Fake news: Paradox of democracy

Park Jung-won

Korea was once regarded as one of Asia’s most remarkable success stories. Having endured Cold War division, authoritarian rule and a difficult transition to democracy, it came to symbolize the possibility that political freedom and economic prosperity could advance together.

Today, however, Korea has entered an age of deep distrust.

Public debate has become increasingly polarized. Questions surrounding the integrity of electoral administration continue to fuel public controversy and deepen political distrust. Trust in the media, the judiciary and public institutions has weakened. How can democratic debate function when citizens no longer trust the same institutions or even agree on the same basic facts? In many respects, that may be the most serious challenge facing Korean democracy today.

The government has identified false and manipulated information as a serious threat to democracy and has moved toward stronger regulation. The revised Information and Communications Network Act, scheduled to take effect in July, includes penalties for the circulation of false or manipulated information, expanded punitive damages and stronger responsibilities for major online platforms.

The concern behind these measures is understandable. Artificial intelligence (AI) has transformed both the scale and sophistication of misinformation in ways that would have been difficult to imagine only a few years ago. Indeed, AI-generated false advertising and deepfake crimes have become serious social problems. Videos featuring nonexistent doctors promoting health products circulate online. Investment scams exploit the fabricated images of well-known business figures. It is now possible to reproduce a person’s face and voice with alarming precision. Few would argue against robust measures aimed at preventing commercial deception, fraud and violations of privacy and individual rights. Freedom of expression should never be confused with the freedom to deceive.

Political expression, however, belongs to a different category.

Whether a tax policy is sound, whether a policy towards North Korea has succeeded, whether an election system is fair, or whether a foreign policy decision truly serves the national interest inevitably involves interpretation, judgment and disagreement. Democracy does not require citizens to reach the same conclusions. It does, however, require some common factual foundation upon which disagreements can take place.

Nor is this challenge unique to South Korea. The United States continues to struggle with election distrust, online disinformation and political polarization. Across Europe, governments have responded with measures ranging from platform accountability rules to greater transparency requirements for digital services. Germany has strengthened obligations on major platforms to address unlawful online content, while the European Union has pursued greater transparency and accountability in the digital sphere. Yet even as regulation has expanded, democratic societies continue to debate where the line should be drawn between combating harmful misinformation and protecting political expression.

This concern lies at the heart of one of the most influential free speech decisions in modern constitutional history. In 1964, the U.S. Supreme Court declared in New York Times v. Sullivan that political debate in a democratic society must be “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.” The Court understood that democracy sometimes requires tolerating the risk of error in order to preserve the freedom necessary for political criticism. If every factual mistake carried overwhelming legal consequences, citizens, journalists and public critics might simply choose silence over participation.

A similar insight can be found in the work of the German philosopher Jurgen Habermas. For Habermas, democratic legitimacy emerges not from official authority but from open public reasoning among free citizens. Democracy remains healthy when competing arguments can be challenged, tested and refined through public discussion.

The current debate in Korea is therefore paradoxical. Legislative efforts to strengthen the regulation of false information have moved quickly, while long-standing concerns regarding restrictions on expression — including the implications of criminal defamation for truthful statements — remain unresolved. If democratic societies are serious about combating misinformation, they must be equally serious about protecting political expression.

The concerns expressed by journalists and media organizations deserve careful consideration. Press freedom is not a privilege granted to media institutions. It is one of democracy’s essential safeguards against error, abuse and arbitrary power. The press exists to ask uncomfortable questions, verify official explanations and challenge prevailing assumptions. If journalists and editors become excessively preoccupied with legal risks and administrative burdens, what may weaken first is not misinformation itself but the media’s ability to hold power accountable.

Like many governments before it, the Lee Jae Myung administration undoubtedly believes that its policies are intended to defend democracy. The danger begins when those in power become convinced that criticism is misinformation or that political disagreement constitutes a threat. It is one of the oldest temptations of political power.

The crisis of democracy does not arrive only when lies multiply. It can also emerge when governments begin to confuse protecting democratic institutions with controlling debate. The deeper challenge facing Korea today is that citizens holding different political views are losing confidence in the same facts, institutions and procedures. Under these circumstances, regulation alone is unlikely to restore trust. It may even intensify existing divisions.

What is at stake in Korea today is part of a broader challenge confronting free societies across the world — whether governments can respond to the dangers of the digital age without weakening the very freedoms they seek to protect. The answer to that question will matter far beyond Korea's borders.

Fake news is certainly an enemy of democracy. But so is the belief that democratic debate can be secured primarily through regulation. The strength of liberal democracy lies in the ability of free citizens to debate, challenge and verify claims for themselves. What Korea needs today is not regulation alone, but the restoration of the trust that makes meaningful public debate possible.

In a democracy, trust is not something that power demands from citizens. It is something that power must first demonstrate.

Park Jung-won (park_jungwon@hotmail.com), Ph.D. in law from the London School of Economics (LSE), is a professor of international law at Dankook University.