Making Mecca Agreement and Abraham Accords compatible

The Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, signed on Aug. 7 by Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan, signals a potential shift in the Middle East’s security order. Saudi Arabia is home to Islam’s two holiest sites — Mecca and Medina — and is a global oil powerhouse. Turkey is a major NATO military power with a robust defense industry. Pakistan is the only Muslim-majority country with nuclear weapons. Together, these countries could reshape the region’s security landscape and influence developments well beyond the Middle East.

Initially, many observers were skeptical about the agreement, questioning whether the alliance could work in practice. Such doubts reflected the belief that the three countries have divergent security concerns and strategic priorities. However, contrary to these expectations, they moved quickly. Within weeks, they agreed to establish a secretariat in Saudi Arabia. Following renewed Houthi attacks, Pakistan stepped up its military support and Turkey provided air defense and technical assistance.

The agreement’s central provision resembles Article 5 of the NATO treaty in that an armed attack against one member is treated as an attack against all three. Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal adds another dimension. The agreement does not automatically extend Pakistan’s nuclear umbrella to its partners. Nevertheless, any potential aggressor would have to consider the possibility of Pakistani nuclear involvement. That uncertainty alone could strengthen deterrence.

The agreement reflects a broader shift in regional thinking. Since World War II, the United States has been the Middle East’s leading external security guarantor. But the recent war involving Iran has exposed the vulnerabilities of American security commitments. Regional powers are seeking additional safeguards while maintaining their partnerships with Washington. A more layered regional security structure is emerging.

Through the U.S.-brokered Abraham Accords in 2020, Israel normalized relations with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, followed by Morocco and Sudan. Saudi Arabia could be the next major diplomatic breakthrough. Its participation could encourage other Arab and Muslim-majority countries to follow suit.

Instead, Riyadh has joined a defense alliance with Turkey and Pakistan, both of which have strained relations with Israel. Israeli concerns are understandable, yet the Mecca Agreement should not automatically be viewed as an anti-Israel alliance. Its members have not identified Israel or any other country as their common enemy. Moreover, the three countries have different threat perceptions and strategic priorities. Strong Israeli opposition could push them closer together and give the alliance a more explicitly anti-Israel character. Israel should therefore respond with restraint and adapt pragmatically to the evolving security environment.

Israel and Saudi Arabia also share important strategic interests. Both have an interest in regional stability, freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea and protection against Iran and regional armed groups. Israel’s advanced air defense systems and cutting-edge technologies could also benefit Saudi Arabia.

What if Riyadh strengthened its security through the Mecca Agreement while gradually improving relations with Israel? The two arrangements could then become complementary rather than confrontational.

Saudi Arabia holds the key. As the central force behind the Mecca Agreement, it could also help expand the Abraham Accords. Its religious standing, economic resources and influence over global energy markets give it considerable diplomatic leverage.

Riyadh could pursue three goals simultaneously: maintain its security partnership with Washington, deepen defense cooperation with Turkey and Pakistan, and keep the door open to normalizing diplomatic relations with Israel. Washington should respect this diplomatic flexibility rather than force Saudi Arabia to choose sides.

One major obstacle, however, remains: the Palestinian question.

Israel’s Oct. 27 elections could provide an opportunity to reconsider the country’s regional policy. Regardless of the next government’s composition, normalization with Saudi Arabia will remain difficult without meaningful progress toward resolving the Palestinian question. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has repeatedly emphasized the need for a credible path to Palestinian statehood.

Israel understandably seeks lasting security. But can military superiority alone guarantee the security of the Middle East? A serious reconsideration of the two-state solution is warranted. Israelis and Palestinians must eventually find a way to live side by side, even if mutual trust remains limited. Elsewhere, hostile neighbors have managed to coexist despite deep disagreements.

The obstacles are formidable. Four longstanding issues remain unresolved: borders, refugees, settlements and Jerusalem. The devastating Gaza war, triggered by Hamas’s surprise attack on Oct. 7, 2023, has added another major obstacle: the collapse of mutual trust.

A 2026 Pew Research Center survey found that only 17 percent of Israelis and 21 percent of Palestinians in the West Bank and East Jerusalem believed peaceful coexistence between Israelis and Palestinians was possible. Drawing borders on a map is difficult enough. Breaking down the walls of distrust in people’s minds may be even harder.

This is where American diplomacy becomes essential.

Washington must safeguard Israel’s security while helping establish a credible political path toward Palestinian statehood. Israelis need confidence that a Palestinian state will not become another security threat. Palestinians, in turn, need assurance that independence is not an empty promise. Progress on both fronts would also give Saudi Arabia greater political room to normalize relations with Israel.

The Mecca Agreement should not be viewed as an American strategic defeat. Washington maintains strong relations with all three members and greater regional defense cooperation could even help reduce America’s security burden. But if Washington treats the agreement as a challenge to its regional influence or unconditionally supports every Israeli military action, the two arrangements could become sources of regional rivalry rather than complementary frameworks.

The Abraham Accords seek to advance peace through diplomatic normalization and economic cooperation. The Mecca Agreement seeks to strengthen security through collective defense and deterrence. Despite their different objectives, the two arrangements are not necessarily incompatible.

The Middle East is entering a new era in which regional powers are increasingly shaping their own security arrangements. America will remain influential, but its role must evolve from that of a dominant security provider toward that of a facilitator and mediator.

Coexistence will not emerge automatically. It requires progress on the Palestinian question, careful Saudi diplomacy, restraint among the members of the Mecca Agreement and sustained American engagement.

The Middle East’s future will not be determined simply by which alliance possesses greater military power. It will depend on whether diplomacy can transform competing interests into a shared commitment to peace. What America needs now is not simply more military power but the wisdom and determination to turn its influence into lasting peace.

Ma Young-sam is a research fellow at Asiatic Research Institute of Korea University. He was South Korea’s former ambassador to Israel and representative to Palestine.