Wang Yi's visit signals major shift in China's Korea policy

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi recently made his first official visit to Seoul in five years. His high-level engagements — first with his South Korean counterpart on Aug. 19 and subsequently with the President the following day — yielded two particularly provocative insights. The first suggested a concerted mission to draw South Korea more closely into Beijing’s sphere of influence, while the second signaled a significant recalibration of China’s commitment to the Korean Peninsula. Taken together, these developments unveil a new Chinese policy framework that appears to align with North Korea’s 2024 shift toward a “two adversarial Koreas” doctrine. While Beijing has avoided issuing formal commentary on Pyongyang’s new stance, Wang’s nuanced rhetoric pointedly mirrored the North’s concept of two-state coexistence. This represents a radical departure from China’s traditional equidistance diplomacy, through which it historically sought to balance relations between the North and South. Consequently, Beijing is now securing broader diplomatic latitude to engage the two Koreas on its own strategic terms.

In the current climate of enduring Sino-American rivalry, Beijing has persistently pressured Seoul to distance itself from Washington, a campaign that has intensified since the 2017 Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) deployment. China has repeatedly urged South Korea to maintain independence and autonomy, demanding a foreign policy insulated from external influence. During this visit, Wang was explicit in his call for Seoul to fully embrace Beijing, arguing that doing so would serve both South Korea’s national interests and the mutual benefits of both nations. Addressing his Korean counterpart, Wang remarked, “It is hoped that the ROK (Republic of Korea) will, proceeding from its own fundamental interests, develop its external relations independently and in parallel without conflict.” This emphasis on “independence” and “parallel relations” was a thinly veiled critique of South Korea’s pursuit of nuclear-powered submarine projects in collaboration with the United States. Such rhetoric aligns closely with the 2026 Sino-Russian Joint Statement.

Both Beijing and Moscow publicly declared their opposition last May not only to the U.S. deployment of intermediate-range missiles but also to American initiatives aimed at providing allies with nuclear counterattack capabilities. This includes nuclear sharing for deterrence and the strengthening of extended deterrence networks, such as missile defense systems and the “Kill Chain” protocol — all of which they claim violate nuclear nonproliferation principles. In the context of South Korea, China’s criticisms are aimed directly at the 2024 Washington Declaration, which established the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), as well as the ongoing development of the Kill Chain system and the nuclear-powered submarine initiative. Within this strategic environment, both China and Russia have been vocal in their condemnation of Seoul’s submarine ambitions.

The seeds of this diplomatic tension were sown as early as last year. In October, a Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson stressed the necessity of strict adherence to the Nuclear nonproliferation Treaty and called for “cautious action.” This was followed in November by Chinese Ambassador Dai Bing, who urged that the situation be managed with “full consideration of the concerns of all parties.” When viewed alongside the THAAD controversy, these warnings from high-ranking diplomatic channels appear to be precursors to a coordinated pressure campaign.

Moscow has mirrored this stance. Last February, the Russian Ambassador to South Korea issued a stern warning, demanding transparent management and rigorous compliance with international nonproliferation standards.

Following the most recent China-Russia summit, Beijing’s rhetoric has grown even more pointed. On June 18, a Foreign Ministry spokesperson expressed “grave concern” regarding the South Korea-U.S. NCG meeting, labeling it a catalyst for expanded deterrence. The next day, Beijing focused specifically on the nuclear submarine project, characterizing it as a primary driver of nuclear proliferation and potential regional conflict. Officials urged Seoul to honor its nonproliferation commitments, emphasizing that the plan must be handled with extreme prudence due to its direct impact on the security of the Korean Peninsula.

Wang also sought to influence President Lee by highlighting the accomplishments of his previous two summits with Xi Jinping. While he praised Lee for making “the right choice to steer China-ROK relations back onto the normal track,” he offered a subtle warning to Lee to maintain the rational, pragmatic and positive policy he initiated toward China as a way to serve the country’s interests. He further asserted that as a consistent proponent of peaceful conflict resolution and a major stabilizing force, China offers a unique partnership. “Embracing China is embracing the future, and working alongside China is working alongside opportunities,” Wang stated, ultimately requesting that the ROK steadfastly pursue “a friendly policy toward Beijing.”

China’s pivot toward the two Koreas policy was later revealed with deliberate subtlety. When questioned by the press regarding China’s position on the peninsula, Wang maintained that Beijing remains “committed to playing a constructive role in maintaining peace and stability.” However, he notably expressed satisfaction in seeing “the two nations in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the ROK move toward peaceful coexistence, and eventually achieve lasting peace and stability.” In a significant linguistic shift, Wang used the official names of both states and referred to them as “two nations,” rather than the term “two countries” typically used in the past. This vision of “peaceful coexistence” mirrors the end goals Pyongyang has envisioned for its own new inter-Korean policy.

Ultimately, Wang delivered three core messages to Seoul: A call to side with China, a subtle warning regarding the pursuit of nuclear-powered submarines and an official recognition of two separate nations on the peninsula — but not in terms of adversaries. This final point is particularly concerning for those in South Korea who dream of unification. Beijing’s alignment with the two nations concept suggests an acceptance of a permanent divide. It now means China has positioned itself in the driver’s seat, steering peninsula affairs to serve its own strategic interests with newfound flexibility. It is now clear that Beijing has moved away from supporting Korean unification and its previous balancing strategy. Instead, it is committed to maintaining the status quo of a divided peninsula while remaining ready to penalize any South Korean efforts toward nuclear-powered defense.

Choo Jae-woo is a professor at Kyung Hee University.