After the Han, a miracle on the Mekong?

Forty years after Vietnam launched Doi Moi, a farmer in Can Tho offers a starting point for considering its next leap. Le Dong Phuong initially doubted that sowing fewer seeds could maintain her rice harvest. According to a 2024 World Bank account, repeated visits to demonstration farms eventually convinced her. Before changing how she worked, she needed evidence that the change would benefit her household.

Vietnam’s ambitions are on a different scale.

Its 14th Party Congress in January set a target of average annual GDP growth of at least 10 percent for 2026-2030, alongside the goal of becoming a high-income country by 2045. These ambitions invite a familiar Korean question: could a miracle on the Mekong follow the miracle on the Han?

I believe Korea’s most useful contribution begins with an honest reading of its own experience. Education, infrastructure and technological learning helped Korean companies raise their competitiveness. Yet success at the top did not automatically produce prosperity throughout the supply chain. These achievements and difficulties are cues Vietnam can take from Korea.

The OECD’s 2024 survey of Korea notes that unfair subcontracting practices can hold back smaller firms’ productivity. For suppliers, the price a powerful buyer is willing to pay affects the money available for equipment, wages and innovation. Dependence on one customer can also weaken bargaining power, even when the relationship brings steady orders. Helping Vietnamese firms enter a supply chain should therefore mean helping them build capabilities they can retain and use elsewhere.

Vietnam’s export figures make that concern relevant. Its National Statistics Office reported that the foreign-invested sector, including crude oil exports, accounted for 77.3 percent of merchandise exports in 2025. Domestic-sector exports fell 6.1 percent. These figures classify exporters by ownership, rather than measuring every Vietnamese contribution to exported goods. They nevertheless invite scrutiny of the opportunities available to domestic firms.

Samsung’s own account, published by Vietnam’s Industry Agency, put Vietnamese first- and second-tier suppliers at 306 in 2023, up from 25 in 2014. The next question is what those relationships enable: sophisticated production, knowledge retained within local firms and earnings sufficient to finance further improvement. Supplier numbers alone cannot tell us.

An Oct. 8 meeting between Samsung Vietnam and the Industry Agency pointed toward a practical next step. The Ministry of Industry and Trade reported discussions about expanding Vietnamese participation, including engagement with procurement and product-development divisions in Korea. The agency also sought better information about purchasing needs and supplier selection criteria.

For a manufacturer considering machinery, that information matters. Training may improve production, but the owner must judge whether orders justify the expense. Buyers cannot promise contracts regardless of price or quality. They can explain qualification requirements, offer feedback and clarify the route toward a trial order.

Cooperation programs should follow what happens next. Do participating firms secure repeat business? Can they undertake more demanding work or attract additional customers? Vietnamese companies must also improve management and give skilled employees reasons to stay. Industrial learning becomes durable when firms have both the ability and the incentive to invest.

Phuong’s experience brings the same question into the rice field. The World Bank’s agricultural project combined cultivation advice with infrastructure and market connections. Its 2024 account reported average earnings gains of 30 percent among participating farmers across roughly 185,000 hectares. The connection with manufacturing is practical: new knowledge becomes valuable when people can afford to apply it and benefit from doing so.

Korean involvement is concrete. A May 2025 World Bank article describes a $1.5 million Korea–World Bank Partnership Facility grant supporting Vietnam’s low-carbon rice program. The Korea Rural Economic Institute contributes policy and technology knowledge that can be adapted to Vietnamese conditions. Such cooperation works from priorities Vietnam has established for itself.

Water conditions impose limits that training cannot overcome. Drought and saltwater intrusion threaten livelihoods in the Mekong Delta. Better cultivation must be accompanied by water management and opportunities for other employment where farming becomes less dependable. A family cannot be expected to solve an environmental threat simply by becoming more efficient.

A Vietnamese miracle must follow Vietnam’s choices. Korea’s experience is useful when it helps local firms and households make informed decisions about their own future. In a 2025 World Bank article, Phuong described being better able to provide for her children and cover expenses. That brings the question of a miracle back to daily life.

Forty years after Doi Moi, Vietnam’s next leap will matter most when more firms can invest and more families can plan. Phuong needed to see results before changing her methods. Suppliers deserve a similar basis for deciding whether to invest. An owner needs that evidence before borrowing for equipment or committing the family’s savings. Korean buyers should make qualification criteria accessible and work with Vietnamese partners to report whether training leads to repeat orders.

Shin Go-eun is an associate professor at the University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Vietnam National University Ho Chi Minh City.