Seoul should listen carefully to Gen. Brunson

Gen. Xavier Brunson, commander of the United Nations Command, South Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command and United States Forces Korea, addressed the military challenges facing the Seoul-Washington alliance in great detail.

On the wartime operational control (OPCON) transfer from the U.S., he said conditions have clearly changed due to escalating North Korean missile capabilities.

His remarks at an event at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. on Tuesday (local time) deserve far more attention in South Korea than they have received.

It is not often that a serving four-star commander speaks so openly and in such detail about the military challenges facing the alliance. Brunson addressed issues ranging from North Korea's growing military capabilities to the importance of sustainment, force protection, interoperability and the future of OPCON.

These were not simply observations by an American general. They were assessments from the officer responsible for commanding the combined forces that would fight if deterrence failed on the Korean Peninsula.

Having spent much of my military career working within the South Korea-U.S. alliance, I know how carefully commanders normally choose their words when discussing sensitive military issues in public. Brunson's willingness to explain these challenges should be appreciated. More importantly, his assessments should be taken seriously by South Korean military leaders, defense officials and policymakers.

The most immediate issue is OPCON transfer. However, it would be a mistake to focus exclusively on OPCON and overlook the other important issues Brunson raised. In many respects, those issues help explain why a successful transition requires much more than changing the nationality of the commander.

Brunson reaffirmed his support for a conditions-based OPCON transition. He also made clear that if political authorities ordered an immediate transition, he would carry out that order while explaining the risks of proceeding without fully satisfying the agreed conditions and securing the necessary capabilities. This is an important distinction.

Military commanders do not make national policy. That responsibility belongs to elected political leaders. But commanders have a professional obligation to explain the military consequences of political decisions. They must identify risks, even when doing so is inconvenient.

There is nothing unreasonable about South Korea wanting to assume greater responsibility for its own defense. Indeed, that should be our objective. The question is whether we have developed the capabilities necessary to exercise that responsibility effectively.

For more than two decades, South Korea and the United States have worked toward a conditions-based transition. The purpose was to ensure that changes in command arrangements would not weaken combined deterrence or warfighting capabilities.

Setting a political deadline does not eliminate military requirements. A calendar cannot command an army, and a declaration of sovereignty cannot substitute for combat readiness. But OPCON is only part of the larger problem.

One of the most important aspects of Brunson's discussion concerned sustainment. This is an area that receives far too little public attention.

Modern militaries tend to emphasize advanced weapons, precision missiles, fighter aircraft and sophisticated command systems. These are important, but wars are not won simply by possessing impressive equipment. Forces must be supplied, repaired, reinforced and maintained under enemy attack.

The war in Ukraine has demonstrated the importance of ammunition production, logistics, equipment repair and the ability to sustain operations over time. A military that cannot replace its losses or maintain its equipment will eventually lose its effectiveness, regardless of how advanced its weapons may be.

Brunson recognized the strength of South Korea's defense industry and discussed the possibility of developing regional maintenance and repair capabilities. This deserves serious consideration.

South Korea has substantial industrial capacity. The challenge is to ensure that this capacity can support sustained military operations during a crisis, not merely produce equipment during peacetime.

Closely related is resilience. The Korean Peninsula is a relatively small operational environment facing an adversary equipped with large numbers of artillery systems, ballistic missiles and increasingly sophisticated capabilities. Military facilities, airfields, ports, communications networks and logistical installations would all be vulnerable in a conflict.

Resilience means being able to absorb an attack, recover and continue fighting. It requires dispersing forces, protecting critical infrastructure, maintaining alternative communications and ensuring that commanders can continue operating even when established systems are disrupted.

Brunson's emphasis on dispersed operations is particularly relevant. Concentrating forces in large, predictable locations may simplify peacetime administration, but it can create dangerous vulnerabilities in wartime.

Protection is equally important. Soldiers cannot fight effectively if their bases, equipment, communications and supply routes are not adequately protected. Nor can an alliance sustain combat operations if its critical infrastructure is disabled in the opening stages of a conflict.

We must also pay greater attention to interoperability. The alliance has decades of experience conducting combined operations. Our soldiers train together, our commanders know one another and our military institutions have developed close professional relationships.

These are considerable strengths. However, familiarity is not the same as technical interoperability. Modern warfare requires forces to exchange information rapidly, connect sensors to weapons, coordinate operations across multiple domains and make decisions under extreme pressure.

As artificial intelligence, unmanned systems, electronic warfare, cyber capabilities and space-based assets become increasingly important, interoperability will become more complicated, not less. A combined force cannot afford to discover during a war that its systems cannot communicate effectively or that critical information cannot be shared in time. All these challenges are becoming more serious because the threat is changing.

Brunson warned that North Korea is learning from its participation in Russia's war against Ukraine. North Korean forces are gaining experience in deploying personnel and equipment over long distances, establishing supply lines and supporting sustained operations. Russian cooperation may also improve North Korea's electronic warfare and other military capabilities.

We should not exaggerate these developments. Battlefield experience does not automatically produce a modern, competent military. But neither should we dismiss them. North Korea is learning, adapting, and receiving assistance. The military we may face tomorrow will not necessarily be the same one we prepared to fight yesterday. This makes Brunson's assessment especially valuable.

South Korea is understandably proud of its military modernization and defense industrial achievements. We have made enormous progress since the 1950-53 Korean War. But national pride must never prevent an honest examination of our weaknesses.

I have seen throughout my military career how dangerous it can be when commanders tell their superiors what they want to hear rather than what they need to know. The same principle applies to governments.

Brunson has provided a professional assessment of challenges that deserve attention regardless of political affiliation or views on OPCON transfer. His observations should be examined on their military merits, not interpreted simply as support for or opposition to a political timetable.

This does not mean accepting every American assessment without question. The alliance is a partnership, and Korean commanders have their own professional judgments and responsibilities. Where disagreements exist, they should be addressed through serious military analysis and frank consultation.

As the two countries prepare for their next Security Consultative Meeting, the discussion should go beyond the timing of OPCON transfer. It should address whether combined forces can survive the initial attack, maintain communications, protect critical facilities, sustain operations and defeat an increasingly capable enemy. These are not secondary issues. They are central to credible deterrence and, ultimately, to the success of any future command arrangement.

Brunson has spoken with unusual openness about the challenges facing our alliance. South Korean policymakers have an opportunity to benefit from the judgment of the commander entrusted with its wartime responsibilities.

We do not have to agree with every word he says. But we would be making a serious mistake if we failed to listen. The purpose of the Seoul-Washington alliance is not to satisfy political schedules or preserve military traditions. It is to prevent war and, should deterrence fail, to win. That responsibility deserves nothing less than an honest assessment of our capabilities and the determination to correct our shortcomings before it is too late.

Retired Lt. Gen. Chun In-bum is the former commander of the Republic of Korea Army Special Warfare Command.