By Andrei Lankov
A couple of months ago, many a North Korea watcher, including my humble self, suddenly found themselves in an exciting situation as strange things began to happen in Pyongyang.
When Kim Jong-il died last December, it was widely believed that the new leader in Pyongyang, his son and successor Kim Jong-un, lacked the power base and experience to seriously deviate from his father’s line even if this were his secret wish.
However, developments in July and August surprised observers. Suddenly Kim Jong-un began to introduce a rather radical set of new policies. The most attention was given to his willingness to show off his beautiful wife Ri Sol-ju, as well as his explicit endorsement of American music ― which for decades had been damned, along with all other things relating to American culture, as decadent. But more attention should be paid to other things discussed at the time, like say the June 28 measures which envisaged economic reform including dramatic changes in agricultural management.
According to the measures, farmers were supposed to keep some 30 percent of their harvest for themselves and family-based production units (albeit in a politically correct wording) were supposed to be introduced as well. Around the same time it was rumored that in October, North Korean industrial enterprises would be given hitherto unthinkable managerial leverage, which would also resemble what was undertaken in China in the early 1980s.
Having been burned by a number of false dawns, many observers remained cautious, but some (including myself) began to claim that contrary to earlier expectations, Kim Jong-un had begun to implement Chinese style reforms. The North still might indeed be heading in this direction, but since mid-September unusual news stopped coming out of Pyongyang.
The dutiful and beautiful Ri has not been seen for over a month (she was last mentioned in the North Korean media on Sept. 26). She probably has not been purged (as some have improbably claimed), and her disappearance is likely to have a simple medical or personal reason: North Korea’s first lady is widely rumored to be pregnant. However there are some slightly less superficial changes (or lack thereof) as well.
The expected changes to industrial management have yet to be seen, even though October is now over. According to some reports, farmers were recently told that the June 28 measures will not be implemented immediately, because North Korea has allegedly suffered from unusually bad weather of late, making such experiments prohibitively expensive for the time being.
So, the tempo of change in North Korea, which dramatically increased in mid-July then, also suddenly, slowed down in late September. We, as outsiders can only guess as to why.
One possible explanation is a factional struggle. Admittedly, no one knows much about factions in the North Korean leadership, so references to “factional struggles” often serve as a convenient non-explanatory explanation for all things which look strange and illogical. Factional struggles must exist in North Korea but we know next to nothing about such conflicts.
It is also possible that Kim was persuaded by some conservatively-minded officials that reforms are for the time being too politically dangerous (and reforms are politically dangerous). And as a result he might have chosen to follow his father’s line, and canceled (or at least postponed) the reforms he and his advisors had seemingly planned.
But there is another possible, indeed credible explanation. In August, Jang Seong-thaek, the dictator’s uncle and reputedly the most influential of all his advisors, traveled to China, reputedly seeking capital to finance the putative economic reforms. According to reports, he came back empty handed, and it therefore makes sense that the North Korean leadership postponed their ambitious plans until they could obtain capital. Indeed, this might have been a wise move, in order for reforms to have a realistic chance of succeeding, the North Korean government will need a large amount of aid and support.
At present then the situation is rather uncertain. Next spring may be significant. If the North Korean government is serious about change, then it makes sense to start from agriculture. Because agricultural reform is impossible to hide due to its scale, outsiders will learn about changes in the property and management system in the countryside in next to no time.
Right now, no one can predict where things will go. It is possible that for the next few years we will see a continuation of Kim Jong-il’s policies but it is also possible that the commotion that was seen in July and August is actually a sign of things to come. We should of course wait and watch. North Korea watching is a very uncertain business but it is not dull.
Professor Andrei Lankov was born in St. Petersburg, Russia, and now teaches at Kookmin University in Seoul. You can reach him at anlankov@yahoo.com.