What Indo-Pacific Four means for Korea

Kim Sae-me

President Lee Jae Myung's trip to Ankara for this year's NATO summit signaled continuity in South Korea's engagement with the Euro-Atlantic security alliance. More importantly, his visit reaffirmed the strategic value Seoul places on the Indo-Pacific Four (IP4) framework which refers to four NATO partners —Korea, Japan, New Zealand and Australia.

At the summit, Lee participated in the NATO-IP4 meeting, held talks with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte and delivered a keynote address. He called for a "Korea-NATO Defense Industry Partnership 2.0" centered on joint research, production and operation of defense systems. Korea also pledged an additional $100 million in non-lethal assistance to Ukraine, underscoring that Seoul continues to view European and Indo-Pacific security as increasingly interconnected, while remaining consistent with its long-standing policy on lethal military aid.

Just one year ago, it was unclear whether this would be the case. Last year, Lee did not attend the NATO summit, prompting speculation that the NATO-IP4 partnership was losing momentum under the new administration. Instead, National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac attended as special envoy, emphasizing that Korea remained committed to practical cooperation with NATO while pursuing a pragmatic foreign policy. This year's participation confirmed that engagement with NATO and the IP4 remains part of the Lee administration's foreign policy.

This is a welcome development. More importantly, it presents an opportunity for the Lee administration to institutionalize the IP4 framework. Rather than treating the IP4 as an annual summit gathering, Seoul should work with its partners to develop the IP4 into a more meaningful pillar of Indo-Pacific security architecture.

The IP4 was established at the 2022 NATO summit in Madrid as a framework bringing together Korea, Japan, Australia and New Zealand in consultations with NATO. Since then, cooperation has expanded in areas such as providing support for Ukraine, enhancing cyber defense, resilience, emerging technologies, disinformation and defense industry cooperation. Despite increasing political attention, the framework remains underdeveloped. It lacks permanent mechanisms for policy coordination, agenda-setting and collective consultation among the four Indo-Pacific partners themselves.

At the moment, the current framework is essentially NATO plus four parallel bilateral partnerships. Each country maintains its own Individually Tailored Partnership Programme with NATO, but there is relatively little institutionalized coordination among the four partners. As a result, NATO primarily hears four separate national perspectives rather than a more coherent regional voice.

A stronger IP4 would help the development of a region-to-region partnership. Greater institutionalization would allow the four countries to better coordinate positions on issues where their interests converge and more effectively communicate Indo-Pacific perspectives to NATO.

The IP4 could also help sustain US engagement in the region. While Korea, Japan, Australia and New Zealand may have some diverging threat perceptions, all four are treaty allies or close security partners of the United States. Consequently, they have all experienced periods of uncertainty as Washington's alliance expectations have evolved, particularly under the Trump administration.

Recent NATO summits have demonstrated that allies can coordinate responses to changing U.S. priorities while preserving alliance cohesion. European allies responded collectively to renewed burden-sharing demands by increasing defense spending and presenting a coordinated approach rather than negotiating entirely separately. The Indo-Pacific allies face a different strategic environment, but the logic remains similar. A more institutionalized IP4 would provide a venue for consultation among like-minded allies, allowing them to better coordinate their approaches and contribute more effectively to regional security.

Finally, the IP4 fills an important institutional gap in the Indo-Pacific. The region has numerous overlapping minilateral arrangements. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, AUKUS, the Five Eyes and numerous trilateral groupings all contribute to regional security cooperation in different ways, but almost all of these frameworks are either led by or include the United States as a central participant. The IP4 could be the only prominent Indo-Pacific minilateral that brings these four together without the United States. Some may argue that a framework without the U.S. cannot become strategically significant, yet that is precisely what makes the IP4 unique. Unlike most Indo-Pacific minilateral groupings, it allows them to coordinate among themselves, creating greater space for middle powers to form their own initiatives and shape regional agendas.

For Korea, this distinction is important because compared with Japan or Australia, Seoul remains a relative outsider in many of the Indo-Pacific's evolving security networks. As the regional architecture becomes increasingly complex, Korea cannot afford to remain a reluctant participant or a reactive player. It needs institutions through which it can actively contribute to shaping the rules, priorities and direction of regional security cooperation.

With nearly four years remaining in office, President Lee has an opportunity to turn the IP4 from an annual summit gathering into a more durable institution. If successful, Korea will have a stronger voice in shaping the Indo-Pacific's evolving security architecture.

Kim Sae-me is a research fellow at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies.