China should study US invasion of Iran carefully

Choo Jae-woo

Less than two months into this year, the U.S. has invaded Venezuela and launched military strikes on Iran. The former's leader is in U.S. custody, while Iran's supreme leader was killed on the first day of the strikes.

Many pundits say these events hurt China diplomatically. China has worked hard in these countries since the Belt and Road Initiative began in 2013. They are some of the few foreign strategic outposts China has nurtured to enhance its influence and presence in their respective regions. The impact on China is not just lost stature and influence in these regions; it involves whether U.S. President Donald Trump’s March 31 visit to China will yield actual benefits because of the messages embedded in these attacks.

On March 5, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi called 2026 a “big year” for U.S.-China relations at a National People’s Congress press conference. Wang expects relations to improve with a series of high-level meetings this year. However, those expectations may have been dashed by the U.S. military actions. As China desires to safeguard its strategic interests in countries such as Venezuela and Iran, it cannot ignore U.S. concerns, creating a dilemma: having better relations with the U.S. at the expense of these nations.

These military actions show us that the world misinterprets Trump's foreign policy. His “America First” and “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) policies made him seem isolationist diplomatically, not caring about the preservation of the international liberal order. This misunderstanding, however, ignores Trump’s consistent foreign policy based on his beliefs — an intolerance for authoritarianism, hostile foreign forces and threats to U.S. national and strategic interests. Yet, his words "peace through strength," advocated in the 2017 National Security Strategy, lacked actions, while committing to sanctions and other "peaceful means."

In retrospect, China’s circumvention of sanctions and the granting of Iran's membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS in 2023 and 2024, respectively, undercut the political and diplomatic effects of Trump’s economic isolation plan. His decision to go to war resulted in an unanticipated regime transition that reminded Beijing "the leader of the world" remains.

The second message is a rejection of unpleasant forces in U.S. jurisdiction. Washington believes China’s direct and indirect backing for Iran has strengthened its position in the so-called "Axis of Resistance," a combination of Iraqi Shiite militias, Hamas, Hezbollah and Houthi militants that threatens U.S. and Israeli standing in the Middle East. Iran is believed to back these proxies, but sanctions have constrained its oil revenue, meaning China’s purchases and investment may help replenish its finances.

Beijing and Tehran signed a $400 million investment contract in 2020 after ratifying a 25-year strategic agreement, having already spent $140 billion for Iranian oil. Iran was reportedly close to buying hypersonic weapons from China a week before the U.S. attack, and axis members have received intelligence from Chinese satellites.

Trump has long been anxious about China’s growing influence in Latin America, notably Venezuela. The 2025 National Security Strategy asserted this point by noting its commitment not to allow “competitors” to deploy military forces or manage vital assets abroad. China has discreetly expanded its presence throughout Latin America, taking advantage of U.S. vulnerabilities and making $60 billion worth of loans from 2016 to 2023. In 2023, China leveled up the ties to an unparalleled "all-around strategic partnership." To Washington, these developments are unwelcome.

The third message signals U.S. resolve to eliminate unfair trade. Trump has long advocated ending trade with sanctioned countries or unfair beneficiaries, which he sees as incompatible with his worldview. The America First Trade Policy, unveiled the day after his 2025 inauguration, reinforces this stance. The document identifies China as a representative bad actor.

In practice, however, bilateral issues are relatively modest. An October report by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission broadened the focus to the global stage. It emphasized China’s illicit and unfair transactions to avoid sanctions. The paper warns that China is now an "outspoken enabler" of global sanction evasion and "leads other authoritarian nations to establish networks that undermine the effectiveness of U.S. export controls." It argues that China’s trading practices undermine the America First Trade Policy’s fair, free and market-based principles.

China evades sanctions and consumes over 50 percent of Venezuela’s oil and 80 percent of Iran’s. China’s "shadow fleet," which conceals smuggled commodities, is an illustration. These ships transport oil from Malaysia and Indonesia to China in excess of limits. As Venezuelan oil is projected to be "redirected" via the U.S., the efficacy of the new measure remains to be seen. Conflict prevents a resolution for Iranian oil.

China must make a strategic move before Trump’s March 31 visit. It must decide whether to improve U.S. ties or protect strategic interests in the Middle East and Latin America. China probably prefers the former. Improving U.S. ties is essential for attaining the "Chinese Dream," "rejuvenation of the Chinese nation" and a "community of shared future for mankind." It might also affect President Xi Jinping’s reelection next year, which will be predicated on China’s economic performance. This is relevant as the National People's Congress forecast China's economic growth rate for this year at 4.5 to 5 percent, the lowest since 1991.

To this end, China must get something major out of the high-level meetings. Based on five rounds of negotiations last year, China will continue to push the same agenda that has failed to materialize. It includes the easing of U.S. restrictions on technology transfers, U.S. investment in China, Chinese investment in the U.S. and semiconductor market expansion involving China. This year, however, looks bleak. Washington’s moves largely explain China’s difficulties, as they signal a resolve to curb unfair trade practices, combat drug flows and limit China’s rise in what the U.S. sees as its own backyard.

At these crossroads, China may prioritize U.S. relations. China is calling this a "big year" for U.S.-China relations, which matches this resolve. Therefore, it is expected to try to maximize the outcome of Trump’s visit, though this seems difficult. China must also make prudent concessions around its involvement in the changing Middle East and Latin America dynamics for now.

Choo Jae-woo is a professor at Kyung Hee University. The views expressed here are his own.