Seoul's diplomatic dilemma over North Korean POWs

During the U.N General Assembly, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky made a surprise announcement. In his speech on Sept. 23, Zelenskyy announced that Ukraine has sent two North Korean prisoners of war (POW) to South Korea, in accordance with the prisoners’ wishes.

The South Korean government expressed displeasure, protesting that Ukraine violated an agreement to keep the transfer confidential. The issue has caused a diplomatic dispute over whether such an agreement actually existed and stirred controversy within South Korea on whether the government was justified in attempting to avoid disclosing their transfer.

South Korea has had a long history of receiving North Korean defectors, regarding them legally as South Korean citizens. During the Korean War, President Syngman Rhee released 27,000 North Korean prisoners who refused repatriation back to the North, allowing them to stay in South Korea. North Korean soldiers, diplomats and civilians have continued to defect to the South by crossing the DMZ and maritime borders or via third countries. Even progressive South Korean administrations have generally adhered to humanitarian principles regarding the acceptance of North Korean defectors, even while pursuing diplomatic engagement with Pyongyang.

The Russia-Ukraine war has presented challenges for South Korea. As the Moscow-Pyongyang strategic partnership continues to expand, Seoul has been reluctant to take action that may be perceived as strategically aligning itself with Kyiv. The release of the POW to South Korea may raise suspicions of a strategic deal with Ukraine, trading aid from Seoul for the transfer of the soldiers. As the Russian military increasingly relies on foreign recruits, publicizing the defections may threaten Moscow’s recruitment efforts. Weighing adherence to humanitarian policies against mitigating conflict with Russia and North Korea, President Lee Jae Myung's government may have calculated that a low-key response was the most appropriate solution. Seoul faced a setback from the lack of cooperation from Kyiv, whose strategic priority is to dissuade foreign military support for Russia.

Seoul may prefer the North Korean POW controversy to quickly fade from attention but may encounter the same dilemma again in the future. Russia may request another deployment of North Korean troops. Should Pyongyang comply, their soldiers fighting, dying and being captured would once again become a challenge for South Korean diplomacy.

As a consequence of the controversy, it will become more difficult for the South Korean government to attempt a quiet transfer of future North Korean POWs from Ukraine. The media and public will likely scrutinize their government’s actions. Kyiv will attempt to drive a hard bargain with Seoul, citing its humanitarian commitment to protecting the North Koreans rather than exchanging them for Ukrainian POWs. Domestic and diplomatic pressures may push South Korea to take a more explicit stance, either affirming or declining to accept future North Korean POWs.

One plausible response from President Lee may be to postpone or sidestep the issue by saying that renewed deployments of North Korean troops are unconfirmed. Seoul may reiterate that it will withhold its decision until future circumstances necessitate a response. The merit of postponement is that a difficult decision may not have to be made. Perhaps Pyongyang will not send combat troops. Perhaps the Russia-Ukraine War will end soon.

Nearly five years of the war have taught the world that prolongment can no longer be easily discounted. As the war continues, Russia’s reliance on North Korean support may increase. For South Korea, a renewed military deployment by North Korea is a realistic prospect that merits a preventive response.

South Korea’s strategic concern has been that its involvement in the Russia-Ukraine war would further strengthen the Russia-North Korea partnership. Would Seoul distancing itself from the North Korean POWs incentivize Russia requesting North Korean military support? On the contrary, explicitly affirming acceptance of North Korean POWs may create a greater burden for the Moscow-Pyongyang partnership. Pyongyang, which increasingly imposes stringent measures to isolate its citizens from interactions with South Korea, may become uncomfortable with the risk of defections at the front. Subsequently, North Korea may decline to deploy its troops in the combat zone, mitigating their contributions to Russia’s war.

Public acceptance of defection by POWs may also provide leverage with Ukraine and Russia. Currently, complying with Ukraine’s request for air defense batteries could increase conflict with Russia. Seoul’s offer to assist Ukraine with North Korean units may work as a substitute in response to Kyiv’s request for arms and reassure Moscow that neither Korea is directly involved militarily in the Russia-Ukraine War.

South Korea faces difficult and even adversarial relations with Russia and North Korea. Lee's efforts to rekindle diplomacy with the two countries has strategic merit, but to quote from a recently published book by North Korea experts, "Turning Away, Looking Back," making South Korea an attractive state to the North Korean public and the world is important leverage that should not be sacrificed. Affirming South Korea’s welcome for asylum seekers sends a message directly to the North Korean public and should occur parallel to negotiations with North Korea.

Lee Jong-eun (Jong.Lee@ngu.edu) is an assistant professor of political science at North Greenville University. Prior to this, he served as a Republic of Korea Air Force intelligence officer.