
Lee Jong-eun
This month, a series of summits was held in East Asia. The first summit was between the two superpowers: the United States and China. A few days later, summits between Korea and Japan, and then between Russia and China, followed. As the current international order undergoes significant geopolitical shifts, these summits have conveyed the participating countries’ overlapping and divergent strategic calculations.
The summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping was held in the context of fluctuations in the geopolitical balance between the two nations. After decades of leading the international order as the post-Cold War superpower, the United States has struggled with domestic political polarization, tensions with traditional allies and prolonged conflicts with adversarial regimes such as Iran. China, despite its own internal socioeconomic challenges, has appeared relatively better positioned when it comes to geopolitical bargaining.
Outwardly, the summit displayed a conciliatory affirmation of “constructive strategic stability” between the two superpowers. The outcome, however, reflected more “strategic probing.” Each side came to the summit to feel out whether the other would concede to its demands. For Trump, these demands centered on China’s cooperation regarding the Middle East crisis and bilateral trade. For Xi, the demand was for the U.S. to suspend arms sales to Taiwan. Neither leader attained a constructive pledge from his counterpart.
The Xi-Trump summit’s immediate outcome is that direct conflicts between the U.S. and China were temporarily averted. However, the lack of substantive consensus means the two superpowers will continue to test each other’s resolve on issues such as Taiwan or competition for technology and resources. By declining bilateral cooperation to resolve current international conflicts, the two superpowers have also retained their leverage to intervene in these disputes.
The two summits following the U.S.-China meeting have reflected the endeavors of countries navigating geopolitical uncertainties amid superpower competition. The Korea-Japan summit was a meeting of two middle powers strategically aligned with the U.S. The China-Russia summit was a meeting between China and its ally, formerly a superpower itself, but currently diminished in its capacity.
At the summit held in Korea, President Lee Jae Myung and Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi pledged cooperation on energy security. The two leaders also pledged to elevate the level of bilateral security consultations. The summit conveyed Korea and Japan’s shared interest in shaping U.S.-China strategic competition. Lee and Takaichi reaffirmed their commitment to the trilateral strategic partnership with the United States. At the same time, they also emphasized mutual respect and cooperation with China.
At the summit held in China, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Xi pledged to extend the bilateral Treaty of Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation. The two leaders also declared advocacy for a “multipolar world” as a counterweight to U.S. “unilateral hegemony.”
The strategic interactions of existing superpowers receive greater attention as they are the main actors in shaping geopolitical order. However, the outcomes of their interactions are also influenced by other countries, in particular their allies. For example, Japan’s decision to go to war with Russia in the early 1900s impacted Britain’s “Great Game” competition with Russia. Austria-Hungary’s decision to go to war with Serbia in 1914 resulted in World War I. Whether U.S.-China strategic competition escalates into what some call a “Thucydides Trap” conflict, or instead achieves a more peaceful balance and orderly transition, could be determined not only by policymakers in Washington and Beijing but also by their counterparts in Seoul, Tokyo, Moscow and beyond.
The Lee-Takaichi summit conveyed the two countries' shared interests in stabilizing geopolitical competition between the U.S. and China. The pursuit of such a strategic aspiration requires effective collaboration between Korea and Japan, as well as the two countries’ achievement of strategic credibility with the U.S. and China. To China, Korea and Japan will need to signal a credible warning that Beijing’s destabilizing actions would result in robust trilateral deterrence. To the United States, the two countries will need to offer reassurance that strategic balancing against China can be more effective through inter-alliance consultations than through unilateral actions.
If Korea and Japan are successful, they may mitigate two key factors that have spurred great powers into a large-scale conflict in the past: fear and overconfidence. They may alleviate the U.S.’ fear of China’s rise, while also restraining China’s geopolitical overreach.
The Putin-Xi summit conveyed another factor that may affect U.S.-China superpower competition. Russia has been strategically aligned with China in challenging the U.S.-led international order. Its aspirations, however, include the restoration of its former superpower status on an equal footing with China and the United States within a “multipolar world.” Russia’s efforts to achieve an equal partnership with China may help expand the two countries’ collective geopolitical capacity to challenge the West. However, its missteps, such as the prolonged war in Ukraine, may become geopolitical liabilities and risks for China.
The outcome of the Trump-Xi summit indicated that there may be, at least for now, a pause in the competition between superpowers. But is that competition leading toward an eventual great settlement or a great conflict? U.S. and Chinese allies, through their diplomatic maneuvers, may have a critical impact on how the two big powers of international politics approach the next phase of strategic interaction. As international analysts observe the trajectory of contemporary U.S.-China relations, also be attentive to the “pace-making,” “pace-changing” and even “pace-breaking” actions taken by other state actors that could shape the geopolitical landscape.
Lee Jong-eun (Jong.Lee@ngu.edu) is an assistant professor of political science at North Greenville University. Prior to this, he served as a South Korean Air Force intelligence officer.