Korea is about to meet a Central Asia it thinks it knows

In a few weeks’ time, the leaders of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan will arrive in Seoul for the Korea-Central Asia Summit hosted by Korea. My only worry is that the summit would produce another collection of bilateral agreements, photographs and carefully worded declarations instead of real partnership.

Korea’s interest in Central Asia is not new. Korean companies have pursued energy projects, construction contracts, transport infrastructure and access to critical minerals there for decades. The region is also home to a substantial ethnic Korean population, a human and historical dimension of the relations that only few other states possess. Five resource-rich countries from the former Soviet space are now a region that is learning to think and act collectively.

Yet, Seoul’s strategic imagination has remained limited. Policy makers and think tanks here still too often look at Central Asia as a map of separate opportunities: uranium and lithium in Kazakhstan, gas in Turkmenistan, infrastructure in Uzbekistan, hydropower in Tajikistan and development cooperation in Kyrgyzstan.

This view is no longer sufficient.

Thirty-five years after independence, the five Central Asian republics remain different, but they increasingly see their stability and sovereignty as interconnected. Their leaders meet more regularly, settle inherited border disputes, coordinate transport initiatives and present Central Asia internationally as one unit.

In it, Kazakhstan has Central Asia's largest territory and economy, large mineral reserves and the region's strongest claim to middle-power status. Astana also wants a larger role in technology, finance and diplomacy. Its leaders are trying to turn resource wealth into institutions that would outlast commodity cycles. Its regional diplomacy rests on a pragmatism: its own room for maneuver grows when neighboring states are stable, connected and able to negotiate together.

Kyrgyzstan has a different record. Outside observers often reduce the country to political turbulence. That obscures its active civic life, local networks and repeated attempts to balance state authority with participation. Its courts of elders, village structures and civil society sit beside programs to strengthen public administration. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan signed a border treaty in 2025. The work remains difficult, but it shows that governments have chosen negotiation over conflict. Korean cooperation in digital government, education and local administration would fit that need.

Tajikistan is all about water, hydropower and a Persian-speaking identity. Its upstream rivers and dams give it influence over regional electricity and irrigation. Dushanbe has used international water initiatives and hydropower projects to increase that influence. Its leaders also draw on Persian literature and history in building national identity. The public place of Ferdowsi's Shahnameh belongs to that effort. But Tajik politics cannot be read through dams and security only. Water governance, climate adaptation, cultural exchange and training for public administrators would give Korea a broader and more durable role.

Turkmenistan covers diplomatic space. Its political system is closed and its official language is tightly managed. Ashgabat uses its doctrine of positive neutrality to maintain relations with competing powers and to join regional initiatives without tying itself to a bloc. This is key in Central Asian governments' efforts to manage ties with China, Russia, the United States, Europe, Turkey and the Gulf states. Turkmenistan shows the limits of any policy that asks the region to choose sides.

Uzbekistan offers direction. With the largest population and a central location, it has pushed hardest for an organized regional agenda. Tashkent is opening parts of its economy, developing capital markets, improving state administration and pursuing transport routes. The planned China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway belongs to this effort. Uzbekistan is seeking greater access to outside markets while also helping shape the system around it. Its continued reliance on the mahalla for welfare delivery, employment and local dispute resolution shows how reform still works through existing social structures.

Korea has an advantage here. It can enter Central Asia without the historical baggage, the geographical weight or the overt strategic demands often associated with larger Western powers. Seoul can present itself as a modernization partner rather than a political patron. But this advantage will disappear if Korea behaves like every other outside actor and reduces the relationship to energy access and commercial transactions.

Central Asia is not becoming a European Union, nor is it likely to construct a supranational organization that overrides sovereignty. Its governments remain highly protective of political independence. Their regionalism is pragmatic, gradual and sovereignty-first. Central Asian cooperation is developing through repeated habits of consultation.

Korea can do a lot here. Instead of approaching the September summit as five parallel bilateral meetings, Seoul should aim to produce regional public goods. These could include a Korea-Central Asia digital governance network, a shared critical-minerals research and processing platform, regional university and technical-training programs, cooperation on water and climate data, and financing for transport and energy projects that cross more than one national border.

Seoul frequently speaks of responsible international leadership and diversified supply chains. Central Asia is a practical test of whether those ideas can become policy. There is even a cultural concept that may help Seoul understand what is taking shape. In Korean, “gongdongchae” means community: not uniformity, but the recognition that neighbors survive disruption more effectively when they accept mutual obligations. Each state brings its own input. None is sufficient by itself. Together, they are beginning to form something more consequential.

For too long, outsiders have described Central Asia as a place defined by others: a buffer, a corridor, a sphere of influence or a source of raw materials. The five states are now trying to write a different story — one in which they act collectively without surrendering sovereignty.

Korea is about to meet a region it thinks it knows. It probably does not. The summit in Seoul is an opportunity to begin learning.

Eugene Lee (mreulee@gmail.com) is a lecturing professor at the Graduate School of Governance at Sungkyunkwan University in Seoul. Specializing in international relations and governance, his research and teaching focus is on national and regional security, international development, government policies and Northeast and Central Asia. The views expressed in this article are his own.