andrei Lankov The recent few months have been marked by a significant increase in the number of the elite defection from North Korea ― a defection of the North Korean minister from London is yet another such incident, but it is believed that up to seven North Korean diplomats have defected this year.Some analysts have expressed belief that this increase is an indication of the growing legitimacy crisis the North Korean regime faces. Some even suggest that an outbreak of a North Korean revolution might be closer than we think. However, there are reasons to be skeptical about such predictions.There are two facts about defections which are not widely understood by the general public. First, defection from North Korea is a relatively recent phenomenon. Second, majority of the defectors in the last 15 years have consisted of people of very humble origin.Indeed, between 1953 when the Armistice ended the Korean War and the late 1990s, the number of defections was very small, usually few persons a year. It was only in the late 1990s when the situation in China and the disintegration

Sep 4, 2016By Andrei Lankov

Andrei Lankov

Large, moody and dangerous

 By Andrei Lankov  It is clear, that since mid-July, the relations between South Korea and China, which in recent years had been quite friendly, have begun to deteriorate quickly. The reason for this crisis is widely known: in July, despite stern warnings from Beijing, the South Korean government decided to deploy the THAAD anti-missile system of the U.S. which is hopefully capable of protecting South Korea against a possible North Korean missile attack.While the THAAD system is said to be technically incapable of intercepting Chinese missiles (at least this is what the U.S. and South Korean governments claim), the decision itself greatly annoyed the Chinese government. Rightly or wrongly, it’s seen to be what they consider a dangerous precedent which might eventually open the gate for large scale deployment of the U.S. anti-missile defense systems in East Asia ― a development China has reason to worry about, since it will reduce the efficiency of its nuclear deterrent.So, predictably, China is expressing its displeasure ― and, remarkably, it is frequently done in way

Aug 21, 2016By Andrei Lankov

Andrei Lankov

Alliance of convenience

By Andrei Lankov Many, if not most, Westerners with a passing interest in North Korea tend to believe that in the bygone days of the Communist bloc the Soviet Union and North Korea were close allies. This is a gross mistake.While relations between Moscow and Pyongyang were initially quite close, from the late 1950s they deteriorated rapidly and significantly. Hence, the 1960 to 1990 period can be best described as a time of a pragmatic alliance driven not by any ideological solidarity but rather by cold, practical geopolitical concerns.It is true that the North Korean state came into existence in the late 1940s as a result of Soviet-inspired and Soviet-controlled social engineering. It might be a bit excessive to describe North Korea in 1945-50 as a “Soviet puppet state”, but the level of micromanagement of North Korean affairs by Soviet officials stationed in the country then was high.However, it was not only the Soviets who were using Kim Il-sung, but also Kim using the Soviets, and at the end of the day, it was Kim who came out on top. In the 1950s, while still pr

Aug 7, 2016By Andrei Lankov

Andrei Lankov

Read more

Kim Jong-un: his first five years

Troubles ahead?

Bridge to nowhere?

A bit of (realistic) pessimism

Phone revolution

Diplomatic roller coaster

Bridges of Dandong county

Jumping the ship

Large, moody and dangerous

Alliance of convenience

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