Trump's Beijing visit: Strategic pause in US-China relationship

Kim Won-soo

Last week, U.S. President Donald Trump paid his first visit to China in nine years. It had attracted much of the world's attention. But it ended in an anticlimactic way, being loud in pageantry style but hollow in policy substance.

The outcome of the visit can be summarized as two no's: no breakthrough and no surprises. It signaled a pause in the strategic competition between the U.S. and China. This strategic pause brought about some cooling-off in bilateral tensions, but also stirring anxiety regionally among U.S. allies and partners.

First and foremost, no meaningful breakthrough in any of the major pending issues has been made. Basically, the two sides agreed to disagree except on one thing: to keep talking. The only meaningful agreed outcome was Chinese President Xi Jinping's return visit to the U.S. this September. On every substantive issue at hand, both sides disagreed even on what they agreed. The statements each side issued during and after the visit revealed wide gaps, ranging from the U.S.-Israel war with Iran, bilateral trade and investment, as well as Taiwan.

Unlike the first visit in 2017, there was no agreed outcome in writing. Instead, both sides issued their respective readouts highlighting each side’s talking points, indicating the wide divergence of positions. But it is noteworthy that each side did not refute nor react strongly to the other side’s statements.

Secondly, there were no surprises. Ironically, this is surprising considering Trump’s unorthodox style. There was no surprise event similar to his last-minute meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, which was hastily arranged hours before his visit to South Korea following the Osaka G20 summit in 2019. This time, Trump showed exceptional restraint in his words or reaction during and after the visit. He mostly stuck to the scripts. This rare caution may reflect his weaker position vis-à-vis China than before.

Trump was seen as more eager to enlist China’s help on the issues haunting him lately. The visit may have been intended to turn the political tides moving unfavorably against his administration. He was plagued by economic woes caused by a soaring energy crisis in the wake of the war with Iran and domestic political setbacks. This allowed Xi to control the geopolitical chessboard and make the outcome of the visit turn out the opposite way. Domestically, the visit did little to help turn the political tides. Externally, it helped China emerge as the G2, more equivalent to the U.S. in terms of strategic influence. The optics from the visit also helped elevate Xi’s persona. Although Trump repeatedly called Xi a great leader, the pleasantries were not reciprocated. China’s status as a great power has been elevated at the home turf. Xi emerges as the leader dealing with the U.S. president on more comparable terms.

Last but not least, the visit is likely to set the strategic pause in the China-U.S. relationship. Truce sets in bilateral trade disputes. Regional issues from Middle East, Europe and the Indo-Pacific will be handled with strategic restraint of each power toward the other. This is positive for the responsible management of hegemonic competition between them, which looks unavoidable and expected to take a while until the dust settles down for the No. 1 power position of the world.

But in East Asia, serious questions will be raised as to the credibility of U.S. security assurances to its allies. Trump has backtracked from the conventional strategic ambiguity intended for the defense of Taiwan by expressing his ambivalence about the arms sales to Taiwan approved by the U.S. Congress under the Taiwan Relations Act. This move was seen as yet another indication of his transactional approach to U.S. security commitments. His follow-up decision on the Taiwan arms sales will be watched closely by all players in the region, including in particular with great anxiety from U.S. allies and partners.

During the strategic pause, Trump's visit and the announced return visit of Xi will sustain the momentum of dialogue between the two major powers. But the visits will not suffice to resolve competing strategic interests of the two. They share the responsibility to manage their hegemonic rivalry in a peaceful manner in the years to come not only for themselves but also for the whole world. The so-called "Thucydides Trap" must be avoided. Korea can build a coalition of the willing to help the two powers explore common ground on issues of global and regional concern. Korea must be vigilant and proactive in mitigating negative fallouts of great power transition through a resilient policy mix of self-reliance, alliance and partnership.

Kim Won-soo is the former under-secretary-general of the United Nations and the high representative for disarmament. He is now the rector of the Global Academy for Future Civilizations and chair professor at Kyung Hee University in Korea.