Korea's renewable energy plan must prioritize energy security

The crisis in the Strait of Hormuz has exposed Korea’s strategic vulnerability to imported fossil fuels. Korea imports 84 percent of its energy, and virtually all of it arrives by sea through contested maritime chokepoints. Its vulnerability to external disruption, a longstanding risk, has become more apparent and less acceptable. Soon, Korea will announce K-GX, its strategy for turning climate commitments into industrial growth, which is an opportunity to reduce this vulnerability.

When I oversaw military bases and associated energy policy at the U.S. Department of Defense, I had to plan for electricity being cut off. Our bases had missions that needed certainty, and we had to assume that the grid would fail. Similarly, Korea should assume its supply lines can and will be disrupted. My challenge was a microcosm of the one Korea now faces — how do you reduce your exposure to external energy shocks?

At the Department of Defense, we had a wide range of options for energy security, from diesel generators to solar battery systems. However, resilience was not our only constraint. We had costs to reduce, emissions goals to achieve and land use constraints to accommodate. Sustainability goals didn’t motivate operational commanders or those who controlled funding, but mission-oriented initiatives that also achieved environmental goals did. The key was making these goals one and the same.

Korea is facing a similar ecosystem of interests on a national scale. It has an energy security challenge, with fossil fuel imports exposed to disruption at chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz. It has a vision for a green energy transition, supported by its climate law and its 2035 climate target, which aims to cut net greenhouse gas emissions by 53–61 percent below 2018 levels by 2035. At the same time, industrial demand, including rapidly growing demand by artificial intelligence data centers, prioritizes energy that is available in the near term, which includes fossil fuels.

Korean manufacturers also face pressure to cut supply-chain emissions from their largest customers, such as Apple and Google. Europe now prices carbon at its border, making clean electricity a condition of market access rather than a cost to absorb. With finite resources, Korea must determine where it will invest to navigate all of these constraints.

Ultimately, success will not mean one interest triumphs over another but rather the ability to address multiple interests at once. The green energy investments that support both industrial growth and energy security simultaneously should be prioritized.

Fortunately, there are multiple opportunities to apply this lesson. The government’s upcoming K-GX plan has the opportunity to minimize resistance and maximize its near-term progress, starting with upgrades to the nation’s transmission infrastructure, which are required for the expected build-out of renewables and for any alternative that may be considered. Moreover, every unit of domestic generation it enables is a unit Korea does not have to import.

Grid-scale batteries are the same kind of investment, strengthening the foundation upon which any new supply will be built, while playing to an established Korean strength. Offshore wind farming leverages Korea’s shipbuilding and fabrication base. Green steel answers a decarbonization requirement and a carbon border tax at the same time. More generally, an expansion of renewable energy to meet 2030 goals would deliver new supply on the timescale that data centers and chip manufacturers require.

nvestments should be prioritized where all of these interests overlap. These are easiest to sustain politically and to justify economically, and most likely to strengthen security over the long term.

The Honorable John Conger is senior adviser to the Council on Strategic Risks, former U.S. principal deputy under secretary of defense and former acting U.S. assistant secretary of defense for energy, installations and environment.