Why Korea and Europe are ideal partners in defense industry

Chun In-bum

The war in Ukraine and the Middle East conflict has reminded the world of an old truth: Wars are not sustained by strategy alone. They are sustained by factories, supply chains, skilled workers, stockpiles, transport networks and political will.

South Korea and Europe should take this lesson seriously.

Industrial resilience has become a fashionable phrase, but the reality behind it is hard and unforgiving. Ukraine exposed ammunition shortages, long production lead times, fragile supply chains and dangerous single points of failure. These weaknesses affected not only Ukraine, but also Russia, Europe and the wider Western defense ecosystem. Modern war consumes equipment and munitions at rates that peacetime planning often fails to imagine.

South Korea understands this problem. Koreans live beside one of the world’s most militarized threats. The country has built a strong defense industry and has become a serious supplier of tanks, artillery, aircraft, ships, missiles and ammunition. But Korea’s greatest vulnerability is not a lack of technology or industrial skill. It is concentration.

Korea is efficient, but efficiency is not the same as resilience. A small number of major firms dominate key sectors. Supply chains are optimized for speed, cost and export performance. That works in normal times. In wartime, however, the same efficiency can become a weakness. If a critical supplier, port, factory or component line is disrupted, the entire system will suffer the fallout.

Europe faces the opposite problem. It has depth, geography and industrial diversity, but its defense production remains fragmented across national systems, regulatory frameworks and political priorities. Europe has capacity, but not always speed. Korea has speed, but not enough depth. That is why cooperation between Europe and South Korea makes strategic sense.

The first priority should be distributed production. Europe and Korea should move beyond simple buyer-seller relationships and build real co-production networks. Critical items such as artillery ammunition, missiles, armored vehicle components, spare parts, batteries, sensors and electronic systems should be produced across multiple locations. The objective is not duplication for its own sake. The objective is survivability. If one production node is disrupted, another must be able to continue.

The second priority is standardization. Allies often speak of interoperability on the battlefield, but industrial interoperability is just as important. If ammunition, spare parts, maintenance systems, software interfaces and certification processes are not aligned, then allied production cannot easily support allied operations. In a crisis, delay kills. Europe and Korea do not need identical systems, but they do need compatible systems where it matters most.

The third priority is sustained government-industry-military coordination. Industrial resilience cannot be built through occasional conferences or emergency procurement after a crisis begins. It requires constant communication among the military users who understand battlefield needs, the companies that produce equipment and the governments that fund and regulate production. Ukraine has shown that requirements change quickly. Drones, artillery, air defense, electronic warfare and logistics all evolve under pressure. Industrial systems must be able to adapt just as quickly.

This is where South Korea has something valuable to offer Europe. Korea’s defense industry can move fast when government, industry and military requirements are aligned. Europe, in turn, offers wider geography, mature technologies and access to broader markets. Together, they can create a more durable defense industrial base than either could build alone.

This cooperation should not be viewed only as a commercial opportunity. It is a strategic necessity. Deterrence depends not only on what a country possesses on day one of a conflict, but on what it can sustain on day 100, day 500 and beyond. An adversary watching Europe and Korea should see not isolated national industries, but a connected network capable of absorbing shock and continuing production.

The deeper lesson is uncomfortable but clear. For decades, advanced economies treated redundancy as waste. They reduced inventories, concentrated suppliers and built just-in-time systems. That made sense for commercial efficiency. It does not make sense for national survival.

Resilience requires accepting some inefficiency. It means stockpiles, backup suppliers, alternative transport routes, surge capacity and political agreements made before the crisis. It means treating defense industry not as an accounting problem, but as a pillar of national power.

Europe and South Korea are natural partners in this effort. Both face serious security challenges. Both are technologically advanced. Both depend on rules-based trade, secure sea lanes, and credible deterrence. And both now understand that industrial weakness can become strategic weakness.

The war in Ukraine has already delivered the warning. The question is whether Europe and South Korea will act before the next crisis proves the lesson again.

Retired Lt. Gen. Chun In-bum is the former commander of the Republic of Korea Army Special Warfare Command.