Perils of a Trump-Kim summit without denuclearization

U.S. President Donald Trump’s renewed interest in meeting North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has once again raised the prospect of U.S.-North Korea dialogue. With the North Korean nuclear crisis dragging on for decades, dialogue aimed at reducing tensions and finding a peaceful solution should certainly be welcomed. What matters to South Korea, however, is not simply whether another summit takes place, but what is negotiated and what it ultimately achieves. We should therefore be particularly alert to the risks of a Trump-Kim summit that excludes denuclearization or settles the nuclear issue largely on Pyongyang’s terms.

Seven years have passed since the failed Hanoi summit in 2019, and the strategic environment surrounding the North Korean nuclear issue has changed dramatically. North Korea now possesses a substantial nuclear arsenal and has enshrined its status as a nuclear-armed state in its constitution, making clear that it has no intention of voluntarily relinquishing its nuclear weapons. Relations between North Korea and Russia have been restored to a level approaching a military alliance. Russia has actively undermined U.N. sanctions against Pyongyang, while China continues to shield North Korea diplomatically.

The bargaining dynamics have also changed considerably since Hanoi. Kim appears to believe that the current international environment is increasingly favorable to him and that time is on his side. Trump, meanwhile, has repeatedly expressed his desire to meet Kim again. As a result, Kim now possesses considerably greater bargaining leverage than he did seven years ago and is likely to demand a high price for returning to the negotiating table.

Pyongyang could insist either that denuclearization be removed entirely from the agenda or that any summit proceed on the premise that North Korea is already a nuclear-armed state. For North Korea, nuclear weapons are no longer bargaining chips. They are regarded as irreversible strategic assets guaranteeing regime survival, national security and international status.

A summit that reduces tensions in Northeast Asia and serves as a bridge toward lasting peace would, of course, be welcome. But a summit that leaves unresolved the greatest threat to peace on the Korean Peninsula — North Korea’s nuclear weapons — could produce consequences more dangerous than the absence of a summit itself.

Washington officially continues to support the complete denuclearization of North Korea. The concern, however, is that the realities of a future negotiation could move in a different direction.

The greatest danger would arise if Washington focused primarily on eliminating North Korea’s intercontinental ballistic missile threat to the U.S. homeland and pursued a “small deal” based on a nuclear freeze, arms control or nuclear risk reduction instead of complete denuclearization.

Halting nuclear tests, freezing fissile-material production and limiting North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities would certainly be meaningful. The critical question, however, is whether such measures constitute an interim step toward denuclearization or become the final destination. If the latter occurs, the fundamental framework of negotiations would change from “North Korea must give up its nuclear weapons” to “North Korea possesses nuclear weapons that must be managed through negotiations with the United States.” This would amount to de facto recognition of North Korea as a nuclear-armed state.

An even more serious danger for Seoul is the potential “decoupling” of U.S. and South Korean security. Suppose Washington and Pyongyang reach an agreement under which North Korea restricts its intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of striking the United States while retaining tactical nuclear weapons and short- and medium-range missiles targeting South Korea. Such a deal would reduce the nuclear threat to the United States while leaving the threat to South Korea largely intact. Greater security for Washington does not automatically mean greater security for Seoul. Unless the credibility and effectiveness of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence are substantially strengthened, South Korea could find itself effectively held hostage by North Korea’s nuclear arsenal. This would revive the classic question associated with Charles de Gaulle’s skepticism about extended deterrence: Would the United States really risk one of its own cities to defend Seoul?

Such doubts would inevitably intensify calls in South Korea for an independent nuclear deterrent, the redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons or a NATO-style nuclear-sharing arrangement. Growing distrust of Washington could also fuel anti-American sentiment and eventually undermine the foundations of the South Korea-U.S. alliance.

North Korea would exploit such developments politically and psychologically. It would proclaim that Washington had finally recognized it as a nuclear power and reinforce the narrative that “North Korea is a strategic state negotiating nuclear issues directly with the United States, while South Korea is merely a separate hostile state.” Combined with Pyongyang’s recent “two hostile states” doctrine toward inter-Korean relations, this narrative could become a powerful instrument of cognitive warfare aimed at weakening South Korean confidence in the alliance and marginalizing Seoul in matters concerning the Korean Peninsula.

The implications for the global nonproliferation regime would also be profound. If North Korea ultimately succeeds in gaining de facto recognition as a nuclear state after enduring decades of international sanctions, other countries could draw a dangerous lesson: Develop nuclear weapons, withstand international pressure long enough and the world will eventually accept the new reality.

Such a precedent could encourage further nuclear proliferation and increase pressure for independent nuclear capabilities elsewhere in Northeast Asia. A regional nuclear domino effect could accelerate an arms race, heighten tensions and increase the possibility of military confrontation — developments that would ultimately threaten U.S. security as well.

None of this means South Korea should oppose a Trump-Kim summit. Dialogue remains necessary but Seoul and Washington must establish clear principles before such a meeting takes place.

Complete denuclearization of North Korea must remain the ultimate objective. A nuclear freeze or arms-control arrangement can be an interim step toward that goal, but it must never become the endpoint that legitimizes North Korea’s permanent possession of nuclear weapons. Past experience has taught us that a U.S.-North Korea summit should not be judged simply by whether leaders meet or sign an agreement. The real test is whether reducing North Korea’s nuclear threat to the United States also reduces its nuclear threat to South Korea.

Above all, one principle must remain clear: No agreement on North Korea’s nuclear weapons should strengthen the security of the United States at the expense of the security of South Korea. That should be Seoul’s most important strategic benchmark in approaching any future Trump-Kim summit.

Yoo Seong-ok is president of the Institute for Insights & Alternatives. He previously served as president and chairman of the Institute for National Security Strategy and, during his career at the National Intelligence Service, as a government delegate to the Six-Party Talks and a senior official involved in inter-Korean summit preparations.