What role does the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat play in the article’s argument?

The Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat is described as the most suitable diplomatic asset for hedging against regional instability and U.S. unreliability. The article says revitalizing it would support trilateral economic cooperation while preserving Korea-U.S.-Japan cooperation as a security axis.

How does the article describe the current China-Japan and North Korea dynamics?

It says China-Japan relations are at their worst point since 1972, with Beijing criticizing Sanae Takaichi’s stance on Taiwan and responding with sanctions and suspended exchanges. It also says North Korea is strengthening nuclear and military ties with Russia, while Xi’s visit to Pyongyang reaffirmed that alignment.

The region has no table, Korea must rekindle the trilateral

Q: Why does the article say South Korea should revive trilateral Korea-China-Japan cooperation?

The writer says trilateral cooperation is needed because Northeast Asia faces structural U.S.-China rivalry, worsening China-Japan tensions, and the growing burden of a North Korea-China-Russia bloc. It is also presented as important for Asian supply chain stability and for new growth engines.

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Summary

South Korea should revive trilateral Korea-China-Japan dialogue and cooperation, the writer argues, while strengthening the U.S.-Korea alliance and Korea-U.S.-Japan cooperation. The piece says Northeast Asia is under rising pressure from U.S.-China rivalry, China-Japan tensions, and the North Korea-China-Russia bloc. It identifies the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat as the best platform to rebuild the framework and support regional economic cooperation.

Key Facts

The article links the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki to the end of Qing influence over the Joseon Dynasty and says the episode is still invoked as part of China’s Century of Humiliation narrative.
It says Xi Jinping seeks the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation while Donald Trump is pushing the world toward multipolarity by rejecting the post-World War II liberal international order.
The writer says China-Japan relations have fallen to their worst point since the 1972 normalization, with Beijing responding to Sanae Takaichi’s Taiwan Strait stance with sanctions and a suspension of people-to-people exchanges.
North Korea is described as advancing its nuclear capabilities while deepening military ties with Russia, and Xi’s recent visit to Pyongyang is said to have reaffirmed that alignment.
The article says Korea, China and Japan all face low birthrates and aging populations, and should cooperate in future-oriented industries such as the digital economy and energy transition.

By Chang Se-myeong

Published Sep 17, 2026 1:40 pm KST

Near the end of the First Sino-Japanese War in 1895, Japanese Prime Minister Itō Hirobumi and Qing statesman Li Hongzhang signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki, in which Qing China acknowledged Joseon as a fully independent and sovereign state. It stripped away Chinese influence over the 1392-1910 Joseon Dynasty — a moment still invoked today as a symbol of China's "Century of Humiliation."

Fast-forward to 2026: Chinese President Xi Jinping, pursuing the "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation" and seeking to restore the pre-1895 East Asian order, stands opposed to U.S. President Donald Trump who is entirely rejecting the declining, rules-based post-World War II liberal international order and pushing the world toward multipolarity. Given how squarely Northeast Asia now sits at the center of the global geopolitical chessboard, South Korea needs to think about geopolitics with creativity and flexibility — working to rebuild a framework for trilateral Korea-China-Japan dialogue and cooperation, while above all finding a way to strengthen the U.S.-Korea alliance and Korea-U.S.-Japan cooperation without sacrificing parallel engagement with China.

To begin with, U.S.-China hegemonic rivalry is structuralizing, China-Japan tensions are intensifying and the consolidation of a North Korea-China-Russia bloc is placing a growing burden on South Korean security. At the May summit in Beijing, references by both sides to a "stable strategic relationship" and the "Thucydides Trap" suggested a tacit understanding between Washington and Beijing over spheres of influence. Meanwhile, over the Taiwan Strait issue, China-Japan relations have fallen to their worst point since the 1972 normalization, with Beijing framing Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi's stance as promoting Japan's return to militarism — pairing sanctions with a suspension of people-to-people exchanges. North Korea, for its part, continues to advance its nuclear capabilities while deepening military ties with Russia, and Xi's recent visit to Pyongyang has reaffirmed a strategic alignment with China as well.

The reality is that China and Japan continue to trade criticism with no real sign either side is willing to work toward normalization, while the expanding scope of U.S.-China competition — now reaching into supply chains, trade and technology — is forcing Korea and Japan into a narrower and narrower diplomatic space, compelling difficult choices.

Yet if Korea recognizes both that trilateral Korea-China-Japan cooperation is critical to Asian supply chain stability, and that all three countries need new engines of growth, it can put forward a framework for trilateral dialogue and cooperation — positioning itself not just as a participant but as an active coordinator. All three societies face the shared demographic challenges of low birthrates and aging populations, and need cooperation in future-oriented industries like the digital economy and energy transition.

The diplomatic asset best suited to hedge against this quagmire and against U.S. unreliability — while also serving as a platform for trilateral economic cooperation — is the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat (TCS). By revitalizing the TCS, both Korea and Japan can preserve Korea-U.S.-Japan cooperation as their security axis while also maintaining the trilateral framework as an economic counterweight — easing Chinese wariness in the process and keeping the China-Russia-North Korea alignment loose.

Northeast Asia is among the most economically interdependent regions, yet also one of the least institutionalized when it comes to cooperation. Both Korea and Japan are wary of America's recent retrenchment and China's expanding dominance — but the key difference is that, for Korea, China has never been an adversary to be confronted and overcome; historically, it has been a far more complex presence, one demanding simultaneous vigilance and adaptation. It is this historical nuance that positions Korea to move beyond the role of mediator and become an agenda-setter — one capable of pursuing a realistic path toward stable coexistence.

Chang Se-myeong (semyeongchangx7@korea.ac.kr) is a student at Korea University Graduate School of International Studies, majoring in International Peace and Security.

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