OPCON transfer: Is Seoul prepared to pay the price?

In November, Americans will go to the polls in an election that could have consequences far beyond their borders. The midterm elections will determine the balance of power in Congress and influence the direction of American foreign and security policy for the remaining two years of U.S. President Donald Trump's term.

For South Korea, the stakes are considerable. At approximately the same time, Washington and Seoul will confront some of the most consequential questions facing their military alliance at the 58th Security Consultative Meeting (SCM). Among them are the credibility of American extended nuclear deterrence and the transition of wartime operational control (OPCON).

The political atmosphere surrounding these discussions may change depending on the U.S. election results. But regardless of which party wins, one principle must remain unchanged: military decisions must be based on military requirements, not political convenience.

Unfortunately, this principle is increasingly being challenged in South Korea.

For many South Korean politicians and their supporters, wartime OPCON remains primarily a question of national sovereignty. They believe that a sovereign nation should command its own military during war. Some also point to international rankings describing South Korea as the world's fifth-strongest military and argue that we should be capable of assuming wartime operational control without further delay. There are even calls to complete the transition by 2028.

I understand the emotional appeal of these arguments. I have spent my entire adult life serving the Republic of Korea. No South Korean soldier wants his country to remain dependent on another nation indefinitely. I would welcome the day when our military possesses all the capabilities necessary to defend our country.

But wanting something and being ready for it are two different matters.

First, we should understand what wartime OPCON actually means. South Korea already exercises peacetime operational control over its armed forces. The issue concerns the command arrangements for combined Korean and American forces during war.

The transfer would place a South Korean four-star general in command of the future Combined Forces Command, with an American general serving as deputy commander. It would not automatically mean the withdrawal of American troops or the termination of the alliance. Nevertheless, it would fundamentally affect how the two militaries plan, command, support and conduct combined operations. This is not a ceremonial change of command. It is a change to a system on which the survival of our nation may depend.

For roughly two decades, South Korea and the United States have worked toward a conditions-based OPCON transfer. The principle is straightforward. Before changing the command structure, both countries must be satisfied that the necessary military capabilities and conditions are in place. Those requirements exist for a reason.

A modern war on the Korean Peninsula would involve much more than tanks crossing the Demilitarized Zone. It could include North Korean nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, cyberattacks, electronic warfare, attacks against critical infrastructure and attempts to disrupt American reinforcements. The combined command must be capable of coordinating intelligence, air and missile defense, targeting, logistics, reinforcement and, most importantly, the relationship between conventional operations and American nuclear deterrence.

These capabilities cannot be created simply by announcing a date.

At the 57th SCM in 2025, both governments reaffirmed that the agreed conditions must be satisfied before wartime OPCON is transferred. They also committed themselves to advancing the evaluation of the future Combined Forces Command. This was a sensible agreement.

Setting a target date can help focus resources and accelerate preparations. But when the target becomes more important than the conditions, the entire logic of the agreement is reversed.

A military commander would never declare a unit combat-ready simply because the inspection date had arrived. Why should we apply a different standard to the defense of an entire nation?

There is another uncomfortable reality that South Koreans must recognize. The United States is changing. American voters are increasingly concerned about domestic economic problems, government spending and the costs of overseas commitments. The U.S. is also concentrating more attention on China and the wider Indo-Pacific.

It would be dangerous to assume that every American official regards retaining wartime OPCON as essential to American interests.

Some may welcome an earlier transition because they believe South Korea should assume greater responsibility for its own defense. Others may see it as an opportunity to reconsider the American military burden on the Korean Peninsula.

I do not suggest that Washington has decided to abandon Seoul. Nor do I believe that OPCON transfer necessarily weakens the alliance. Properly prepared, it could strengthen our partnership. But the political interests of Washington and Seoul are not always identical. A transition that offers political advantages to both governments may still carry military risks if the necessary capabilities have not been demonstrated.

This is why the SCM must address more than a target year. What American intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities will remain available to the combined command? How will American reinforcements be guaranteed during a regional crisis involving China? How will conventional operations be coordinated with American nuclear capabilities? What happens if North Korea uses nuclear weapons early in a conflict?

And who will determine whether the future command is genuinely ready?

These are not questions of national pride. They are questions of survival.

I am also concerned by the frequent reference to South Korea's supposed ranking as the world's fifth-strongest military.

Such rankings may be useful for public discussion, but they do not measure everything that matters in war. Numbers of aircraft, ships, tanks and soldiers do not necessarily translate into the ability to conduct sustained combat operations against a nuclear-armed enemy.

A military can possess impressive equipment and still suffer from shortages of personnel, ammunition, training and logistical support.

Having served in both South Korean and American military organizations, I know that effective combined operations require far more than modern weapons. They require trust, common procedures, realistic training, experienced leaders and the ability to operate together under enormous pressure. These things take years to build. They can be damaged surprisingly quickly.

If South Koreans genuinely want greater independence in national defense, we must also be willing to discuss what that independence will cost.

Our population is declining. The number of young men available for military service is shrinking. At the same time, the demands placed on our armed forces are becoming more complex.

We cannot continue to pretend that advanced technology alone will solve every personnel problem. We should seriously examine extending the period of military service. We should discuss women's military service, whether through conscription or other forms of national service. We must be prepared to increase defense spending where necessary and devote more resources to ammunition, logistics, readiness and realistic training.

Above all, we must build a military that trains to fight, rather than one that spends excessive time satisfying administrative requirements.

None of these choices will be popular. Politicians will hesitate because elections are won by promising benefits, not sacrifices. Citizens will resist because military service takes time away from education, employment and family life. Increasing defense spending means fewer resources for other national priorities. But national defense has never been free. It is easy to demand sovereignty. It is much harder to accept the responsibilities that come with it.

I am not opposed to OPCON transfer. I am opposed to pretending that changing the nationality of the combined commander automatically makes South Korea stronger or more independent. Nor should Americans view OPCON transition as a convenient way to reduce their responsibilities without carefully considering the consequences for deterrence and regional stability.

The alliance has preserved peace for more than seven decades because both countries understood that their security interests were closely connected. We should not jeopardize that achievement for a political timetable.

As the United States approaches its midterm elections and the two governments address the future of the alliance, I hope our leaders will remember a simple military principle: never confuse an order with the capability to execute it.

If the conditions are met, transfer OPCON. If they are not, continue preparing.

And if the South Korean people insist on accelerating the process, they deserve an honest explanation of the additional responsibilities, costs and sacrifices that may follow. The question is whether we are prepared to exercise it without putting our country at greater risk. That is a question no election, political slogan or military ranking can answer for us.

Retired Lt. Gen. Chun In-bum is the former commander of the Republic of Korea Army Special Warfare Command.