Valuable lesson from lost submarine bid

Moon Keun-sik

Korea's unsuccessful bid for Canada's next-generation submarine program was a bittersweet experience. From the early stages of the competition, I argued in newspaper columns and public commentary that the contest would ultimately become a showdown between Korea and Japan — and one that Korea needed to win.

At the time, Canada was seeking a long-range conventional submarine in the 2,500-3,000-ton class. Korea offered the KSS-III, emphasizing its indigenous design, competitive pricing and relatively short construction timeline. Japan, meanwhile, relied on its operational experience with 4,000-ton-class submarines and its long-established reputation for technological reliability. I did not regard Germany as a major competitor because it had no export record for submarines larger than 2,500 tons.

The competition, however, changed dramatically after Japan withdrew for domestic reasons. Germany emerged as Korea's principal rival. More importantly, Canada's evaluation increasingly prioritized interoperability with NATO forces, compatibility with existing logistics and sustainment systems and broader strategic alignment, rather than submarine performance alone.

Ultimately, the competition became less a comparison of technical specifications than a contest between Korea's technological excellence and the strategic network that NATO countries have built over decades. The outcome, therefore, should not be interpreted simply as a technological defeat.

Despite the loss, Korea gained valuable experience. Team Korea came together with an unprecedented level of coordination. The presidential office, relevant ministries, the Republic of Korea Navy and industry all worked toward a common objective. The government provided diplomatic support, the Navy contributed operational expertise and industry actively showcased world-class technology through an extensive marketing campaign.

One of the campaign's most remarkable achievements was the Navy's trans-Pacific deployment of a submarine to Canada — an exceptionally rare demonstration in the global submarine market. The voyage showcased the submarine's long-range endurance, operational reliability and the professionalism of its crew. Equally significant was the opportunity for Canadian naval personnel to embark from Hawaii to Canada, allowing them to experience firsthand the submarine's operation, automation, quietness, and onboard systems. Regardless of the procurement outcome, this experience almost certainly strengthened confidence within the Royal Canadian Navy in Korean submarine technology.

These experiences should now be preserved as national strategic assets. Every aspect of the campaign — including the long-range deployment, onboard demonstrations, promotional activities and negotiations — should be systematically documented, analyzed and converted into digital content, case studies and marketing materials for future export campaigns. In today's defense market, success depends not only on superior technology but also on compelling narratives backed by demonstrated operational experience.

Perhaps the most important lesson from Canada's submarine competition is that market development begins not with the Request for Proposal (RFP), but with the Request for Information (RFI). The recent decision by the United States to send RFIs to Korea's three major shipbuilders regarding naval ship construction and maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) cooperation underscores this point. An RFI is far more than a routine request for information; it is the stage at which a prospective buyer evaluates a supplier's technological capabilities, production capacity, financial stability, supply-chain resilience, cybersecurity, technology protection and long-term partnership potential. How effectively a company responds during this phase often determines whether it will even be invited to submit a formal proposal.

For this reason, both government and industry must stop treating RFIs as routine administrative procedures. Instead, they should be regarded as matters of national strategic importance. From the moment an RFI is received, a dedicated national task force should begin assessing the customer's security environment, defense strategy, industrial policy, political dynamics and competitors' strengths. At the same time, a comprehensive national approach should integrate expanded military exercises, high-level defense exchanges, defense cooperation agreements, joint research and development, technology partnerships, financial support, local production and MRO capabilities. Modern defense exports are no longer determined solely by weapon performance; they have become comprehensive competitions encompassing diplomacy, security policy, industrial capability, finance and long-term strategic relationships.

Korea should also institutionalize a permanent whole-of-government defense export support system. Relevant organizations — including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of National Defense, the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy, the Defense Acquisition Program Administration, the Navy and the National Security Office — should establish a standing coordination mechanism capable of managing every stage of the export process, from RFI analysis and RFP preparation to contract negotiations, lifecycle support and future upgrades. Equally important, lessons from both successful and unsuccessful campaigns should be systematically recorded in a national defense export knowledge management system to strengthen future competitiveness.

Industry must also embrace the principle of "One Team Korea" in overseas markets. Healthy competition is essential in the domestic market, but excessive rivalry abroad can weaken national bargaining power. In regions such as the Middle East, Southeast Asia, South America, North America and Europe, Korean companies should offer comprehensive industrial cooperation packages that include local production, technology transfer, MRO capabilities, workforce training, and long-term industrial partnerships. The objective is not merely to sell warships but to become trusted strategic partners throughout the entire service life of those platforms.

Canada's submarine program has concluded, but Korea's journey in the global submarine market is only beginning. If this experience is carefully analyzed and institutionalized into systematic market-development strategies beginning at the RFI stage, the lessons learned in Canada will become invaluable assets for future opportunities, including cooperation with the United States and other naval powers.

Failure is not the end. The real failure is failing to learn from it. Nations that preserve their setbacks, institutionalize their lessons, and transform them into future strategies are the ones that ultimately lead the global defense industry. Although Korea did not secure Canada's submarine contract, the campaign may ultimately prove to have been one of the most valuable milestones in its journey toward becoming a global leader in naval shipbuilding and defense exports.

Retired Navy Capt. Moon Keun-sik is adjunct professor of the Graduate School of Public Policy at Hanyang University in Seoul.