A bit of (realistic) pessimism

By Andrei Lankov

Recent talks, technically “Track Two” and “unofficial,” between former U.S. diplomats and North Korean representatives, have predictably spawned a number of speculative suggestions for solving the North Korean nuclear problem. This is understandable, particularly in an era where dialogue is so scarce between DC and Pyongyang, but as somebody who has dealt with North Korea for some 30 years, I have a rather pessimistic, if realistic, answer to the perennial question: What could bring about a solution to the North Korean nuclear problem? My answer is simple: “Short of a military strike or revolution, nothing ”(as long as by ‘solution’ one means ‘complete denuclearization of North Korea’).

As decades-long experience has demonstrated, neither sanctions nor negotiations will work. Both have been tried, and both failed, in a rather spectacular fashion.

North Korean decision makers see nuclear weapons as their only security guarantee; an absolute deterrent, an infallible defense against would-be attackers foolish enough to mess with a nuclear North Korea. It means not only insulation from a foreign attack, but also increases the chances of surviving a major domestic crisis. The assumption is that nuclear weapons afford the Kim Family and its supporters time and space to deal with local rebellion, should it happen, in a harsh way, without bothering with nonsense such as ‘no-fly-zones’ and the like.

Recent events have demonstrated quite clearly to Pyongyang that nuclear weapons are, indeed, the only guarantee of regime security. Muammar Gaddafi was the only strongman in recent history who agreed to swap his country’s nuclear weapons program for promises of economic advantages ― and got killed because he was too credulous. North Korea believes that Western powers would be less likely to support the local anti-Gaddafi forces had he maintained his arsenal. Without foreign assistance it’s less clear if the rebels would have been victorious.

Thus, the North Korean leadership believes that nuclear deterrence is the only thing which might keep them in power and alive if things get really bad. They are not going to do what Gaddafi did, they will not negotiate the denuclearization in exchange for a brighter economy, partially because they do not believe these promises anyway (especially having witnessed recent turmoil in the Middle East), and partially because the economic growth and well-being of the population is much lower on their agenda then regime survival.

But is it possible, as many argue today, to use sanctions to create discontent among the elite or general population, thus forcing denuclearization of Kim Jong-un’s regime? Unfortunately, this is an unrealistic expectation that does not reflect the realities on the ground.

First, there is no chance that economic difficulties, present or future, will spark elite discontent. It is true that most dictators have to buy the loyalty of their henchmen and thus need capital. However, North Korea is different. The North Korean generals and apparatchiks, no doubt, appreciate a Mercedes and a good bottle of cognac, but, unlike their peers in other dictatorships, they also know that they are cornered. It is the presence of a very rich South Korea that makes the difference. If stability is threatened in North Korea and the country goes down in flames, it is likely to mean the absorption of the North by the South. For the North Korean elite this means the loss of all power and, perhaps, freedom (and some of them are (rightly) afraid of going to the lampposts, a la 18th century France).

Only excruciating sanctions, strong enough to bring down the economy and even cause famine have some chance to succeed. However, these chances are slim. China will not allow this to happen, however, since Beijing is more afraid of North Koreas’ collapse and Korean unification than North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. Sanctions without Chinese acquiescence become mostly impotent. Further, even in the event of crisis, the North Korean elites will stubbornly cling to their nuclear program on the assumption that denuclearization will merely postpone a revolution for few years, while a nuclear arsenal will give them an opportunity to survive the challenge.

We are left with a pessimistic conclusion: nothing will work, at least in the short term. Of course, in a democratic country every new administration will have to repeat the same song and dance: sanctions on one end, negotiations on the other, and various moves in between. History leaves little doubt that these attempts will end in failure.

Presumably, some partial and imperfect solutions are possible ― like, say, a negotiated freeze of North Korea’s nuclear program (it will cost a lot of money, no doubt). However, North Korea will remain nuclear as long as the Kim family stays in power, which might mean a few more years, or a few more decades.

Andrei Lankov was born in St. Petersburg, Russia, and teaches at Kookmin University in Seoul. Reach him at anlankov@yahoo.com.